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Correspondence

ARABIA

PART 1

January to December 1947

(Continued from "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part 67)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING ARABIA

PART 1—JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1947

(Continued from "Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs," Part 67)

CHAPTER I—BAHREIN

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No. 1

MEMORANDUM ON BAHREIN

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- Paper H.—Two circular letters from the Director of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union, dated 26th January, 1933, and 20th April, 1933, communicating a protest from the Persian postal authorities and the reply of the Indian postal authorities respectively.

APPENDIX II.—Submission to Law Officers of the Crown and their Report. Full texts.

Paras: 1-154 are substantially a transcript of the Historical Memorandum on Bahrein (PZ. 4718/1934) prepared in the India Office. Marginal references up to page 38 are to India Office documents, except where otherwise stated. Subsequent references are to Foreign Office papers. The Press News Summaries referred to in paragraph 169, are in the Research Department, Foreign Office.

MEMORANDUM ON BAHREIN

[The Memorandum which follows deals with the history of Bahrein from the point of view primarily of the political status of the islands at various periods and in particular with the claims to sovereignty over them put forward by Persia at various dates since 1783, and with the correspondence and discussions which have taken place in connection with such claims.

The principal authorities quoted, apart from original despatches and letters, are the following:—

- (1) Lorimer: "Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf."
- (2) Selections from "Records of the Government of Bombay," Vol. XXIV (1856).
- (3) Aitchison: "Treaties" (1933 Edition), Vols. XI (Persian Gulf) and XIII (Persia).
- (4) "Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf" (1801 to 1853), by J. A. Saldanha (1906).
- (5) Sir A. T. Wilson: "The Persian Gulf" (1928).
- (6) Curzon: "Persia."
- (7) Hertslet: "Memorandum on the separate Claims of Turkey and Persia to sovereignty over Bahrein" (1874).
- (8) P.G. 13: "Historical Summary of Events in Territories of the Ottoman Empire, Persia and Arabia affecting the British Position in the Persian Gulf, 1907-28."]

I.—Geographical Situation

1. The Principality of Bahrein consists of the archipelago formed by the islands of Bahrein, Muharraq, Umm Na'asan, Sitra, and Nabi Salih, and by a number of lesser islets and rocks. Taken altogether these form a compact group almost in the middle of the V-shaped gulf on the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf which divides the independent Arab Trucial Sheikdom of Qatar from the coast of Qatif in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

2. The term "Bahrein" formerly embraced the promontory of Qatar and the oases of Qatif and Hasa on the Arabian mainland, as well as the islands of the archipelago, and, according to Lorimer, "some authorities would attribute to it in the past an even more extended application, affirming that it once denoted the whole western side of the Persian Gulf from Ruus-al-Jibal to the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab."

Lor. II, 234.

Lor. II, 233.

II.—Bahrein prior to 1783

3. The very conflicting evidence available goes to show that Bahrein was subject to Persian rule for a period in the early part of the Christian era, and between A.D. 615 and 723. It is stated to have been conquered by one Keshin bin Abdul Malik, and to have come under the sway of the Umayyid Caliphs, in the latter year, and to have remained under the control of the Caliphs until the close of the Abbasid dynasty in the 11th century, when it again became subject to chiefs of its own race. Its mediæval history is obscure, but a writer who visited the islands in A.D. 1051 refers to the fact that half of the pearls taken in Bahrein belong to the Chiefs of Hasa on the Arab mainland. Idrisi, the Arab geographer, writing about a century later, states that the island "is governed by an independent chief. The inhabitants of the two shores are satisfied with his justice and piety, and when he dies he is replaced by a person of equal virtue and piety." It was conquered about 1320 by the (Arab) rulers of Hormuz, a kingdom finally subdued by the Portuguese in 1506, but which appears to have been tributary to Persia in at any rate its later days. Bahrein appears at the same date to have fallen under Portuguese control. The Persians have adopted in a recent Note on the subject a statement that it remained under Portuguese control from 1507 to 1622. It would appear, however, that there are at any rate some breaks in the continuity of Portuguese control. An agreement of 1515 between the Portuguese and the Persians, under which the King of Hormuz was to be "ruler of Hormuz in the name of King Dom Manuel, his Lord," provided *inter alia* that Portuguese shipping should be available to enable the Persians to invade Bahrein and Qatif. In 1522 a revolt stimulated by the King of Hormuz broke out against the Portuguese at Bahrein among other places, but was quelled, and in 1528 endeavours by the Portuguese to quell a subsequent rebellion in Bahrein against the King were beaten off. In 1559 it was temporarily occupied by the Turks, who were, however, driven out by the Portuguese in the same year. In 1602 the Portuguese were forcibly expelled from the islands by the Persians. The Persian occupation was of uncertain duration, and in their Note of 2nd August, 1928, they refer to 1622 as the date on which Persia regained possession of Bahrein. They appear in any event to have had a military depot in Bahrein in 1622. Curzon states that "the Portuguese . . . in 1625 concluded a treaty with Shah Abbas, by which they restored to him all his coast possessions, retaining only the pearl banks at Bahrein. . . ."

4. In the early years of the 18th century the authority of the Persian Government in the Gulf area was at an extremely low ebb, and it seems most unlikely that they were able to maintain a garrison in Bahrein. In 1717 the islands were occupied by the Arabs of Muscat, who appear to have met with no opposition. In 1718 however, the Persians, by means of shipping lent by the Portuguese, were able to transport a force to Bahrein and temporarily to reoccupy the islands. During the confused period following upon the Afghan invasion of Persia in 1722, the Huwala Arabs established themselves on the islands: they maintained their control until 1736 when Nadir Shah (who had built up a naval force in the Gulf) sent an expedition to Bahrein and drove out the Huwalas. After Nadir's assassination in 1747 another period of chaos occurred, during which the Huwalas or other Arabs, gained control over the islands. However, in 1753 the Ruler under the Persian Government of the town of Bushire made a descent upon Bahrein, the chief resident tribe in which (the Huwala Arabs—at the present day still strongly represented in the islands) was seriously divided by internal feuds, and established his authority there. In this manner the islands again became, at least in name, dependent on Persia. In 1782 the Arabs of Zubarah, on the Arabian mainland, efforts to reduce which had been made by the Governor of Bahrein under the Persians in the years immediately preceding that date, retaliated by a descent on the island of Bahrein. They defeated the Persian Governor, drove him to his fort, plundered and destroyed the town of Manama, and took possession of a Bushire vessel, with which they retired to Zubarah. A counter-attack was repulsed, and in the following year the Utabi Arabs of Zubarah, assisted by contingents from various tribes of Qatar, occupied the Bahrein islands, the Persian garrison of the Manama Fort capitulating on 28th July, 1783, after a siege of about two months' duration, and being allowed to return to Bushire.

Summary

5. It will be seen that while the history of Bahrein prior to 1783 is very obscure, it would appear that Persia for not inconsiderable periods exercised control over the islands. The nature of that control is not, however, very clear;

Bombay Selections, XXIV 23, G. of I. Desp. No. 18 of 22.2.1870, para. 2.

Wilson, Persian Gulf, pp. 85-6.

Wilson, 88-90.

Wilson, 105.

Wilson, 116.

Wilson, 121.

Wilson, 124.

Lor. I, 841.

Wilson, 140.

Lor. I, 836.

Curzon, Persia II, 419.

Memorandum in French, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Perse, Vol. I, fol. 43 (b). L. Lockhart's "Nadir Shah," p. 108.

Lor. I, 837.

Lor. I, 839-40.

it seems probable that it was only very rarely of a definite character; and even in more recent periods Persian relations with the islands were for a substantial number of years interrupted by Portuguese occupation of or overlordship over them. It is, however, clear that Persia or a Persian vassal was in effective control of the islands during the 30 years prior to the expulsion of the Persians by the Arabs of the mainland in 1783.

III.—1783–1820. From the Expulsion of the Persians to the conclusion of the Treaty of 1820 with His Majesty's Government

Bahrein pays Tribute to Persia, 1799

6. Projects by the Persian Government for the re-establishment of its authority in Bahrein between 1783 and 1800 did not materialise. In 1799 the Imam of Muscat declared war on the Uttabis of Bahrein, who, alarmed by his proceedings, opened a correspondence with the Persian Governor of Bushire, in the course of which they stated that the island originally belonged to the Turkish Government but that it was many—about 70—years since the Turks had been in possession of it.⁽¹⁾ He, on their offering to become tributary to Persia, proceeded privately to Bahrein and received from them an instalment of revenue on account of the preceding year.

Lor. I, 841.

Muscat occupies and loses Bahrein, 1800–01

7. In 1800 Bahrein was occupied by the Imam of Muscat, the occupation lasting until 1801, when the Muscat forces were invested by the Uttabis and compelled to surrender and evacuate Bahrein. In 1802 the Imam of Muscat, having obtained some assistance from Bushire, again landed in Bahrein and attacked the Uttabis. The latter had, however, by now secured the support of the Wahabi rulers of Central Arabia and the Muscat project was abandoned.

Bahrein under Wahabi influence, 1803–11

8. From 1803 to 1809 the Uttabis of Bahrein appear to have been under the influence of the Wahabis (the Bombay Government declined to take action on an enquiry made by them in 1805 as to whether, if they withdrew from the Arabian mainland and withheld their assistance from the Wahabis, the British Government would give them a ship or two to enable them to remain undisturbed at Bahrein) and they were under strict control by the Wahabi Government during 1810–11.

G. of I.
Desp. No. 18
of 22.2.70,
para. 5.
Lor. I, 842–3.

Dispute with Muscat, 1816

Persian Envoy to Bahrein, 1816–17

9. In 1811 the islands were freed from Wahabi rule by the Imam of Muscat, when the Uttabis were restored to power, though according to a claim subsequently made by the Imam, in subordination to Muscat. In 1816 the Uttabis sought the protection of the Wahabi rulers of Central Arabia, and the Imam of Muscat undertook an armed expedition against Bahrein, explaining to the British authorities that he was compelled so to act by the repudiation by the Uttabis of his suzerainty, which they had admitted in 1811, by their alliance with the Wahabis and by their piratical practices. The Muscat expedition, to which three Bushire vessels were added by the Persian Government, effected a landing in the summer of 1816, but was signally repulsed and withdrew. Unsuccessful negotiations took place later in the same year between Muscat and the Persian Government with a view to a fresh attempt on Bahrein. Subsequently, but apparently in the same year, a Persian emissary, one Sikander Khan, arrived in Bahrein, who accepted presents from the Sheikhs of Bahrein for the Prince of Shiraz and conferred on them in return Persian Robes of Honour.

Bo. Sel.,
XXIV, 372.

Teh. Desp.
No. 6 of
16.4.1817.

10. In April 1817 His Majesty's Minister in Persia reported the arrival at Tehran of an agent from the Imam of Muscat, the object of whose mission was credibly stated to be to inform the Shah that His Majesty's Government contemplated the capture of Bahrein, and to ask for armed assistance for the Imam in order that he might thwart their design by taking possession of the

⁽¹⁾ This was, of course, incorrect. Turkey does not appear to have held the island since 1559 and then only for a few months.

island in the name of the Persian Government. His Majesty's representative stated that an agent of the Sheikh of Bahrein was also at Tehran, bearing a letter which stated that as the inhabitants of the island were of the same sect as the natives of Persia, they had always looked up to the Persian monarch as their protector and head, and that they therefore hoped for the assistance of His Majesty to cloak them from the oppressions of the Wahabis. Approval for the grant of the military assistance desired was stated to have been given by the Shah to the Imam, but no action appears to have followed.

Teh. Desp.
No. 10 of
6.5.1817.

11. In 1818, on the appearance of the Egyptians in Hasa, the Sheikh of Bahrein appears to have offered to assist them with sea transport. In February 1819 the Sheikh entered into an agreement with the British Government, with the terms of which he subsequently failed to comply, for preventing the sale of captured British property in his dominions, and in the same year he expressed great indignation at the violation by the British authorities, under a misapprehension as to the nationality of certain vessels, of the neutrality of his port.

Lor. I, 846.

12. On 19th April, 1819, His Majesty's Representative at Tehran reported to the Government of India that the Imam of Muscat had complained bitterly against the non-fulfilment of the engagements contracted with him by the Persian Government for the capture of Bahrein. The Minister added that letters received by him showed that the troops of Ibrahim Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt, had occupied Bahrein (this appears to have been incorrect) and that the Imam had suggested to the Shah that he should send a messenger to the Pasha asking him to evacuate the island. The Imam is stated to have urged upon the Shah the necessity of endeavouring to recover a possession which according to him "had for ages acknowledged the sovereignty of Persia." He was, however, unsuccessful, and in June 1819 His Majesty's Minister reported that the Shah had "for the present" dropped all intention of taking any steps in pursuit of his pretensions to the sovereignty of the island. It may be added here that the Government of Bombay in a despatch of 21st July, 1819, to the Government of India, in which they discussed the desirability of assisting the Imam of Muscat, in return for assistance in connection with the expedition proposed against the Gulf pirates, to establish his claims to Bahrein, referred to an "arrangement some time since concerted" between the Shah and the Imam, whereby the former "had agreed to relinquish all claims to the island of Bahrein in favour of the Imam, under the condition of receiving a portion of its revenues."

Teh. Desp.
No. 16 of
25.5.1819.

BAHREIN SUBMITS TO MUSCAT, 1820

13. The Persians, at the beginning of 1820, moved apparently by a desire to anticipate any attempt by Muscat to establish control over Bahrein with the support of His Majesty's Government, unsuccessfully requested the Imam to convey their troops to Bahrein. They addressed a similar application, equally unsuccessful, to the Commander of the British Expedition in the Persian Gulf. In the early part of 1820 the rulers of Bahrein made full submission to the Imam of Muscat and agreed to pay him a tribute of 30,000 dollars. An instalment (12,000 dollars) of this tribute appears subsequently to have been actually remitted.

Lor. I, 847.

POLICY OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT, 1819–20

14. The policy to be adopted by the British Government in regard to Bahrein was examined between the Government of Bombay and the Government of India in 1819–20, and was ultimately defined as one of complete neutrality. The transfer of Bahrein to the Imam of Muscat had been contemplated, but this project, so far as the British Government were concerned, was now abandoned. The Government of Bombay suggested that the Sheikh should be informed that so long as he restrained his subjects from piracy he would reap the advantage of a friendly neutrality on the part of Britain, whereas should a piratical spirit manifest itself forcible measures of coercion would be applied to him. They added that the conclusion of an engagement in general terms with the Sheikh "would probably tend to convince the Uttabi Arabs of the integrity of our intentions."

Govt. of
Bombay to
G. of I.,
15.12.1819,
paras. 2, 3.

British Offer to Persia of Mediation with Bahrein, 1820

15. Simultaneously the Government of Bombay, in a despatch to the Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, remarked that "we mean to avoid all interference in respect of the island of Bahrein . . . There is, however, reason to believe that

Dated
15.12.1819,
para. 11.

provided the Persian Government will consent to the Uttabis continuing in the undisturbed occupation of Bahrein the Sheikh would readily agree to pay them tribute, and for this purpose the mediation of the British Government would be gladly afforded provided it could be employed in such a manner as to avoid anything which might in any shape involve us in the transactions of the parties after the conclusion of the negotiation immediately referred to"

TREATY OF 1820 BETWEEN BAHREIN AND HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

16. On 17th January, 1820, the Sheikh agreed to surrender certain pirate craft which had taken refuge in his territories, and undertook to the British Government not to admit any more boats of the same character until authorised to do so by the British authorities. On 5th February, 1820, a preliminary Treaty of Peace was signed between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government, and on 23rd February, 1820, the Sheikh was admitted to the benefits of the General Treaty of Peace which had been made between His Majesty's Government and the Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf and under which His Majesty's Government undertook, in return for abstention by those rulers from piracy and the slave trade, that "if any shall attack them the British Government shall take notice of it" (Article 10). The Sheikh of Bahrein went so far as to claim subsequently that the treaty in question established relations of protection and dependence between the British Government and himself, but it was made clear to him by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf while on a visit to Bahrein in 1823 that this was not the case.

Proposal for British Mediation with Bahrein not taken up by Persia

17. On 10th May, 1820, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reported to the Government of Bombay that he had been received in audience by the Shah on 5th May and had put to him the proposal referred to in paragraph 15 for British mediation with a view to securing tribute to Persia from Bahrein. The Shah had replied that "he wished that advices should be received from Shiraz before the mediation of the British Government to render Bahrein a tributary to Persia can be accepted." Sir H. Willock remarked that "the great repugnance of the Shah to the formation of any British settlement in the neighbourhood of Persia was strongly manifested by His Majesty's not immediately accepting the British mediation to obtain a tribute from the island of Bahrein, an object which he so urgently desired and which His Majesty was aware must at a future period be difficult of attainment from the already advanced stage of negotiations between the Sheikh of Bahrein and the Imam of Muscat."

and withdrawn (1820)

18. On the 3rd October, 1820, the Government of Bombay instructed Sir H. Willock to take the earliest opportunity of informing the Persian Government "that as our views are exclusively limited to the extirpation of piracy, it would be contrary to our policy, in the present state of the Gulf, to afford the mediation we formerly offered between His Majesty [the Shah] and the Uttabis of Bahrein."

Summary, 1783-1820

19. In 1799 the Sheikhdom, independent since 1783, professed allegiance to Persia and paid a year's tribute, but it was immediately afterwards conquered by the Imam of Muscat, and thereafter fell under the influence and ultimately the control of the Wahabi Amir. Liberated by Muscat in 1811, it appealed to the Wahabis in 1816 against the Imam and defeated him.

In 1816 or 1817 a Persian envoy was received at Bahrein and presents exchanged. While no details are available as to what precisely took place on this occasion, the incident had no effective sequel. Persian authority was not asserted in the island between the date of the visit and 1820, and in the latter year the island became temporarily subject and tributary to Muscat.

In 1820 Bahrein entered into its first formal treaty with the British Government, and that Government, on condition that the Sheikh abstained from piracy, undertook to "take notice" "if any shall attack them."

Aitchison,
Vol. XI,
No. viii, 233.
Aitchison,
Vol. XI,
No. xix, 245-9.

Lt. McLeod
to Govt. of
Bombay,
No. 8, dated
17.2.1823,
paras. 30,
64-5.
Précis, 297.

Teh. Desp.,
10.5.1820.

No. 1485 to
Tehran.

IV.—1820-30

UNAUTHORISED AGREEMENT BETWEEN CAPTAIN BRUCE AND THE PRINCE GOVERNOR OF SHIRAZ, 1822

20. In 1822 Captain Bruce, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, acting on his own initiative and without any authority from or prior reference to Government, having proceeded of his own accord to Shiraz there signed an agreement with the Minister of the Prince Governor of Shiraz, on the part of Persia. This agreement alleged, *inter alia*, in regard to Bahrein, that the islands had always been subordinate to the Governor of Fars, against whose authority the Uttabi Sheikhs had lately become rebellious; that the flag assigned to the Uttabis of Bahrein under the General Treaty of Peace with Britain in 1820 should accordingly, if already granted, be withdrawn, that no assistance should in future be rendered by Britain to the Uttabis of Bahrein, and that on the contrary the British Government should, if requested, assist the Persians against Bahrein with "one or two" vessels of war. In other words, the title of Persia to the possession of Bahrein was explicitly admitted. The arguments which carried weight with Captain Bruce in concluding this unauthorised agreement appear to have been that the reversion of Bahrein to Persian authority would tend "more to the tranquillity of the Arabian side of the Gulf than almost any other act."

21. The Resident's action was immediately disavowed and disapproved by the Government of Bombay, in letters from the Governor to the Prince Regent of Fars (which stated that "it is not the intention of this Government to take any part in the claims of the several Powers and States of the Persian Gulf further than may be necessary to prevent a renewal of piracy. . . . There can be nothing in the flag [granted to the Uttabis] to give offence to Persia, as there is not the smallest connection between it and the British flag, nor the smallest pretension to superiority on the part of the British Government"), the Imam of Muscat, and the Sheikh of Bahrein, and as a mark of disapprobation he was removed from his appointment. With regard to the clause of the agreement affecting Bahrein the Government of Bombay remarked: "It acknowledges the King of Persia's title to Bahrein, of which there is not the least proof, and which the British Government cannot assert without injuring the pretensions of the Imam [of Muscat] and the Uttabis. . . ." On the Persian side, the Shah not only refused to approve the arrangements which had been made, but expressed his displeasure that the Prince of Shiraz should have entered into any engagement with the British Government without his knowledge and injunctions. The agreement was thus repudiated by both sides.

1822-29. BAHREIN—MUSCAT DISPUTES

22. By 1822, if not earlier, the Sheikh of Bahrein had ceased to observe the engagement undertaken by them in 1820 to pay an annual tribute to Muscat. In August 1822, an attack by Muscat on Bahrein seeming in consequence imminent, the Governor of Bombay, in letters to the Sheikh and to the Imam of Muscat, suggested that if this tribute was of ancient origin it should be regularly paid, but that otherwise it should be dropped. In January 1823 the Political Resident (Lieut. McLeod) visited Bahrein to reassure the Sheikh in regard to the unratified treaty concluded by Captain Bruce with the Prince Governor of Shiraz, and to inform them that that treaty was of no effect and that no change of policy was contemplated by Government. In the spring of 1823, on rumours of a contemplated joint attack on Bahrein by Persia, Muscat and the Arabs of the mainland, the Minister at Tehran was asked at a suitable juncture to dissuade the Persians from disturbing the tranquillity of the Gulf.

23. In February 1824 the Resident composed for a period of two years the acute internal disputes between members of the ruling house which were for many years a feature of the history of Bahrein. In 1825 the Governor of Bombay personally remonstrated with the Imam of Muscat on an endeavour by the latter to interfere in the question of the Bahrein succession consequent on the death in that year of Sheikh Salman, who had ruled the Sheikhdom since 1796 (in association in his later years with his brother Abdullah).

Reassertion of Persian Claim, 1825

24. In 1825 an intimation was made by the Political Resident to the Prince Governor of Fars, who had been meditating an expedition to subdue Bahrein, and whose Minister had requested the Resident to give directions to the Sheikh

Capt. Bruce
to Govt. of
Bombay,
3.9.1822.

Govt. of
Bombay to
Capt. Bruce,
No. 1491 of
1.11.1822,
para. 6.

Teh. Desp.
No. 1,
25.1.1823.

Lor. I, 851.

Govt. to
Imam,
19.8.1822.
Govt. to
Sheikh,
19.8.1822.
Précis, 307.

Lor. I, 850.

Resdt. to
Govt. of
Bombay,
No. 8,
27.2.1823.

Lor. I, 852.
Govt. of
Bombay to
Teh., No. 394,
26.3.1823.

Lor. I, 851.

Lor. I, iii, X,
Table 9.

to strike the flag which the British Government had authorised the Uttabis of Bahrein to fly. "He was informed that no control was assumed over the people of Bahrein and that the letter disapproving of Captain Bruce's treaty had manifested the line of conduct Government would pursue in regard to Bahrein." The expedition was abandoned on a pretext, "but the Sheikh averted the danger which threatened him by presents of considerable amount."

25. In October 1828 a last attack by the Imam of Muscat was severely defeated and driven off, "after several undignified attempts to conclude a peace with the" Sheikhs of Bahrein, and on 2nd December, 1829, peace was finally made between the Sheikhs and the Imam. The main provisions of this agreement were that tribute should not in future be paid by Bahrein to Muscat, and that neither ruler should henceforth interfere in the affairs of the other. By a supplementary verbal agreement the parties bound themselves to aid one another in the event of an attack by a third party.

Summary, 1820-30

26. During the first two years of this period the islands acknowledged the supremacy of and, for a time, paid tribute to Muscat. From 1822 to 1829 they were intermittently at feud with Muscat. In 1829 a treaty was concluded by which Muscat withdrew its claims to supremacy and to tribute. The Persian claim was alluded to in 1822 and 1825 but not pressed.

V.—1830-40

Bahrein and the Wahabis, 1830-35

27. In the course of 1830-31 the Sheikhs, His Majesty's Government having refused to intervene in their favour, and fearing a combination between the Amir and Muscat, formally submitted to the Wahabi Amir of the Arab mainland. They agreed to acknowledge the Amir's supremacy and to pay a tribute to him. He on his part undertook to protect Bahrein against external aggression. In 1833, however, the Sheikh felt strong enough to repudiate Wahabi supremacy, and he conducted a not unsuccessful offensive against the Wahabis between 1833 and 1835.

Bahrein and the British Government

28. Sheikh Khalifah-bin-Salman, who had been joint ruler with his uncle Sheikh Abdullah since the death of Sheikh Salman in 1825, died in 1834, and was succeeded as joint ruler by his son Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifah. Effective control continued to rest with Sheikh Abdullah. Internal dissension in the ruling family became more marked between 1834 and 1839, and the misgovernment of the island continued to grow with unfortunate effects on its prosperity. His Majesty's Government, although in 1834 they had to take forcible measures against the Sheikh to secure reparation for an insult to their Residency Agent in Bahrein, were, however, content to abstain from any interference in the internal affairs of Bahrein so long as the Sheikhs discharged the obligations undertaken by their Treaty of 1820.

RESTRICTIVE LINE APPLIED TO BAHREIN, 1836

29. In 1835 the British Government renewed the maritime truce which they had imposed in 1820 on the Arab rulers of the Gulf in the interest of the suppression of piracy. The Sheikh of Bahrein was not, however, included in the renewed truce, partly apparently because he had behaved so well that this was thought unnecessary, partly because he could be easily punished in the event of this proving desirable, and partly lest in the event of his inclusion he might claim British intervention if attacked by Muscat. In March 1836 the Sheikh agreed, however, to the application to Bahrein of the "Restrictive Line," this being a line laid down in that year by His Majesty's Government between which and the Persian coast no naval hostilities were in future to be permitted.

Reassertion of Persian claim. Bahrein tributary to the Wahabis, 1836

30. In the middle of 1836 the Sheikh, alarmed by a communication from the Governor of Shiraz calling on him as a Persian subject to tender his submission to the Shah, and by the possibility of the co-operation of the Imam of Muscat in a Persian attack on Bahrein, took steps for a reconciliation with the Wahabi Amir. As a result, he agreed to pay a nominal tribute of \$2,000 to the Amir, the Amir on his side agreeing to supply troops for the defence of

Bombay
Political
letter dated
27.1825.
Abstract.

Lor. I, 854.

Lor. I, 855-6.

Lor. I, 856-7

Lor. I, iii,
Table 9.

Lor. I, 860.
Précis, 350.

Bombay
Selections,
XXIV, 385.
Lor. I, 858.

Bahrein against external attacks and to refrain from calling on the Sheikh for marine transport in the event of a Wahabi attack on Muscat by sea.

31. In 1837 the Sheikh, with the prior approval of Her Majesty's Government, was allowed to punish certain pirates. In 1839 the Resident was invoked to settle internal disputes in the ruling family, but the parties would not agree to any settlement without a guarantee by Her Majesty's Government, which Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to give.

EGYPTIAN INVASION OF HASA : SHEIKH PROFESSES TO BE A PERSIAN SUBJECT, 1839

32. In 1838-39 the Egyptians conquered Hasa and captured the Wahabi Amir. They thereupon demanded the payment of tribute and certain territorial concessions from the Sheikh of Bahrein. The Egyptian Commander about the same time intimated to the British authorities his intention to attack and reduce the island. The Sheikh appealed for assistance to the Government of India, but in the absence of instructions from Her Majesty's Government the Government of India were at first not prepared to give him any pledge and the Sheikh was instructed to decide for himself as to waiting on the Egyptian representative. Much alarmed by the proceedings of the Egyptians, "and perhaps even more so by a rumour, apparently well founded, that the Saiyed of Oman was intriguing with the Egyptians to obtain and hold Bahrein as a fief under the Viceroy of Egypt," the Sheikh thereon professed, in reply to demands made on him in the name of the Egyptians, to be a subject of the Persian Government. Apparently as the result of overtures by the Sheikh designed to substantiate this, the Prince Governor of Shiraz thereupon sent an envoy—one Haji Qasim, formerly supercargo of a trading vessel—to reside in Bahrein as Persian agent, "and to be the medium of receiving and transmitting the annual tribute which the Persian authorities vainly flattered themselves the Bahrein Chief was disposed to pay for their countenance and protection," and to bear a Robe of Honour and a letter to the Sheikh. The envoy was accompanied by a guard of ten Persian infantry. No details appear to be available about his mission, which was apparently a failure.

33. On 1st April, 1839, Admiral Sir F. Maitland, then commanding the Gulf Squadron, was instructed by the Government of Bombay to give the Sheikh all support against the Egyptians, short of actually entering on hostilities. If the Sheikh asked for a new engagement with Her Majesty's Government he should offer to transmit his proposals to India. The Resident was simultaneously to send a formal protest to the Egyptians. On the 18th April the Government of India empowered the Admiral, if the Sheikh claimed British intervention and offered to place his territories under British protection, "to assure him of the temporary protection of Her Majesty's squadron in the Gulf," to inform the Egyptians that this pledge had been given and to urge them to abstain from further military proceedings until the views of both Governments were known, failing which Bahrein would be defended against intervention by them until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government had been communicated to the local authorities. In the same month the Sheikh promised the Assistant Political Resident to take no steps to place himself under the authority or protection of a foreign Power without first consulting the Political Resident.

SHEIKH SUBMITS TO EGYPTIANS (JULY 1839)

34. In July 1839 the Sheikh "suddenly and unexpectedly" acknowledged the supremacy of the Egyptians and agreed to pay them a tribute of 2,000 dollars a year, on the understanding that his local authority would be observed and that no representative of the Egyptians would be sent to reside in Bahrein. The Resident protested in writing to both the Sheikh and the Egyptians, and expostulated with the Sheikh on the way in which he was sacrificing his independence. The Sheikh explained that his action was the result of the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to give him advice or a specific assurance of support. For a trifling financial payment he had now secured immunity from interference. He offered, however, in return for a written and distinct pledge of protection, to repudiate his agreement with the Pasha and to avow himself a dependent of Her Majesty's Government; but on being pressed he refused to confirm this in writing and said that in any event it would be necessary for him to justify his change of attitude to the Egyptians on the ground that it was the result of compulsion by Her Majesty's Government.

36095

Lor. I, 860.

Bombay
Selections,
XXIV, 387-8.

Lor. I, 862.

Bombay
Selections,
XXIV, 388.

Précis, 375,
Govt. of
Bombay to
Res., No. 661,
dated 4.1839.

Lor. I, 864.

Lor. I, 865.
Bombay
Selections,
XXIV, 389.

Pol. Res. to
Govt. of
Bombay,
4.7.1839.

1839-40. VIEWS OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ON FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS
BAHREIN

35. As a consequence of the activities of the Egyptians discussion appears about this time to have taken place as to the desirability of declaring a regular protectorate over Bahrein. On 1st July, 1839, the Secret Committee of the East India Company informed the Government of India that if necessary they would "not disapprove of your entering into an engagement with the Chief of Bahrein to protect him against encroachments from Mehemet Ali, but we concur in the doubt expressed by Captain Hennell [then Political Resident] as to whether it would be expedient for that island to be taken under the protection of the British Government." On 24th February, 1840, the Foreign Office wrote to the India Board (with reference to an enquiry from the Bombay Government) that it was important that the Egyptian troops should not be allowed to take possession of Bahrein and that if the Company's troops could occupy it, even provisionally, such a measure could not fail to be attended with advantage. On the retirement of the Egyptians from Hasa in 1840 their relations with the Sheikh came to an end.

Summary, 1830-40

36. From 1831-33 Bahrein was subject and tributary to the Wahabi Amirs. She revolted from them in the latter year, but in 1836 again entered into an understanding, which appears to have lasted until 1838, under which Bahrein paid a tribute and received guarantees of assistance against external attack. In 1838 the Wahabi Amir was himself conquered by the Egyptians.

The Persians reasserted their claim in 1836, the Bahreini answer being a renewal of their understanding with the Wahabi Amirs.

In 1839, when faced by a demand for tribute from Egypt, Bahrein appealed to Persia, claimed to be a Persian subject, and received a Persian envoy. But immediately after she formally acknowledged Egyptian supremacy and paid tribute to Egypt. The visit of the Persian envoy had thus no effective sequel.

VI.—1840-50

37. In 1840 the Government of India, provoked by the attitude which the Sheikh had adopted, decided not to restrain the Imam of Muscat in the event of his wishing to conquer Bahrein. On 27th March, 1840, the Secret Committee remarked to the Government of India "We consider ourselves . . . relieved from all regard to the interests of the Sheikh of Bahrein, and we should be glad to hear that his island was in possession of a friendly chieftain."

38. Towards the end of 1840 the Imam of Muscat informed the Resident that while his views in regard to Bahrein remained unaltered, he had been restrained from giving effect to them by his impression that Her Majesty's Government were averse to the prosecution of his claim and that without their assistance or that of the Egyptians he would have no chance of success.

EXPULSION OF SHEIKH ABDULLAH. SUCCESSION OF SHEIKH MOHAMED BIN KHALIFA
(1843-68)

39. Internal dissensions in the Sheikhdom between the ruler, Sheikh Abdullah, and his grand-nephew and co-ruler, Sheikh Mohamed, became increasingly bitter, and Sheikh Mohamed was finally expelled from the island. In November 1842 he was given permission by Her Majesty's Government to attack Sheikh Abdullah. After a civil war which lasted from January to April 1843, Abdullah was expelled by Mohamed, who thereafter held the Sheikhdom, no reply being sent to an appeal to restrain the attackers which was made by Abdullah to the British authorities in February 1843.

INTRIGUES OF EX-SHEIKH, 1843-49

40. Between 1843 and 1849 the ex-Sheikh appealed at various times for the assistance of the Wahabis, the Trucial Sheikhs, the Sheikh of Koweit, and the British and Persian authorities to enable him to recover his position. In 1843 Her Majesty's Government dissuaded Muscat from trying to conquer Bahrein—considerations which weighed with them being *inter alia* the risk of provoking the Wahabis and the danger of giving Persia an excuse to espouse the cause of the ex-Sheikh. In the same year the ex-Sheikh twice visited Bushire, where he failed to find any consolation from the Resident, who, on his stating that

if disappointed by Her Majesty's Government he was ready to throw himself into the arms of Persia, informed him (October 1843) that the adherence of Persia to his cause would not be recognised by Britain unless it was open and declared.

41. In the course of his visits the ex-Sheikh entered into discussions with the nephew of the Persian Sheikh of Bushire, who, while holding no official position himself, promised him military assistance from Persia. On representations being thereupon made to the Persian Prime Minister by Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the Prime Minister "informed me that Sheikh Suleiman had acted with great presumption in having interfered in political affairs without having any authority from the Government, and he said that he would reprimand him for his conduct. His Excellency added that Bahrein belonged to Persia and that she would take possession of it when more pressing affairs were disposed of. As I looked on this as mere idle boasting which was never likely to be fulfilled, I thought it unnecessary to pursue the conversation."

42. It may be recorded that on a second visit of the ex-Sheikh to Bushire from December 1843 to March 1844, he is stated to have been received with distinction by the Persians, and to have offered, if reinstated, to pay the cost, to remit in future a large annual tribute to the Shah, and to leave one son as a hostage in Persia. His proposals were not, however, accepted by the Persian Government.

43. In 1844 the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was instructed by the Government of India to resist by force any attempt by Persia to establish troops on the island of Bahrein. During the same year the ex-Sheikh, having, while residing at Naband in South Persia, captured two Bahreini vessels, the ruling Sheikh appealed to the Resident, with the result that an injunction was issued by the Central Persian Government at the instance of the British envoy directing the Governor-General of Fars to compel Sheikh Abdullah to give up the boats he had taken and abstain from disturbing the peace of the Gulf.

VIEWS OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ON PERSIAN CLAIM AND ON FUTURE
POLICY, 1844-45

44. Consequent on indications that Persia intended to intervene in the succession at Bahrein on behalf of the ex-Sheikh Abdullah the general question of policy was considered by Her Majesty's Government in the early part of 1844 in the light of an intimation by the Government of India that they would see the strongest objections to any such interference by Persia, which could not but react adversely on British interests. As a result, Her Majesty's Minister was informed (Foreign Office Despatch to Tehran, No. 23, dated 1st May, 1844), that "the question of the right of Persia to interfere and of the Indian Government to prevent interference necessarily depends upon the validity of the pretension put forward by Persia to the sovereignty of Bahrein. Her Majesty's Government are ignorant of the grounds of such pretension, and, assuming those grounds to be insufficient, they would claim for the British Government the right to prevent, if it accorded with its policy to do so, any direct interposition of Persia in the quarrels of rival claimants to the possession of Bahrein. The British Government in India at present consider that any such disturbance as may be occasioned by military operations on the part of Persia directed against the island of Bahrein would be injurious to British interests, and, therefore, unless Persia can show that she has a clear and indisputable right to the sovereignty of Bahrein; that she has exercised it without interruption under the dynasty of the Kajar family; that consequently her present policy is directed to the maintenance of her lawful claims and not to the assertion of a pretension not founded on law, she must be prepared to encounter in any scheme of this kind the active opposition of the British Government in India." In these circumstances the Minister was instructed to inform the Persian Government that "Her Majesty's Government had heard with regret that that Government contemplated taking part in the disputes respecting the Government of Bahrein; that such a proceeding would be viewed with much jealousy by the British Government in India; and that unless the right of Persia to interfere in the matter is beyond dispute, any interference on her part might lead to unpleasant discussions with England. For, although Her Majesty's Government do not dispute the right of Persia as an independent Power to adopt any line of policy not inconsistent with its engagements to foreign States which she might think advantageous to herself, they claim for themselves a corresponding right to judge and act in such matters as they may think fit."

Précis, 393.

Hertslet,
1874, p. 5.No. 591,
27.3.1840.
Précis, 394.India Board
letter,
22.10.1840.

Lor. I, 866.

Lor. I, 873.

Teh. Desp.
86, Oct. 1843.

Lor. I, 875.

F.O. to Teh.,
No. 23, of
21.8.1844.Hertslet, 6.
Lor. I, 876-7.

*Discussions with Persia, 1844-45*Teh. to F.O.,
No. 69 of
22.6.1844.

45. On a communication in these terms being made to the Persian Prime Minister, the Prime Minister "said he would undertake to prove the right of Persia to possession of that island, and that in the meantime he would not make any movement against it without giving previous notification of such an intention to the British Government."

Teh. to F.O.,
No. 19 of
25.2.1845.

46. In February 1845 the Minister at Tehran sent home a letter received from the Prime Minister, from which it appeared that the Persian claim was essentially based on the Convention of 1822 between Captain Bruce and the Minister of the Prince Governor of Fars. (See paragraphs 20-21 above.)

Teh. to F.O.,
No. 28 of
18.3.1845.

47. In a subsequent despatch the Minister said that he had informed the Prime Minister that the Bruce Agreement was unauthorised and had been repudiated at the time, and that the Prime Minister had thereupon sent him a fuller statement of the grounds of the Persian claim. The result of enquiries which His Majesty's Minister had made consequent on the receipt of this statement "confirmed me in the opinion that this island has not formed part of the dominions of Persia since the accession of the Kajar dynasty [1795]. It is true that the Chiefs of Bahrein have in all probability from time to time given *peeshkesh*, offerings, or tribute to this country [Persia] as a mark of superiority, as Kandahar and Herat continue to do, without an acknowledgment of subjection,^(*) and it is also not unlikely that the rulers of that island may have declared themselves to be subjects of the Shah when threatened with subjugation from Bagdad, but I cannot ascertain that Persia has exercised any real control over it within the last fifty or sixty years." The Minister added that in further support of their claim the Persian Government had sent him a gold coin struck at Bahrein in 1817 in the name of Fateh Ali Shah Kajar, which he believed to be genuine.

Secret
Committee to
Bd. of Control,
31.7.1845.

48. The fuller statement of claim put forward by the Persian Government was investigated by the Secret Committee of the East India Company, who, after detailed examination of it, reached the conclusion "that Persia has no legitimate claim to the sovereignty of Bahrein." It may be remarked that the Persian claim was largely based on a general claim that the Persian Gulf from the Shatt-el-Arab to Muscat and all the islands in it belonged to Persia; that the employment in English of the term "Persian Gulf" was itself evidence of this; that from about 1300 A.D. the island of Bahrein had always been in the possession of the Governors of Fars and had paid revenue to them until its conquest in 1783 by the Utabi Arabs, from which tribe "itself, likewise, presents have generally been sent to the Governors of Fars"; that Her Majesty's Government had recognised the position when they warned Mehemet Ali of Egypt in 1840 not to attack Bahrein, which did not form part of Arabia, but rather of the Persian Gulf; "and that accordingly the British Government would not allow him to extend the hand of possession over that island"; that the British authorities had formally and repeatedly asked Persia to rent the island to them and that British representatives at Tehran had frequently declared that Her Majesty's Government had no right whatever to the Gulf or its islands [there is no foundation for either statement]; and that the fact that Captain Bruce's treaty was on record supported the Persian claim. The following extract, which (except as regards the initial date) appears correctly to represent the true facts, may, however, be placed on record from the Prime Minister's memorandum: "In the commencement of the reign of His Majesty the late Shah, the Arabs of Beni Attabi came from the desert and conquered the island by sea. The object and desire of the Persian Government has since always been and is the recovery of that island from its spoilers."

F.O. to Teh.
No. 38 of
7.8.1845.

49. Her Majesty's Government, in view of the unlikelihood that Persia had, or could give effect to, any serious designs in Bahrein and the undesirability of engaging in those circumstances in a correspondence which might merely cause irritation without serving any useful purpose, instructed the Minister at Tehran not to revert to the subject unless it was forced upon him by the Persian Prime Minister. In that case he was to employ certain arguments supplied to him (apparently the critical comments of the Secret Committee of the East India Company on the Prime Minister's memorandum) to show generally the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government were "unable to recognise as valid the claims advanced by Persia to the sovereignty of Bahrein, and you may add

(*) On this point the Secret Committee of the East India Company remarked: "Presents and complimentary messages do not imply an acknowledgment of sovereignty, and they have not been confined to Persia." (Secret Committee to India Board, 31st July, 1845.)

that they would . . . very much disapprove of any attempts on the part of Persia to interfere in the affairs of that island and thus disturb the peace of the Gulf and to afford an opening to piracy." The question appears to have dropped for the time being.

Treaty of Peace with Wahabis, to whom Bahrein pays Tribute (1847)

50. Meanwhile, the ex-Sheikh (who in 1845 had unsuccessfully attempted to capture Bahrein with the aid of the Wahabis) had been invited in June 1846 by the Governor-General of Fars to return to Bushire, where he should be liberally entertained "until . . . the season for action had arrived," but he declined the invitation. In October 1846 the Wahabi Amir asked the permission of the Resident to call in the Trucial Sheikhs of the Arab littoral against Bahrein. This was refused. A request by the ruling Sheikh of Bahrein to be allowed to call in the assistance of the Sheikh of Debai against the Wahabis was equally refused in November 1846. In August 1847 a Treaty of Peace was concluded between the Wahabi Amir and the ruling Sheikh, under which the ruling Sheikh agreed to pay a tribute of 4,000 dollars a year, while the Wahabi Amir agreed not to encourage the ex-Sheikh.

Lor. I, 877.

Lor. I, 877.

Lor. I, 880.

Slavery Treaty with Great Britain, 1847

51. On 8th March, 1847, Her Majesty's Government entered into a Slavery Treaty with the ruling Sheikh.

Turkish Designs on Bahrein, 1847

52. In the same year the first Turkish claim to suzerainty over Bahrein was put forward, the Turkish Mutasallim of Basra writing to the Sheikh inviting him to declare his allegiance to the Sultan and to submit lists of his shipping for registration. These overtures were evaded by the Sheikh, while the Porte assured Her Majesty's Government that they did not intend to use compulsion against him; but that "if the Governor of Bussorah had attempted by negotiation to induce any of the Maritime Chiefs of the Persian Gulf to return to their allegiance to the Porte, they could not disapprove his doing so."

Lor. I, 881.

F.O. to India
Bd., 28.9.1847.*Persian Intrigues, 1848*

53. In the following year correspondence took place between the Persian Consul-General at Bagdad, the ex-Sheikh (whom he advised to press ahead, since Persia would surely assist him) and the ruling Sheikh, whom he addressed in friendly terms. The correspondence was put a stop to consequent on representations by the British Resident at Bagdad. In 1849 the ex-Sheikh died.

Bushire to
Tehran,
No. 177 of
5.6.1848.

VIEWS OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ON FUTURE POLICY, 1847-49

54. The overtures made by the Turks in 1847 gave rise between 1847 and 1849 to consideration by the Government of Bombay, the Government of India, and Her Majesty's Government of the policy to be adopted in regard to Bahrein. The Sheikh hinted in 1847 that unless certain grievances were met he might become a Turkish subject. His grievances were accordingly remedied by the Government of Bombay. That Government represented, however, that it was desirable to exclude interference in Gulf affairs by foreign Powers, since unless Her Majesty's Government retained the supreme control they could not secure the permanence of the objects (the suppression of piracy, &c.) on which so much money had been spent. The Court of Directors concurred in the Government of Bombay's recommendation "that any attempts upon Bahrein ought to be resisted by the British Naval Force" and that the Resident should be so informed.

Lor. I, 881.
Bo. to Res.,
334 of
31.7.1847.

55. On 11th October, 1847, the Foreign Office, in a letter to the India Board, in which they referred to recent Turkish assurances that the Turkish Government had no intention of using compulsion with regard to Bahrein, added that "if the Indian Government has any further apprehensions on the subject, and if the Bahrein Chief is really an independent ruler, the best course would be to make with him a treaty of alliance which would secure his independence and his friendly connection with England." The Resident, who deemed it inexpedient that Her Majesty's Government should involve itself in the embarrassments likely to arise from a closer alliance with Bahrein (letter of 25th January, 1848), was, however, opposed to making the existing connection closer, as were the Secret Committee of the East India Company, who expressed the view that the

Resident "had exercised a wise discretion in not taking any step for the negotiation of a new treaty with Bahrein." The Resident was, at the same time, authorised, while avoiding discussion with the Turks, to ascertain whether the Sheikh was inclined to enter into a closer connection with Her Majesty's Government.

SHEIKHS REQUEST TO BE TAKEN UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION REFUSED (1849).

Lor. I, 882.
Bombay
Selections,
XXIV, 429.
India Bd. to
F.O., 3.2.1851.
India Bd. to
F.O. 26.7.1849.

56. In January 1849, however, the Sheikh spontaneously asked to be taken under British protection. The Resident, who, as stated above, had originally opposed, ultimately supported this request, but after a lengthy discussion the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government agreed that a change of policy was inexpedient, and the Resident was instructed in September 1849 to decline the Sheikh's overtures, but to assure him of the continuance of the goodwill and friendship of Her Majesty's Government.

Persian Protest, 1848

Hertslet, 9.
Teh. Desp.
No. 15,
17.2.1848.
Teh. Desp.
No. 11,
2.5.1848.

57. During the course of these discussions, the Persian Government protested against British interference in the affairs of Bahrein, whereupon they were informed by the Minister at Tehran in February 1848 that the British Government were unable to recognise as valid the claims advanced by Persia to the sovereignty of Bahrein.

Designs of Muscat, 1849

F.O. to I.O.,
11.6.1849.

58. In June 1849 the Imam of Muscat, having intimated his desire to send an expedition to take possession of Bahrein, and having asked the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, was strongly dissuaded from doing so by Her Majesty's Government.

Summary, 1840-50

59. The ruling Sheikh was expelled in 1843 and continued to intrigue to regain the throne till his death in 1849, appealing for assistance during this period to the Wahabis, Persia, Muscat and Great Britain, in all cases unsuccessfully.

In 1847 Turkey asserted a claim to Bahrein. In the same year the islands submitted themselves to the Wahabi Amir and agreed to pay tribute to him.

Claims by Persia were advanced, but rejected, in 1844-45 and 1848.

Muscat was dissuaded from attacking Bahrein in 1849.

Her Majesty's Government, on consideration of the policy to be adopted in regard to Bahrein, decided against establishing a protectorate and refused a request put forward in 1849 by the Sheikh to be taken under British protection. They assured him at the same time of their general goodwill, and their deliberations made it clear that they regarded the island as independent, but were reluctant to assume further responsibility in relation to it so long as its independence and the performance of the engagements undertaken by the Sheikh could be secured without their doing so.

VII.—1850-61

DISPUTES WITH WAHABIS, 1850-51

Lor. I, 884.

60. In 1850 the Resident found it necessary to take disciplinary action against the ruling Sheikh—an individual of "irresponsible character." Consequent on strained relations between the Sheikh and the Wahabi Amir, the Amir, with whom the sons of the ex-Sheikh Abdullah were associated, in 1850-51 threatened Bahrein, whereupon the Sheikh "against his own better judgment. . . rendered a small annual tribute to the Amir," a circumstance from which it may perhaps be inferred that he had failed to observe the agreement of 1847 referred to in paragraph 50 above. The Amir rejected the offer and made exorbitant demands instead. The Sheikh was about to succumb to a combination of the sons of the ex-Sheikh and the Wahabi Amir "when a British squadron arriving off Bahrein took the islands under their protection." Peace was subsequently made with the Wahabis in July 1851.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE CLAIMS OF TURKEY (1851)

F.O. to
India Bd.,
24.1.1851.

61. In the same year Her Majesty's Government decided that the Turkish Government should be informed at Constantinople that Her Majesty's Government, having heard that the Sheikh was desirous of placing himself under

Turkish protection, could not acknowledge or acquiesce in any such arrangement, seeing that the Government of British India had had relations with Bahrein as an independent State and had concluded with it certain treaties, namely, one in 1820 for the suppression of piracy and one in 1847 for the prohibition of the exportation of slaves, and that Her Majesty's Government must object to any arrangement which would transfer Bahrein to the dominion or protectorship of any other Power.

62. In the correspondence leading up to this decision Lord Palmerston remarked: "I come to the conclusion that it is the opinion of the East India Company that the object first to be aimed at is to prevent Bahrein from falling under the control of any foreign Power, and to keep that island in its present condition of political independence. But I infer from what has been stated in the despatches which you have communicated to me, that if that independence could no longer be maintained, and if the ruler and the people of Bahrein were determined to place themselves under some foreign protection, the East India Company would think that less evil would arise from affording to Bahrein British protection than from allowing French, Persian or Turkish authority to be established in that island."

Attitude of the Wahabis and of Muscat, 1852-53

63. In 1852 the Sheikh proposed to withhold his tribute from the Wahabi Amir, but on the advice of the Resident decided to pay it. In the same year the Consul at Zanzibar was instructed to inform the Imam of Muscat that Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to alter the views regarding the possession of Bahrein communicated to His Highness in 1849 (paragraph 58 above). In May 1853 the Government of India authorised the Government of Bombay to offer every obstacle to an attack on Bahrein by the Wahabi Amir (who was now nominally subject to the Turkish Government) on the ground that Her Majesty's Government would not permit the occupation of Bahrein by the Turkish Government or by anyone acting for them or in their interest.

PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS LAID DOWN BY BOMBAY GOVERNMENT (1854)

64. On 20th November, 1854, the Government of Bombay in a letter to the Resident laid down the principle of non-interference in the *internal* affairs of Bahrein, and authorised the Resident simultaneously to inform the Sheikh of Qatif on the Arab mainland that the British Government would not tolerate his further interference with the affairs of Bahrein.

SLAVERY AGREEMENT WITH HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT (1856)

65. On 10th May, 1856, an agreement supplementary to the Treaty of 1847 (paragraph 51 above) regarding the slave trade was made with the Sheikh. Its contents were identical with that of corresponding engagements entered into at the same time by the Arab rulers of the Trucial Coast.

66. The Sheikh's internal government continued to go from bad to worse. In September 1858 reparation was secured from him for the ill-treatment of British subjects in Bahrein. In 1859 a Wahabi attack was averted by British intervention. The local Wahabi Governor sued for pardon to the Senior Naval Officer; the Wahabi ruler, however, made a formal protest, asserted his authority over Bahrein, and declared that he was himself a vassal of the Sultan of Turkey. The Resident, in reply, informed him of the determination of Her Majesty's Government to preserve the independence of Bahrein, and pointed out the inconsistency of his piratical attacks on Turkish shipping with his professions of dependence on the Ottoman Government.

SHEIKH'S APPEAL TO PERSIA AND TURKEY, 1859-61

67. At the end of 1859 or early in 1860, as the result, apparently, partly of apprehensions of the Wahabis and partly of irritation at the restraint exercised by the Resident over his piratical activities directed against the Wahabis, the Sheikh made a simultaneous appeal for assistance to the Persian Governor of Fars and the Turkish Wali of Bagdad. The Turkish answer was delayed. A Persian agent (Mirza Mehdi Khan), bearing a Persian Firman to the Sheikh, arrived in April 1860. The Persian flag was hoisted, Persian sovereignty proclaimed, and the Sheikh's agreement to pay tribute secured. These ceremonies were, however, scarcely over when a Turkish emissary arrived. The

India Bd. to F.O., 3.2.1851.
F.O. to India Bd., 6.2.1851.
India Bd. to F.O., 7.2.1851.
Lor. I, 885.
F.O. to Sir S. Canning, Constantinople, No. 40, 12.2.1851.

Lor. I, 885.

Lor. I, 887.

Aitchison,
Vol. XI,
No. ix, 234.

Lor. I, 887.

Lor. I, 888.

Resdt. to Bombay, No. 118, 14.4.1860;
No. 2A, 7.5.1860;
No. 219, 26.7.1860.

Resdt. to
Tehran,
No. 210,
16.7.1860.
Resdt. to
Constant.,
3.6.1860.

Persian flag continued to fly during the Sheikh's negotiations with the Turks, but on the latter withdrawing, and subsequently communicating assurances of a character satisfactory to the Sheikh from the Turkish Government, the Turkish flag was hoisted on the forts in place of the Persian flag in May 1860 and the Sheikh agreed to pay tribute to Turkey. The Persian emissary, however, refused to leave Bahrein "or surrender his imaginary authority in the Sheikhdome." The Resident reported in July 1860 that "the Ottoman flag has now become the national one." The Sheikh appears to have endeavoured to play off each party against the other.

Views of the Minister at Tehran and the Government of Bombay

68. The Minister at Tehran regarded the matter as one of relatively small importance. He pointed out to the Persian Government "that under no circumstances can the British Government be expected to concur in the proposed transfer of the sovereignty of Bahrein to the Persian Crown, since we have contracted engagements with the Arab Sheikhs of the island as independent Chiefs, and since the maintenance of their independence is indispensable to the successful working of those plans of maritime police in the Persian Gulf which we have been at so much pains and expense to establish"; and obtained an assurance from Persia that no military occupation of Bahrein should be attempted until the title to the island had been settled through the diplomatic channel. He advised the Resident that, while hostilities against Bahrein were to be repelled by force, a voluntary tender of allegiance by the Sheikh to any other Power might, so long as it was unaccompanied by any military occupation, be ignored as of no particular importance. In the light of the Minister's views the Government of Bombay instructed the Resident that he should not interfere with the occupation of Bahrein, whether by Persia or Turkey, save by protest and by an intimation that the matter had been referred to Her Majesty's Government; but at the same time that the agents of both Powers (Turkey and Persia) should be warned that aggression by or in the name of Bahrein on neighbouring tribes would not be allowed and would, if necessary, be prevented by force. In representing the matter to the Secretary of State for India they urged that in the interests of the peace of the Gulf it would be better that Bahrein should be regarded as independent and as subject neither to Turkey nor to Persia, that its independence should be recognised, and the engagements into which in the interests of humanity we had entered with its rulers for the preservation of the peace and good order of the Gulf should be maintained.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT DECIDE THAT BAHREIN SHALL BE REGARDED AS
INDEPENDENT (1861)

69. In February 1861 Her Majesty's Government, after discussion between the India Office and the Foreign Office, approved the recommendation of the Government of Bombay. The Resident and the Minister at Tehran were so informed. During part of the time at any rate that the question was under consideration in London the Turkish and Persian agents or their representatives appear (though it is not clear how consistently) to have remained in Bahrein, and the flags of both Powers to have been flown simultaneously. On 27th February, 1861, the Political Resident reported that "the Persian and Turkish flags still fly on the forts of the island and in an interview that Commander Cruttenden had with Sheikh Md. bin Khalifah at his own request he (the Chief) remarked in respect to them that they were displayed 'merely to suit his own fancy. What did he care for Turk or Persian? He valued the friendship of the British Government highly.'"

British Convention of 31st May, 1861, with the Sheikh

70. In May 1861 the Sheikh, refusing to discontinue a blockade which he had imposed on the Wahabi coast, was informed by the Resident of the decision of Her Majesty's Government that he was regarded as an independent Chief and that in these circumstances he must be held responsible by them for any piratical activities in which he might indulge. The Sheikh proved obdurate; he was threatened with forcible measures by the Resident and two of his ships were seized. He accordingly submitted, and on 31st May, 1861, he signed a Friendly Convention with the Resident, acting on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, by which he entered into a "perpetual treaty of peace and friendship" with Great Britain, and in which, as "independent ruler of Bahrein," he acknowledged as

Teh. to Bu.,
No. 16 of
4.5.1860.

Dec. 1860.

I.O. to F.O.,
11.2.1861.
F.O. to I.O.,
12.2.1861.
S. of S. to G.
of I., No. 2,
18.2.1861.

Pol. Res.
to Sheikh,
25.5.1861.

valid and in force the earlier conventions entered into between Bahrein and Her Majesty's Government, and undertook in return for a guarantee of protection against aggressions "by the Chiefs and Tribes of the Gulf" to abstain from maritime aggression, piracy, the slave trade, &c., and to agree to certain conditions in regard to residence and trade in Bahrein by British subjects and to jurisdiction over them. One of the ships seized from him was thereupon returned; the second, the *Hamrah*, was retained.

71. The Turkish and Persian agents would seem to have disappeared from Bahrein before the Resident's arrival. The Persian authorities at Bushire in June 1861 asked the Resident for an explanation of his proceedings. The Resident, however, contented himself with forwarding their enquiry to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran. The Convention was approved by the Government of India in 1861, and the Turkish and Persian Governments were informed of what had happened.

Summary, 1850-61

72. The Turkish Government were informed in 1851 that Her Majesty's Government could not recognise any claim on their part to Bahrein.

The Sheikhs appear to have continued to pay tribute to the Wahabi Amir in the early part of and possibly throughout this period.

In 1859 the Sheikh appealed simultaneously to Turkey and to Persia, as the result of apprehensions of a Wahabi attack, and received a Persian envoy, who hoisted the Persian flag. On the arrival immediately afterwards of the Turkish envoy the Persian flag was hauled down. Subsequently the Sheikh for a time flew both flags side by side. The envoys seem to have left Bahrein in the early part of 1861. No action was taken by the British authorities pending a decision by Her Majesty's Government as to whether they regarded Bahrein as independent. The Persian Government undertook not to endeavour to occupy the islands until the title to them was settled.

Her Majesty's Government decided in February 1861 to regard the Sheikh as an independent ruler and so hold him responsible for piracies, &c. Punitive action against him by Her Majesty's Government having proved necessary in May 1861, he entered in that month into a convention with them in which he was described as "independent ruler of Bahrein," and secured certain guarantees of protection.

VIII.—1861-67. From the Convention of 1861 to the Punitive Expedition of
August 1868

PERSIAN PROTEST (1862)

73. In January 1862 the Persian Minister in Paris protested to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris against the seizure of the *Hamrah*. He was informed in reply that Her Majesty's Government could not recognise any claim on the part of Persia to question their proceedings in regard to Bahrein, and must therefore decline to offer him any explanation on the subject of his complaint.

PERSIAN PROTEST (1866)

74. Between 1863 and 1865 the Sheikh continued to misbehave, and in the latter year his ship, the *Dinar*, was seized under the instructions of the Resident. The Persian Government in 1866 made a complaint in regard to the *Dinar* proceedings on the ground that Bahrein under the unratified agreement of 1822 was a dependency of Persia. The Government of India, after ascertaining from the Government of Bombay the nature of the agreement of 1822, communicated the result of their enquiries to the Minister at Tehran, and added their own opinion that "whatever might have been the pretensions of Persia or the grounds of the same to the sovereignty of Bahrein in former days, the Shah could not now be regarded as possessing in point of fact any rights in the principality." This communication was approved by Her Majesty's Government in the same year, and the matter appears to have dropped.

NATURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BAHREIN AND WAHABI AMIR (1867)

75. In 1866-67 the Resident, on the instructions of the Government of India, investigated the relations of the Sheikh of Bahrein and the Wahabi Amir. He reported as a result that the Sheikh claimed to be independent so far as his islands

Aitchison,
Vol. XI,
No. x, 234.

Pol. Res. to
Teh., No. 20,
8.6.1861.

Lord Cowley
to F.O.,
No. 15,
7.7.1862.
F.O. to
Lord Cowley,
No. 209,
22.2.1862.

Lor. I, 891.

Lor. I, 691.

I.O. to G. of I.,
No. 37 of
28.2.1867.

were concerned, and that the annual tribute of 4,000 dollars "which he indubitably paid" (*cp.* paragraph 50 above) to the Amir was on account of the possessions held by him in Qatar on the Arabian mainland, the object of the payment being to secure those possessions against attacks by Arab tribes under Wahabi influence. The Government of India, in the light of the Resident's investigation, expressed the view in March 1867 that the Sheikh was independent of all other Powers in respect of his insular possessions and owed fealty to the Wahabis only in regard to Qatar.

Summary, 1861-67

76. This period is marked by assertions of the Persian claim in 1862 and 1866. Her Majesty's Government on both occasions made it clear that they could not regard that claim as well founded.

Investigation showed that the tribute still paid (1867) by the Sheikh to the Wahabi Amir was in respect of Bahreini possessions on the mainland of Arabia, and not in respect of Bahrein, which the Sheikh held independently of all other Powers.

IX.—Discussions and Incidents, 1868-70

77. Questions of considerable importance as bearing on the status of Bahrein arose in 1868-70 consequent on—

- (a) the disciplinary action taken by the Government of India against the ruling Sheikh Md. bin Khalifa, in view of his breaches of the Maritime Truce of 1820, which resulted in his flight from Bahrein in September in 1868 and the succession as sole Sheikh of his brother, Sheikh Ali bin Khalifa;
- (b) the punitive action taken at Bahrein by the Government of India in November-December 1869, consequent on the invasion of Bahrein by the ex-Sheikh Md. bin Khalifa, the murder of Sheikh Ali and the attempt of Sheikh Md. bin Khalifa and Sheikh Md. bin Abdullah to establish themselves in control of the islands.

78. In view of the weight attached by the Persians to the declarations made in the course of those discussions as indicating the view held by Her Majesty's Government on the status of Bahrein, of the Persian allegations that overtures to Persia had been made by the ruling Sheikh, Ali bin Khalifa, and by the ex-Sheikh, Md. bin Khalifa, and of the misleading but categorical accusations made against the Resident by the Persian Government, it seems desirable to examine in some detail the correspondence which passed and the sequence of events.

Punitive Expedition of August-September 1868

79. In 1868, consequent on an attack on Qatar by the Sheikh of Bahrein, the Government of India resolved to take disciplinary action against Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa. The Sheikh sent an agent to Bushire to satisfy the Resident, but the agent having no powers from his master, his mission proved fruitless, and he returned to Bahrein in August 1868. An armed expedition was thereupon sent against the Sheikh in August-September of that year. Before it reached Bahrein the Sheikh fled to the Arab mainland, and he was thereafter regarded by the people of Bahrein and by Her Majesty's Government as having abdicated the Sheikhdom. The expedition found it unnecessary to use any force, a full submission being made on its arrival by Sheikh Ali bin Khalifa, brother of Sheikh Mohamed, who had previously been associated with Sheikh Mohamed to some extent in the Sheikhship. An agreement was reached by the Political Resident with Sheikh Ali, which disposed of the matters in dispute, on 6th September, 1868. The agreement was signed by "Ali bin Khalifah and the inhabitants and subjects of Bahrein." It declared *inter alia* that "Md. bin Khalifah having repeatedly committed acts of piracy and other irregularities at sea, and having now, after his recent piratical acts, fled from Bahrein, has forfeited all claim to his title as principal Sheikh and Chief of Bahrein."

80. Subsequently to the conclusion of this agreement the Resident, by way of punishment, destroyed the fort of Muharraq by gunfire and burnt certain vessels of war belonging to Sheikh Mohamed bin Khalifah. His despatch, which contains a detailed report on the course of events, makes no reference to any flying

Bushire
Desp. 3 of
25.9.1868.

Aitch. XI,
No. xi, 236-7.

Pol. Res. to
Govt. of
Bombay,
No. 3,
25.9.1868.

of the Persian flag by Mohamed bin Khalifah, and the bombardment of Muharraq and the punitive destruction of the warships took place after the submission of Bahrein, and so after Mohamed bin Khalifah had fled from the islands.

Persian Protest, November 1868

81. The facts appear to be as stated in the preceding paragraph. It was some time before a full account of these proceedings reached either India or London. Meanwhile, as will be seen from the correspondence, extracts of which are quoted below, the action of the Government of India drew a vigorous protest from the Persian Government. The protest, after appealing to the treaties concluded between England and Persia in 1809, in 1814, in 1822 (unratified) and in 1857, urged that the Resident, instead of respecting the rights of Persia in the Gulf to the extent provided for in those treaties had, without any prior intimation to the Persian authorities, attacked Bahrein, which island had been and still was the property of Persia; had bombarded and destroyed the Governor's fort and house and caused considerable damage; had appointed the Sheikh's brother as Governor over the island on the flight, through fear, of the Sheikh; had imposed a fine; and had required the new Sheikh to find his brother and deliver him up to the British authorities. These proceedings had taken place at a time when "Sheikh Md. bin Khalifah, the Governor of Bahrein, was openly avowing his submission to and dependence upon Persia and declaring that he considered Bahrein to be indisputably Persian, in proof of which the Persian flag was flying over his fort."

82. Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran was instructed to communicate a suitable explanatory statement to the Persian Government. The Foreign Office suggested, however, that it might be advisable, in the event of similar proceedings again becoming necessary, that communication should be had with that Government. While this question was still under consideration a formal protest against the Resident's action was received (11th February, 1869,) from the Persian Chargé d'Affaires in London, who complained, *inter alia*, that the Resident had sunk three ships belonging to the Governor of Bahrein and fired on his Palace on which the Persian flag flew, and requested that the British Government would give orders for the repair of the damage caused. He was informed in reply that "the Sheikh of Bahrein was an independent chief with whom the British Government had treaty engagements and whom they must hold strictly to the performance of those engagements."

83. This contention the Persian representative disputed, and in support of his view he forwarded letters addressed "from 1858 to 1869 by the Sheikh of Bahrein to His Imperial Majesty the Shah and the Prince Governor of Shiraz." The translations of these letters are dated 9th April and 12th April, 1869, respectively. From internal evidence it seems probable that they were, however, written in 1860 on the occasion of the visit to Bahrein of the Persian envoy, Mirza Medhi Khan (paragraph 67 above). They acknowledge the receipt of a Firman from the Mirza (apparently recognising Sheikh Md. as Sheikh and accompanying a Firman and a Sword of Honour for Sheikh Ali). They state emphatically that Bahrein forms part of Persia, and has always done so. They refer to an agreement reached for the future payment of tribute; remark that "the slight neglect which was lately shown on our part towards Your Imperial Majesty's Government was because they had not for a while superintended and protected us, but as now the Government of Your Imperial Majesty has intended by sending over Mirza Mehdy to enquire into and manage the affairs here, I, with my brother and all the inhabitants, feel quite ready to declare at once that we are most willing to render any services required from us towards Your Majesty's Government, being already aware that Bahrein (Persian Gulf) is part of Persia," and add "I will hasten to hoist the flag on my residence bearing the Lion and the Sun which are the signs of the Persian Standard."

British Note of 29th April, 1869

84. The question of the reply to be given to this further protest was carefully considered between the India Office and the Foreign Office. The Duke of Argyll, then Secretary of State for India, remarked that although he was of opinion that the line of policy which had hitherto been pursued of regarding the Sheikh of Bahrein as an independent sovereign, and of refusing to recognise the right of sovereignty advanced by Persia, as had been done in 1845, 1848 and 1860, could not be now abandoned without very serious risk of endangering the peace of the Gulf, yet that "he was not blind to the expediency of avoiding all causes

Teh. Desp. to
G. of I.,
28.10.1868
Teh. Desp.
149 of
17.11.1868.

F.O. to I.O.,
1.2.1869.

From Gen.
Mohsin Khan,
11.2.1869.
To Gen.
Mohsin Khan,
5.3.1869.

Gen. Mohsin
Khan to Duke
of Argyll,
13.4.1869.

I.O. to F.O.,
21.4.1869.

of unnecessary irritation at the Court of Tehran and that he was willing, therefore, should Lord Clarendon desire it, as a matter of courtesy to the Persian Government, to issue instructions to the Government of India to direct the Resident in the Persian Gulf (whenever he might on any future occasion, under orders from India, be about to call the Chief of Bahrein to account for any breach of his engagements with the British Government) to notify the fact to the British Minister at Tehran for the information of the Shah's Government." Circumstances might, however, arise in which the Resident might, in the general interests of peace and order, be called upon to act promptly on his own responsibility, and in such cases the Secretary of State was not willing to waive what he considered "as not only a right pertaining to, but a duty incumbent upon, the British Government." The Foreign Office concurred in these views and the Persian representative was informed accordingly.

85. The Persian representative on receipt of the Foreign Office letter asked that in order to make it more palatable to the Shah, certain modifications should be made in it. After private discussion between Lord Clarendon and the Duke of Argyll, of which no record exists, and an interview between the Envoy and Lord Clarendon, it was finally agreed to accept the modification embodied in the opening paragraph of the letter which follows, but also to make the addition contained in the last paragraph of that letter; and a letter so amended was despatched to him. The text (omitting an introductory paragraph) of the amended letter, which is of importance as one of the principal pieces of evidence subsequently adduced by the Persian Government in support of their claim that Her Majesty's Government have recognised Persian sovereignty over Bahrein, is as follows. The sentences in *italics* are those which were added in deference to the further representations from General Mohsin Khan referred to above:—

"The British Government readily admit that the Government of the Shah has protested against the Persian right of sovereignty over Bahrein being ignored by the British Authorities, and they have given due consideration to that protest. But it is the fact, as yourself and the Government of the Shah are undoubtedly aware, that the Sheikhs of Bahrein have at different periods entered directly into engagements with the British Government; and I beg to assure you that the British Government hold the Sheikh to these engagements solely for the purposes of preventing Piracy and Slave Trade, and of maintaining the police of the Gulf. If the Persian Government are prepared to keep a sufficient force in the Gulf for these purposes, this country would be relieved of a troublesome and costly duty; but, if the Shah is not prepared to undertake these duties, Her Majesty's Government cannot suppose His Majesty would wish that in those waters disorder and crimes should be encouraged by impunity.

"I need scarcely assure you of the friendly feelings entertained by Her Majesty's Government towards Persia, and their desire on all occasions to meet as far as possible the wishes of the Shah; and, in regard to this question, I have the honour to state to you that, whenever it is practicable to do so, Her Majesty's Government will cause the Persian Government to be informed beforehand of any measures of coercion against himself which the conduct of the Sheikh of Bahrein may have rendered necessary.

"But the British Government cannot consent to debar its officers, to whom the superintendence of the police of the Persian Gulf is entrusted, from the exercise of the right of punishing by prompt measures any violation of Treaty engagements by the Sheikh of Bahrein, when a reference to the Court of Tehran would be attended with embarrassing delays which might endanger the general peace of the Gulf; but whenever such a necessity shall arise a full communication respecting it shall be made to the Persian Government."

Overthrow and Death of Sheikh Ali (August–September 1869)

86. In August–September 1869 Bahrein was invaded by the ex-Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifah, who was joined by one Mohammed bin Abdullah, son of the Sheikh who had been deposed in 1843 (paragraph 39 above). The ruling Sheikh Ali was defeated and killed, while Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdullah assumed the leadership of the usurping party.

87. Her Majesty's Minister reported on 14th November, 1869, a conversation on this incident with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of which the latter admitted that Persia had not acquired sufficient power or authority in that part of the Gulf to enable her to repress acts of piracy and to

To Gen.
Mohsin Khan,
29.4.1869.

F.O. to I.O.,
11.5.1869.
I.O. to F.O.,
19.5.1869,
5.6.1869.

Pol. Res. to
Govt. of
Bombay, 165
of 11.9.1869,
181 of
25.9.1869,
184 of
5.10.1869.

maintain order, but added that he hoped that before long the Shah's authority would be fully established at Bahrein, when full redress would be given for losses suffered through the recent events, and that in the meanwhile it would not be considered necessary that the British authorities should undertake coercive measures. Her Majesty's Minister further reported that "Ali bin Khalifa having forwarded letters to this court admitting his allegiance to the Shah and offering his services to the Persian Government," an agent (Mirza Medhi Khan, who had been Persian Envoy to Bahrein in 1859 (paragraph 67 above)) had been despatched with a Royal Firman, recognising Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah as Chief of Bahrein, but that on receipt of the news of the murder of the Sheikh by the ex-Sheikh Mahomed bin Khalifah, the Firman had been recalled and the name of the ex-Sheikh substituted (from paragraphs 94–5 below it will be seen that these statements subsequently proved to be incorrect in material particulars).

British Punitive Expedition (November–December 1869)

88. Punitive operations consequent on the murder of Sheikh Ali were undertaken by the British Government in November of the same year. Previous notification was given to the Persian Government of the grounds of this expedition, the object of which was stated to be "to call the chief now in possession of Bahrein to account for his breach of the maritime peace and for the attack on Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah, who had been placed in power by the British Government."

89. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on receipt of the notification in question stated that the ex-Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifah, who had, he said, been the cause of the recent disturbances, had been killed (this was in fact incorrect); that the Resident's action would therefore be useless, and that the Persian Government hoped that he would be telegraphically instructed not to proceed to Bahrein. He added that the Persian Government would themselves keep the affairs of Bahrein by land in order and that should anything happen to affect its affairs by sea they would request the British Government to send a naval force to put affairs in order, "but up till now the state of affairs in Bahrein had not fallen into disorder."

90. The Persian agent referred to in paragraph 87 above, arriving in the Gulf at this stage, addressed letters to Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdullah (see paragraph 86 above) intimating his recognition as Sheikh, and despatched them by a special messenger, who proceeded to the island in a native boat belonging to a Persian. The messenger was, however, on his arrival prevented by the Resident from landing or communicating with the Sheikh, and his letters were detained and ultimately handed by the Resident to Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdullah after the submission of that Sheikh, who returned them to Colonel Pelly after perusal. The messenger stated that he had himself no authority from the Shah's Government and was deputed by the Chief of Dayer, who was acting in obedience to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

SUBMISSION OF USURPING SHEIKHS

Sheikh Isa bin Ali becomes Sheikh

91. The punitive operations against Bahrein resulted in the complete submission of Sheikh Md. bin Abdullah and the ex-Sheikh Md. bin Kalifah in September 1869. It may be remarked that prior to the opening of operations Sheikh Abdullah made overtures to the Resident, which were, however, rejected, with a view to securing recognition by Her Majesty's Government. He also appealed to the Wahabi Amir for recognition and protection. Sheikh Isa bin Ali, son of the murdered Sheikh Ali, voluntarily assumed the vacant Chiefship and was recognised by the Resident on behalf of the Government of India ("in no way did Colonel Pelly influence the succession") and the ex-Sheikh and Mohammed bin Abdullah were deported to India. Shortly after his installation the new Sheikh received a letter from one Hydar Khan, Zabit of the Dashti district on the Persian coast, advising him to place himself under the Shah's protection, but the incident appears to have been unimportant.

PERSIAN PROTEST, 1869–70

Views of Government of India

92. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs appears at first to have received news of the removal of the ex-Sheikh with equanimity and is said to

Teh. Desp.
No. 81,
14.11.1869.

Pol. Res. to
Teh. tel. of
14.11.1869.

15.11.1869.

Teh. Desp. 83
of 16.11.1869.

Bushire Desp.
216 of
15.12.1869.

Pol. Res. to
Govt. of
Bombay, 165
of 11.9.1869,
181 of
25.9.1869,
184 of
5.10.1869.

Teh. Desp.
No. 94 of
11.12.1869.

Teh. Desp.
No. 7 of
12.1.1870.

have remarked that Persia and Great Britain had an equal interest in the maintenance of peace by sea and that Persia had therefore no reason to object to the punishment of the delinquent. But he protested in strong terms against the Resident's action in preventing the Persian agent from landing and holding communication with the Sheikh, and a still stronger protest was made by the Persian Minister in London. The Government of India, in the exhaustive reports they submitted on the Resident's action, urged, after a review of the history of the islands, that the Shah had no legitimate control over the Sheikh of Bahrein; that his Government had, nevertheless, encouraged the piratical faction in the Persian Gulf by sending letters of recognition to the piratical leader; that in styling Sheikh Md. bin Abdullah Chief of Bahrein the Persian Government ignored the facts that he had never held sway in Bahrein, belonged to the younger branch of the ruling family, and so had neither by right nor possession claim to this title; and that, so far from the Shah having any just cause of complaint against the Resident, the Persian Government should be called upon to give some explanation of the conduct of its officers in encouraging a piratical expedition which was prejudicial to British interests in the Persian Gulf and for the successive appointment by them of Ali bin Khalifa and Md. bin Khalifa to the sovereignty of a district over which they had no legitimate control. The Government of India added that they had no confirmation of the alleged overtures of Sheikh Ali bin Khalifa to Persia (paragraph 87 above), as to which further enquiry was being made of Her Majesty's Minister (see paragraphs 94-95 below), but in any event could not admit "that such overtures, made without its knowledge and consent, can in any way affect its treaty relations with Bahrein."

British Reply to Persia, March 1870

93. Her Majesty's Minister was therefore instructed by the Foreign Office that it appeared possible that Her Majesty's Government, instead of furnishing explanations to Persia, might have cause to complain "of the proceedings of the Persian authorities in endeavouring to communicate with a piratical chief who had been guilty of a breach of the Maritime Truce, and who had attacked the Chief placed in power at Bahrein by the British Government," and was informed that no notice would be taken of the complaints against the Resident until the Persian Government gave a full explanation of the intercepted letters.

Supplementary Reports by Her Majesty's Minister, Tehran, April 1870

94. On 6th April, 1870, the Minister at Tehran reported as follows to the Government of India:—

"In my Despatch No. 81. . . . I reported that the Firman of appointment was originally in the name of Ali bin Khalifa, but that, on hearing of his death, it was altered in favour of his brother, Md. bin Khalifa. This information had reached me from a relation of . . . one of the principal Persian officials in Shiraz, and not . . . from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. When further intelligence reached Shiraz from the Gulf and it was supposed that Md. bin Abdullah would retain possession of Bahrein, the Firman was probably again altered in his favour, as it was to him that it was eventually forwarded. In conversation with the Persian Minister this afternoon, His Excellency admitted that this was probably the case. He said that Mirza Mehdi Khan on leaving Tehran had received general instructions for his guidance respecting the Bahrein question, but that the details were settled at Shiraz and the Firman was issued in the name of the Persian Governor of Fars and not in that of the Shah. The name inserted in this document had certainly, he said, been altered once to his knowledge, and it was not unlikely that it had been changed a second time before being forwarded to its destination.

"With regard to the overtures said to have been made by Ali bin Khalifa to the Persian Government, as reported in my Despatch No. 81, I have the honour to state that that information also reached me from a private source and not from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency has, however, asserted very positively to me to-day that Ali bin Khalifa had repeatedly written to the Persian Government professing allegiance to the Shah and that a number of letters containing assurances of this kind are now in his (the Minister's) possession.

"It appears to me that on the receipt of a correspondence which passed last April between Her Majesty's Government and the Shah's representative

in London, the Persian Ministers, believing that the Bahrein Chief was himself well disposed to further their designs, resolved to take measures with a view to establishing, if possible, the Shah's authority in that quarter and make good his claim to exercise sovereign rights over Bahrein. Mirza Mehdi Khan was accordingly dispatched to Shiraz and Bushire and a certain latitude was given to him as to the mode in which he should proceed to carry out the wishes of his Government. The Persian authorities in Shiraz finally determined that a Firman should be addressed to Md. bin Abdullah, conferring upon him the government of Bahrein and with this the Khan hoped to be able to come to terms with the Chief then in possession of the place. But in this matter the sole object of all concerned would seem to have been to carry out the policy of the Persian Government at Bahrein without reference to the interests or wishes of Her Majesty's Government in that quarter."

95. On 8th April, 1870, the Minister at Tehran addressed the following despatch to the Government of India:—

"With reference to my despatch of the 6th instant, in which I stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed me that Ali bin Khalifa had repeatedly made overtures to Persia admitting his allegiance to the Shah, I have the honour to report to Your Excellency that Mirza Sayed Khan has just sent to inform me that he was mistaken in making this assertion, and that he finds on enquiry that the letters to which he referred were not from that Chief, but from Md. bin Khalifa."

Views of Government of India, May 1870

96. The Government of India, commenting on these facts, remarked that Mehdi Khan appeared to have left Tehran with a general discretion as to which of the various Sheikhs should be recognised as ruler. "At the capital no more definite plan appears to have been resolved on than that measures should be adopted to establish the Sheikh's assumed right of sovereignty over the island."

97. The Government of India proceeded that they had already pointed out that any disposition to admit the claims of Persia would probably lead to the revival of similar claims on the part of Turkey, a result which had in fact now been brought about (*cp.* paragraph 99 below). "This (*i.e.*, the Turkish) claim rests on no better foundation than that of Persia. It was summarily rejected by Lord Palmerston in 1851 and in our opinion should not again be reopened. With equal reason the Wahabi Amir and the Sultan of Muscat could claim the sovereignty of the island, if the nominal and temporary tender of allegiance, in times of difficulty, and as a security against foreign intervention be considered sufficient ground on which to base such pretensions. On the same ground indeed we might claim Bahrein as a part of the British dominions. But, as we have repeatedly observed, the real status of the island, and the only one which we have recognised and admitted, or are prepared to recognise and admit, in all our dealings in the Persian Gulf and our negotiations with the Chiefs, is that of an independent State, subject neither to Persia nor to Turkey, neither to the Wahabis nor to Muscat, nor yet to the British Government.

Review of Discussions of 1868-70

98. The matter ultimately lapsed. But from the facts and the correspondence summarised above it will be seen, in the first place, that there appears to be no foundation for the alleged overtures to Persia by the ruling Sheikh, Ali bin Khalifa, or for the statement that the Persian flag was flying at the time of the punitive expedition of 1868; and that if any overtures were made to Persia in 1868-69 (and there is no confirmatory evidence of any such overtures) they would appear to have been made by the ex-Sheikh Md. bin Khalifa, presumably in his anxiety to secure Persian support for his restoration. Secondly, while the statements contained in the Note sent by the Foreign Office on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to the Persian Chargé d'Affaires on 29th April, 1869, were widely phrased, and afford some justification for the interpretation placed on them by Persia, and while the Persians may have been confirmed in their view by the absence of any protest by Her Majesty's Minister against the mission of Mirza Mehdi Khan, the terms of that Note do not, in fact, constitute more than a recognition that Persia had in the past repeatedly pressed her claim to Bahrein, and that Her Majesty's Government did not claim sovereignty over that island

and interested themselves in its affairs only to the extent necessary to discharge their treaty obligations to its rulers (which included a guarantee of defence against external aggression) and to ensure the peace of the Gulf. Finally, that while Her Majesty's Government agreed to notify Persia, when circumstances permitted, before taking punitive action against Bahrein, on the only occasion on which (immediately after) they appear to have given effect to this undertaking, the terms of their communication made it clear that they regarded themselves as at liberty to punish the usurping Sheikhs Md. bin Abdullah and Md. bin Khalifa (in accordance with the obligations assumed by them under the Treaties of 1820 and 1861 with Bahrein) for their piratical attack on Bahrein and murder of the Chief placed in power there by the British Government.

X.—1870–80. From the Turkish Occupation of Hasa to the First Exclusive Agreement

Turkish Protest, 1870

99. In January 1870 a protest was received from the Turkish Government against the recent actions of the Resident at Bahrein. In reply the Turkish Government were informed that Her Majesty's Government could not recognise the Turkish claim to sovereignty over Bahrein; and were courteously reminded of the intimation made to them in 1851 on Lord Palmerston's instructions (paragraph 61 above).

Turkish Occupation of Hasa. British Assurances to Bahrein, 1871

100. In 1871 the Turks occupied Hasa. Protests at Constantinople in April and May 1871 against rumoured Turkish designs on Bahrein resulted in a repudiation by Turkey of any such designs. The assurances received from the Turkish Government were communicated to the Sheikh of Bahrein, who had asked Her Majesty's Government for their advice and their protection against the Turks in May 1871, and he was informed that so long as he observed the provisions of the Convention of 1861 (paragraph 70 above) the reciprocal obligations towards him of Great Britain would be fulfilled.

101. Protests about the same time at Constantinople led to a Turkish repudiation of the designs which the Turkish Government were alleged to have entertained at Bahrein, and the Turkish authorities in Hasa were given instructions by their Government which debarred them from approaching Bahrein. In May 1871 the Shah enquired from Her Majesty's Representative at Tehran as to the probable effect on Bahrein of the Turkish occupation of Hasa and was informed in reply of the assurances which had been given to Her Majesty's Government by the Turks.

Reply to Persian Legation at Constantinople as to meaning of British Note of April 1869

102. In November 1871 the Secretary of the Persian Legation at Constantinople made enquiries of Her Majesty's Ambassador in connection with a rumour that a Turkish expedition was to be sent for the reduction of Bahrein, "which island the Persian Secretary stated had been acknowledged by the British Government as a portion of the Persian dominions and . . . in proof of this assertion he had handed to Sir H. Elliott a copy of the note which Lord Clarendon addressed to General Haji Mohsin Khan on 28th April, 1869. Sir H. Elliott, however, observed that he saw in that note nothing more than an acknowledgment that the claim had previously been made, but that he was unwilling to discuss the point, as he believed there was no danger of any attempt being made to interfere with the position of Bahrein as it then stood."

Turkish Claims, 1871–79

103. Consequent on the murder of a Turkish messenger in Bahrein in August or September 1871, the Turkish Government demanded reparation direct from the Sheikh and received a conciliatory reply. On their demand being pressed the Sheikh, on the advice of the Resident, suggested that the matter be arranged between the British and the Turkish Governments, by whose joint decision he would abide, but the Turkish Government preferred that it should be settled direct by the parties by agents. Her Majesty's Government saw no objection to such a procedure so long as no compulsion or show of force by Turkey was involved. The Turks, however, let the matter drop. The incident is of some interest as

F.O. to I.O.,
11.1.1870,
5.3.1870.

Lor. I, 901.

Lor. I, 902.

Lor. I, 919.

Hertslet, 28.
cp. G. of I.
No. 16,
15.3.1872.

illustrating the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the Sheikh as an independent ruler who might deal direct with foreign Powers.

104. In August 1872, a further complaint having been received from Turkey of British proceedings in regard to Bahrein and the commission of "acts of sovereignty" on the part of the English, the Ambassador was informed in reply that enquiries would be made into the point raised by him and that his Government might rest assured that it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to interfere in the affairs of the Persian Gulf beyond what was imposed upon them by treaty for the preservation of peace in the waters. The Ambassador was finally informed in April 1873, after investigation, that there were no grounds whatever for the statement that the British Government had attempted to exercise acts of sovereignty over Bahrein.

105. In 1874, consequent on a Turkish claim to conscript Bahreinis resident in Basra, the Turkish Ambassador in London was referred to the British Notes of 1851 and 1870 (paragraphs 61 and 99 above), which stated that Her Majesty's Government did not admit the claims of Turkey to consider Bahrein as part of the Ottoman dominions. In the same year, on a piratical attack being made on the island by certain Bahreini exiles who had signed a petition claiming Turkish protection, the Ambassador at Constantinople handed a memorandum to the Porte in which it was stated that Her Majesty's Government could not recognise any rights or pretensions of the Porte over Bahrein. In 1875 a rumour that Her Majesty's Government were fortifying Bahrein led to representations from Turkey. The rumour was unfounded and the Turks were so informed. On its becoming known about the same time that the Turks themselves contemplated building a lighthouse on the island, the British Government entered a protest at Constantinople (October 1875), with the result that the project was abandoned.

106. In 1876, consequent on steps taken by the Turkish authorities to enforce the claims of Qatar merchants against Bahreinis, a Note was addressed to the Porte reminding them of the determination of Her Majesty's Government to protect Bahrein against any attack on its independence.

107. In 1879–80 the Turkish Government took up the cause of the rebels of 1869. Her Majesty's Government, after again disclaiming the exercise of sovereignty over Bahrein, which they regarded, they said, as independent, promised to make enquiries as to certain acts of which complaint was made by petitioners to the Turkish Government.

First Executive Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Sheikh of Bahrein (1880)

108. In 1880 the Political Resident, finding that the Sheikh was disposed to conclude a special arrangement with the British Government, entered on the 22nd December into what is known as the First Exclusive Agreement with him. By this Agreement the Sheikh undertook on behalf of himself and his "successors in the Government of Bahrein to the British Government to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties of any sort with any State or Government other than the British without the consent of the said British Government, and to refuse permission to any other Government than the British to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots in our territory, unless with the consent of the British Government. This engagement does not apply to or affect the customary friendly correspondence with the local authorities of neighbouring States on business of minor importance." The agreement was approved by Her Majesty's Government and ratified in 1881.

Summary, 1870–80

109. The claims of the Wahabi Amir disappear with the subjugation of Hasa by the Turks in 1871. The Turkish claim was repeatedly pressed during this period and was consistently rejected by Her Majesty's Government.

The Persian claim appears to have been dormant. Her Majesty's Government repudiate suggestions that they have committed "acts of sovereignty" and continue to express their view that the Sheikh is an independent ruler. In 1880 the Sheikh entered into his first exclusive agreement with Her Majesty's Government.

F.O. to
Turkish
Ambassador,
8.8.1872.
Hertslet, 30.
I.O. to F.O.,
30.7.1872.

Lor. I, 914.

Lor. I, 915.

Lor. I, 915.

Aitchison,
Vol. XI,
No. xxii, 237.

XI.—1880–92. From the conclusion of the First to the conclusion of the Second Exclusive Agreement with Her Majesty's Government

Persian Démarche, 1886

110. In September 1886 the Shah sent a verbal message to Her Majesty's Government through the Minister at Tehran that he considered the communication made to him in April 1869 as tantamount to an admission of his rights in Bahrein and that he was anxious to establish his authority effectually over the islands either by sending a Governor to Bahrein or possibly by recognising the Sheikh as representative of Persian authority, but that he wished the maritime police to remain in the hands of the British authorities. An answer was prepared by Her Majesty's Government to the effect that they did not concur in His Majesty's interpretation of the communication of April 1869. They had treaty engagements with the Sheikh, whom they considered to be independent, and must hold the Sheikh to his engagements while fulfilling those they had contracted towards him. As, however, the Shah did not return to the subject, the message was not delivered.

Lor. I, 919.

Teh. tel. 188,
27.9.1886.

F.O. to I.O.,
30.7.1886.

F.O. to Teh.,
tel. No. 58,
8.10.1886.

Lor. I, 911.

111. In the same year presents sent from the Persian Governor of Lar to the Sheikh were returned to the sender.

Lor. I, 920.

112. In 1887–88 Persian intrigues took place with a view to the establishment of Persian influence on the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf. These were of little importance in the case of Bahrein, but it may be recorded that it appears that in the case of that principality the Persian Government had sanctioned a scheme for the seizure of Bahrein by Sheikh Jasim of Dohah in Qatar, who had seemingly undertaken to put the Persians in possession of the Sheikdom. Two British ships were in February 1888 stationed off Bahrein, with instructions to prevent by force any hostile attempt to land by the Turks, Arabs or Persians, and the Minister at Tehran was asked by the Government of India so to inform the Persian Government. As, however, the Amin-us-Sultan, "on being questioned disavowed all designs on Bahrein, Her Majesty's Minister thought it better to avoid the reference to forcible action."

Warning to Turkey, 1888

113. In March 1888 the Turkish Government were informed that any attempt to effect a landing in Bahrein would be opposed by force, and that no claim by the Porte to jurisdiction over Bahrein could be admitted, since Her Majesty's Government regarded the Sheikh as an independent ruler with whom they were in treaty relations.

Second Exclusive Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and Bahrein (1892)

114. On 13th March, 1892, the Political Resident signed a second Exclusive Agreement with the Sheikh of Bahrein on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. The provisions of the Agreement (which was ratified on 12th May, 1892, and which was expressed to be binding on the Sheikh, his heirs, and successors) were as follows:—

- (1) "That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.
- (2) "That without the assent of the British Government I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.
- (3) "That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government."

Further Warning to Turkey, November 1892

115. In November 1892 the Ottoman Government were warned (apropos of the position of Bahreinis at Basra) that Bahrein was under British protection, and that no interference with its natives by the Ottoman authorities could be admitted. In the same year the Porte was informed, with reference to a rumoured intention to land Turkish troops, that such action would be opposed by Her Majesty's ships.

Aitchison
(1933),
Vol. XI,
No. xiii, 238.

Const. Desp.
No. 348 of
15.11.1892.

Summary, 1880–92

116. The Turkish claim was again pressed vigorously during this period and was consistently rejected by Her Majesty's Government.

The Shah raised the question of the Persian claim in 1886, but did not press the matter.

In 1892 the Sheikh entered into his Second Exclusive Agreement with Her Majesty's Government.

XII.—1892–1913. From the Second Exclusive Agreement to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913

British repudiations of Turkish Claims, 1892–98

117. In 1895 steps were taken at Constantinople by Her Majesty's Government to check an attempted invasion of Bahrein from Qatar, which seemed not improbably to have been inspired by the Turks, and later in the same year Her Majesty's Government twice reiterated to the Porte that Bahrein was under British protection and that no interference with it would be tolerated. The views of Her Majesty's Government on the status of the island were again officially repeated at Constantinople on two occasions in 1896. In 1897 the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Bahrein. The proposal was abandoned on the objections of the British delegate, who represented that Bahrein was an independent principality under British protection.

Lor. I, 935.

118. In 1898 a Turkish request that a British Vice-Consul alleged to have been appointed at Bahrein should apply to the Turkish Government for his exequatur was refused on the ground that Her Majesty's Government could not admit the right of the Turkish Government to insist that a British Consular Officer in Bahrein should be provided with a Turkish exequatur. In 1899 the Minister at Tehran informed the French representative at that capital that since 1880 the Sheikh was precluded by treaty from holding direct relations with any Power other than Her Majesty's Government and that his subjects abroad were now under British protection.

Lor. I, 935.

119. A native British Agent had for a long period of years been maintained in Bahrein. In 1900 a British Political Agent was appointed at Bahrein. The post has been maintained since that date, and has been filled by an officer of the Indian Political Department since 1904.

THE INCIDENT OF 1901

120. On 31st August, 1901, a Belgian customs official in the service of the Persian Government visited Bahrein, where he called on the Sheikh and informed him that he had been deputed by the Shah to obtain his consent to place Persian custom officials in Bahrein. An official protest was at once made by His Majesty's Minister to the Persian Government in the course of which Sir A. Hardinge remarked that no intimation had been given to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf "of this Persian mission to an Arab State under British protection and bound by special treaties, of which the Persian Government cannot be ignorant, to the Government of India . . . It is my duty to place on record in the clearest manner that His Majesty the Emperor of India cannot acquiesce in any foreign interference in the affairs of Bahrein . . . and that any attempt to disturb the relations established by treaties of long standing between those Chiefs and the Government of India will be regarded as an unfriendly act." The Attabeg-i-Azam, in a note received on 17th September, 1901, replied: "As I have told you verbally, M. Simais has had no instructions from the Persian Government on this matter, and if there have been any steps on his part it must have been by mistake and he will be reprimanded for it."

Lor. I, 935-6.

Teh. Desp.
No. 140 of
18.9.1901.

THE DISORDERS OF 1904–05

121. In 1904–05, consequent on a series of attacks on Persians and on German subjects in Bahrein, the Persians appealed to the Shah. The Persian Government replied that His Majesty's Government would take action on their behalf. The text of their telegram was as follows: "To the Merchants and Traders of the High Government living in Bahrein. Your telegram on the subject of the assaults which have been made upon you by the Arab roughs of Bahrein has been received. Certainly let your minds be at rest. Consultations

Lor. I, 938-42.

with the English Legation have taken place on this subject, and it will shortly be settled in such a way that the oppression will be removed and that the offenders will receive their proper punishment."

122. The Germans complained to the German Vice-Consul at Bushire, who made a direct request to the Sheikh for reparation, in reply to which he was referred by His Excellency to His Majesty's Government. The Sheikh was ultimately compelled by His Majesty's Government to give redress.

Turkish Protest, 1904-05

123. On the Turks pressing in 1904-05 for an explanation of the action taken by His Majesty's Government in connection with the ill-treatment of the German subject, the Turkish Ambassador was informed by Lord Lansdowne that it was a matter of common knowledge and well known to the Turkish Government, that His Majesty's Government had direct relations with the Sheikh of Bahrein; that the island and its natives were under British protection; and that His Majesty's Government were within their rights in taking measures to obtain redress for the outrage committed there. On the Ambassador reverting to the subject later in 1905, he was informed (20th May, 1905) that His Majesty's Government must decline to entertain any further representations from the Turkish Government on the subject.

Reassertions of Persian Claim, 1905-13

124. In 1905 the Persians again reasserted their claim. On the 19th February, 1906, in reply to a further reiteration which appears to have been based on the treaties of 1809, 1814 and 1857, the Minister at Tehran informed the Persian Government that "The Treaties of 1809, of 1814 and of 1857 on this subject have always been scrupulously observed by His Majesty's Government, but have no bearing on the present question. His Majesty's Government have never admitted the ownership or sovereignty of Persia over Bahrein. Such a claim is in their view entirely inadmissible. His Majesty's Government consider the island of Bahrein and its inhabitants to be under British protection, and must decline to entertain any further representations on the subject. I am further to mention that this reply has invariably been made to the Ottoman Government, who have on several occasions advanced a claim to Bahrein." The Note concluded *in extenso* the telegram of reassurance (paragraph 121 above) to the Persian inhabitants of Bahrein then sent on behalf of the Persian Government.

125. On 13th September, 1906, the Persian Grand Vizier revived the Persian claim in a letter referring to Captain Bruce's unauthorised agreement of 1822. He was reminded in reply that that agreement had been expressly disavowed by His Majesty's Government and that Captain Bruce had been recalled. In a supplementary note the Grand Vizier's attention was drawn to the fact that the then Shah himself had "refused to recognise" the stipulations of the Treaty of 1822, which had never been ratified, and had "expressed his displeasure that the Prince of Shiraz should have entered into any engagements with the British Government without his knowledge or instructions."

126. On the Ala-es-Sultaneh reviving the Persian claim, on the ground of the Agreement of 1822, in August 1907, his attention was drawn in a Note dated 13th August, 1907, to the notes referred to in the preceding paragraph; and to the fact that the Agreement had been disavowed alike by His Majesty's Government and by the Shah. The Note added that "since 1822 the Turkish Government have raised claims on Bahrein, and, like the Persian Government, have been informed that Bahrein is under British protection."

127. In 1908 the Persian Government, in a correspondence regarding the punishment of a Bahrein subject at Lingah, intimated that instructions had been sent to Lingah that reparation should be made, but added that His Majesty's Minister would admit that "the proprietary right of the Persian Government over the island is not a matter to be disputed." The Note was returned as inadmissible to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A modified version was subsequently accepted by His Majesty's Government, which was acknowledged by a Note from His Majesty's Minister, reaffirming that His Majesty's Government maintained as regards the status of Bahrein in Persia the position that the island of Bahrein and its inhabitants were under British protection, and that they would be guided entirely by their own views of the position should any action of the Persian Government make representations necessary.

128. Early in 1910 the Persian Government assimilated the formalities to be fulfilled in the case of persons visiting Bahrein to those prescribed in the case of travellers to Persian ports, a measure which, as pointed out by the Foreign Office at the time, constituted a fresh attempt to assert Persian sovereignty over the island, but it was agreed that in view of the undesirability of raising the general question, no protest should be made to them. In July of the same year it was reported that internal Persian coastal passes issued to persons proceeding to Bahrein from Persian ports were visé by a Persian merchant residing in Bahrein. In 1912 the individual in question was forbidden to take any action in regard to the endorsement of passes held by Persian subjects for travelling in Bahrein. The endorsements in question were, however, henceforth granted by the Political Resident—a practice, as pointed out by the Political Resident nine years later, "of itself open to objection, as it might be construed into a tacit admission that the Persian passport authorities are justified in giving passes for another Persian port to persons going to Bahrein."

Withdrawal of Turkish Claim to Bahrein in Anglo-Turkish Convention of 29th July, 1913

129. On 29th July, 1913, His Majesty's Government signed a convention (which still awaited ratification on the outbreak of the War of 1914-18) with the Ottoman Government, under which that Government renounced all their claims to the islands of Bahrein, the independence of which they recognised. His Majesty's Government on their part declared that they had no intention of annexing the islands and undertook not to allow the Sheikh of Bahrein to disturb the autonomy of the peninsula of El Katr or to annex it, and to ensure that the Sheikh should not discriminate against Ottoman subjects in the matter of dues levied upon pearl fisheries. The Turkish Government on their side accepted a reservation of the right of the population of Bahrein to visit Zakhnuniyah Island for fishing, and recognised the rights of subjects of the Sheikh to British consular protection in Turkey. This arrangement, followed, as it was, by the disappearance of Turkey from the Gulf after the War of 1914-18, disposed of the Turkish claim to Bahrein, which had been reasserted on numerous occasions and with great insistence since 1847.

Summary, 1892-1913

130. The Turkish claim was repeatedly raised during the early part of this period, but consistently opposed by His Majesty's Government. It was finally abandoned in the (unratified) Anglo-Turkish Convention of July 1913. While that Convention was never ratified, the abandonment of the Turkish claim was confirmed by Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

The Persian claim was also frequently pressed and was consistently repudiated in strong terms by His Majesty's Government.

XIII.—1913-34

Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreigners by British Agents in Bahrein

131. In virtue of the Convention of 1861 (paragraph 70 above) and of subsequent delegations by the Sheikhs, the British Representative in Bahrein has for over 70 years exercised important judicial powers in the islands. The Sheikh in 1909-12 formally requested His Majesty's Government to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in Bahrein other than the subjects of Arab potentates. An Order in Council conferring such jurisdiction on the Political Agent was made in 1913. It was supplemented by a further Order in 1922. Since 1920 jurisdiction over all foreign subjects has rested with the British authorities within the limits of the Orders in Council.

132. The Sheikh, on 14th May, 1914, undertook not to entertain any overtures for an oil concession save after consultation with the Political Agent and with the approval of His Majesty's Government.

Undertakings secured from Ibn Saud, December 1915

133. In 1915 His Majesty's Government, in entering into an Agreement with Ibn Saud, then ruler of Nejd, secured an undertaking from him "to refrain from all aggression on, or interference with the territories of . . . Bahrein . . ."

Teh. Desp.
No. 95 of
26.4.1910.
P. 3539/10.

P.G. 13, 67,
§ 24.

Lor. I, 944.

F.O. to Con-
stantinople,
No. 59 of
22.2.1905.

19.2.1906.

Teh. Desp.
No. 3 of
3.1.1907.

Teh. Desp.
No. 61 of
27.3.1907.

Teh. Desp.
No. 179 of
15.8.1907.

Teh. tel. 95
of 11.4.1908.

Teh. Desp.
No. 10 of
22.1.1909.

P.G. 13, § 8,
p. 62.
§ 10, p. 63.

Aitch, XI,
No. xvi, 229.

Aitch, XI,
No. ii, 206-8.

Persian Claim reasserted, 1922-23

134. In 1922 His Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas reported that the Persian passport officials at Lingah had ruled that Bahreinis were Persian subjects and should be given Persian passports. They seized two British certificates of identity granted to Bahrein subjects, but on representations being made by the Minister at Tehran instructions were given by the Central Government that there was to be no repetition of this incident. In 1922, also, the Persian delegate at a Postal Conference held at Bushire stated that while not for the moment pressing for the transfer to Persia of the Bahrein post office, his action was without prejudice to the Persian claim to Bahrein.

P.G. 13, 67,
§ 26.

135. In 1923, consequent on a Press campaign and a discussion in the Majliss on the desirability of giving Bahrein the right to return a member to the Persian Parliament, which was referred to a Commission for report, His Majesty's Government decided that it was desirable to address a formal Note to the Persian Government in terms similar to those employed in 1906 (paragraph 124 above). Owing to the difficult internal situation in Persia this proposal was dropped, but in September 1923 the Persian Government was informed that the island was now a British protectorate, and that His Majesty's Government did not contemplate any alteration of its status. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of which he was a member had no intention of laying claim to Bahrein on behalf of Persia. But despite this statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs again reverted to the question in the following month.

P.G. 13, 67-8,
§§ 27-9.

His Majesty's Government remove Sheikh Isa for Misgovernment (1923)

136. Consequent on the gross mismanagement of Sheikh Isa, who had been ruler of Bahrein since 1869, the Sheikh was deprived by His Majesty's Government of his control of affairs in Bahrein on 26th May, 1923, and was granted an allowance, his son, Sheikh Hamad (whose right of succession had been recognised by His Majesty's Government in 1901) being appointed to act for him "as his father's fully empowered agent."

P.G. 13, 63-4,
§§ 11-14.

Oil concession granted by Sheikh, 1925

137. In 1925 an oil concession was granted by the Sheikh of Bahrein to the Eastern and General Syndicate, a British corporation, with the approval of His Majesty's Government.

Undertakings secured from Ibn Saud in Treaty of Jeddah, 1927. Persian Protest

138. The Treaty of Jeddah, concluded on 20th May, 1927, between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, in substitution for the Treaty of 1915 (paragraph 133 above), provided *inter alia* that "His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies" should "maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of . . . Bahrein and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government." Consequent thereon, a strong protest was received on 26th November, 1927, from the Persian Government, copies of which were despatched to the League of Nations. The Persian protest was based essentially on the recognition stated to have been accorded to Persian sovereignty over Bahrein in Lord Clarendon's Note of 29th April, 1869 (paragraph 85 above). A reasoned reply to the Persian Note was despatched by His Majesty's Government on 18th January, 1928, and circulated to the League. While avoiding any definite statement as to their own position in Bahrein or its basis, His Majesty's Government in their Note repudiated the Persian claim in the strongest terms, and intimated that no argument such as was suggested could be based on the communication of 29th April, 1869.

Aitch. XI,
No. vii, 227-9.

26.11.1927.
P. 5559/27.

P. 322/28.

Attitude of Sheikhs to Persian claim (1928)

139. The Sheikhs of Bahrein, on being apprised of the revival of Persia's claim, gave a letter to the Political Resident, requesting His Majesty's Government in accordance with their treaties "to defend Bahrein from outside interference" and to act as their agents in rebutting the Persian claims, and intimating that the Sheikhs proposed to send Sheikh Mohamed, brother of Sheikh Hamad, the deputy ruler and son of the deposed ruler, Isa, as their representative in answering the claim should the case be taken to Geneva.

P. 1409/28.

Further Persian Protest, 2nd August, 1928.

140. On 2nd August, 1928, the Persian Government communicated a lengthy and reasoned reply to the British Note of 18th January, 1928. The Note based its reiteration of the Persian claim on the principle that territory belonging to a sovereign State could definitely be detached from that State only with the consent of the State in question, which had not been given in the case of Bahrein; and alleged that the terms of the Foreign Office Note of 29th April, 1869, were conclusive evidence of the view then held of the rights of Persia by His Majesty's Government; that Bahrein had consistently recognised Persian sovereignty, as could be proved by documentary evidence, up to the date when the Sheikhs were instigated to rebellion by a foreign Government; that no valid argument could be founded on the direct relations into which the Sheikhs had entered with His Majesty's Government, since their action had been without the approval of their suzerain; that the relations of Bahrein with Persia were more highly developed than with any other independent civilised country; that the Persian claim had been consistently and uninterruptedly pressed; and finally that even if the Treaty of 1822 was disavowed by His Majesty's Government, it was material evidence of the view held by a British officer of great experience at the time of its conclusion, and that its disavowal by the then Shah of Persia was not because of any doubt on his part as to the true status of Bahrein.

P. 4184/28.

141. A reasoned reply, which examined in detail the arguments put forward by the Persian Government and reached the conclusion that they were without substance, was despatched and circulated to the League at the request of His Majesty's Government on 18th February, 1929.

P. 1640/29.

Assignment of Bahrein Oil Concession to American Interests, 1930. Fresh Persian Protest

142. On 23rd July, 1930, the oil concession granted to the Eastern and General Syndicate in 1925 having been assigned by that Corporation, with the approval of the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government, to the Bahrein Petroleum Company (incorporated in Canada in 1929), an American-owned subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California, a formal protest against such assignment was received from the Persian Government, based on the ground that, Bahrein being Persian territory, neither the Sheikh nor His Majesty's Government had any right to grant a concession. The protest reserved the right of Persia to claim damages. Treaty negotiations were at the time proceeding with Persia, and it was thought unnecessary to send any reply to this Note, which was, however, circulated, at the request of the Persian Government, to the League of Nations.

P. 5723/30.

Discussions between His Majesty's Government and Persia, 1928-34

143. Between 1928 and 1934 treaty negotiations, with a view to the conclusion of a general treaty which should dispose of outstanding points of difference, were in progress with Persia, the question of Bahrein figuring prominently in those negotiations. The general attitude taken by the Persians was that Bahrein was a point of great importance to them, but that in return for a sufficient *quid pro quo* they would be prepared to abandon their claims. His Majesty's Government on their side consistently maintained that the Persian claim was worthless, and that while they would gladly see it finally disposed of as part of a general settlement, they would not be prepared to make any specific concession in return for its abandonment. On 17th March, 1934, His Majesty's Minister in Tehran communicated copies of certain treaties and agreements between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India on the one hand, and certain Arab Rulers on the other, to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In his acknowledgment Mirza Bagher Khan Kazemi remarked that the Persian Government did not consider "those of the agreements, treaties and concessions in question which related to lands and places such as Bahrein, &c., which are inseparable parts of Persian territory, to be either official or valid." In his reply, His Majesty's Minister said that he was instructed, as His Excellency had thought fit to mention Bahrein, "to emphasise once more that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the Persian claim to these islands is entirely inadmissible."

E. 3357/2240/
91, 1934.

E. 5955/2240/
91, 1934.

144. In 1932 the Persian Government protested to His Majesty's Government against the issue of British Indian postage stamps surcharged "Bahrein," and repeated their protest to the League. Their protest was rejected by His Majesty's Government, and the stamps were issued in August, 1933.

The Bahrein Petroleum Company's Concession

145. The interest of the Persian public in Bahrein during 1934 had been aroused by articles in British and foreign newspapers dealing with the activities of the Bahrein Petroleum Company, Ltd., which had just struck oil and was beginning production. Outbursts in the Persian press provoked a statement in the Majlis by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he said that he had addressed a Note to the United States Minister in Tehran pointing out that the Standard Oil Company's concession was null and void, since it had not been obtained from the Persian Government, whose claim to Bahrein was indisputable. Copies of this Note were circulated to all members of the League of Nations at the request of the Persian Government. In reply His Majesty's Government requested the Secretary-General of the League to refer to the British Notes of 18th January, 1928, and 18th February, 1929, and to circulate this reply to the States Members of the League. In that year His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in his despatch of 7th April, reviewed the state of our relations with the Persian Government and, in particular, the means by which a general treaty settlement might be secured. In the course of this review he remarked upon the unsatisfactory situation resulting from the assertions of His Majesty's Government that the Persian claim to Bahrein was "worthless," while the existence of the claim continued, nevertheless, to hamper freedom of action at every turn. He further expressed the opinion that there was little hope of reaching a general settlement until the Shah was "forced to believe that we are determined, treaty or no treaty, to settle the Bahrein issue once and for all."

XIV.—Summary

146. It may be convenient at this stage to summarise very briefly the claims to sovereignty over the islands which have been advanced by various countries since 1783; the particular basis of those claims in the case of Persia (whose claim is alone at the present time of any importance); and the basis and development of the attitude of His Majesty's Government.

A.—Claims to or Assertions of Sovereignty over Bahrein, 1873–1934

147.—(a) *Muscat*.—Bahrein subject to Muscat 1800–01, 1811? to 1816, 1820–22. Tribute paid to Muscat 1820. Bahreini independence recognised by Treaty 1829. Muscat thereafter deterred by His Majesty's Government from pursuing its claims.

(b) *Egypt*.—Representative of Mehemet Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, informed by Her Majesty's Government in 1839 that no claim upon Bahrein could be admitted. But in 1839–40 the Sheikh acknowledged Egyptian supremacy and he paid tribute during this period.

(c) *Wahabi Amirs of the Arab Mainland*.—Bahrein under protection of or subject to Wahabi Amirs 1803–11; 1816; 1830–33 (tributary); 1836–1838–39 (tributary); 1847 (tributary); 1852 (tribute). In 1867 (see paragraph 75) it was held by Government of India that tribute was paid to the Wahabis only in respect of mainland possessions and not of Bahrein. The claims of the Amirs disappeared with the conquest of Hasa by Turkey in 1871.

(d) *Turkey*.—The islands have never in the period subsequent to 1783 been occupied by Turkey or (if the incidents of 1860–61 (paragraphs 67–9 above) are ignored) subject to Turkish sovereignty. But Turkish claims to them were advanced, directly or indirectly, in 1847, 1851, 1870, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1879, 1888, 1892, 1893, 1895, 1896 and 1905, and on each occasion, save in 1847, when certain assurances were given by Turkey (paragraph 52), were rejected by the British Government. The Turkish claim was finally withdrawn in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913. That Convention was never ratified, but the withdrawal of the claim was confirmed by Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

(e) *Persia*.—The Persian claim has been consistently urged on a variety of occasions through the period in question. The Sheikhs momentarily submitted themselves to Persia in 1799 and paid tribute. In 1816–17 they received a

Persian envoy and apparently appealed for help to Tehran. They again momentarily submitted to Persia and received an envoy in 1839. Persian aid was invoked and a Persian emissary received at Bahrein in 1860–61, while in 1869 the deposed ex-Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa may have made overtures to Persia (though there is no confirmation of this) to enable him to re-establish his control over the island.

The Persian claim appears, apart from this, to have been asserted in 1822, 1825, 1844, 1848, 1861, 1862, 1866, 1868, 1869, 1886, 1901, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1910, 1927, 1928, 1930, 1932–33 and 1934, and to have been rejected by His Majesty's Government in 1822 (as part of their refusal to accept Captain Bruce's Treaty), 1825, 1844, 1848, 1861, 1862, 1866–67, 1869, 1901, 1906, 1907, 1908–09, 1923, 1928, 1929, 1933 and 1934.

B.—Basis of the Persian Claim

148. Ignoring contentions such as that the use of the term "Persian Gulf" is a recognition of Persian sovereignty over the various islands of the Gulf Persia has at one time or other based her claim on the nine grounds examined below:—

(1) *History of the Islands prior to 1783*

The history of the islands prior to the expulsion of the Persians in 1783 is dealt with in paragraphs 3 to 5 above. It will be seen that at various periods since the beginning of the Christian era, Persia has exercised a degree of control over the islands, and in particular that during the 30 years prior to 1783 her control was of a more definite character. On the other hand, the facts recorded above do not support any claim by Persia to an uninterrupted occupation or control of the islands.

Persia has on various occasions in the past appealed to the early history of Bahrein in support of her claim that it is historically Persian territory. Since 1930, too, certain Persian newspapers, presumably inspired, have dealt at considerable length with the history of Bahrein in the more or less remote past, and have supported their statements by quotations from, or references to, Arab or Persian geographers or historians. Owing to the absence of records and the shortness of time available, it has been impossible to check these statements in detail, or to conduct elaborate researches into the writing of Arab geographers and others from which further information might be secured. But it is arguable that the position of the islands prior to 1783 is at most only of very indirect importance in the present connection. The essential weakness in the Persian claim is, it is suggested, that there has been no effective exercise of authority in the islands by Persia since her expulsion in 1783, and that the Sheikhs, who originally established themselves by conquest, have now acquired a prescriptive title, based on an uninterrupted occupation of 150 years by the present ruling family.

(2) *The Absence of Persian Consent to the Detachment of Bahrein from Persia*

The Persian Government, in paragraph 2 of their Note of 2nd August, 1928 (Appendix I, Paper B), invited attention to "the following international juridical principle. . . . A territory belonging to a sovereign State cannot be lawfully detached so long as the right of ownership has not been transferred by this State to another State in virtue of an official act, in this case a treaty, or so long as its annexation by another State or its independence have not been officially recognised by the lawful owner of the territory." They added (correctly) that Persia has never renounced her sovereignty or ceded it to another State or ever recognised any of the Sheikhs of Bahrein as independent rulers.

The argument put forward by the Persian Government under this head is examined in detail in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Note despatched by the Foreign Office on 18th February, 1929, in reply to the Persian Note of 2nd August, 1928 (Appendix I, Paper B). His Majesty's Government expressed their inability to agree that any such principle, if alleged to be of universal application, formed part of international law. The deciding factor in the question of international title in cases in which territory has effectively established its independence of the former sovereign is the effective establishment by that territory of its independence, "and in the case of Bahrein His Majesty's Government regard as wholly untenable the proposition that effective possession and administration by the present ruling family for 145 years, during which these rulers have been

independent of Persia and during which no Persian authority has been exercised in their dominions, can be affected by the mere consideration that the Persian Government have not set their signature to a document formally recognising the fact of their independence." In paragraph 7 of the same Note His Majesty's Government cite historical precedents to show that the theory of the necessity for the formal consent of the dispossessed State is not one which has ever obtained international acceptance.

(3) *The Unratified Treaty of 1822*

The circumstances in which the Treaty of 1822 was concluded by Captain Bruce with the representative of the Prince Governor of Shiraz are set out in paragraphs 20-21 above. As will be seen, Captain Bruce concluded it without the authority of or reference to Government. The treaty into which he had entered was immediately officially disavowed, and the Persian Government so informed, and Captain Bruce, as a sign of disapproval of his action, was removed from his appointment. The Persian Government on their side equally disapproved the action of the Prince Governor of Fars in entering into any treaty discussions without the prior approval of the Shah. [The Persian Government were reminded of this in 1825, 1845, 1866, 1907, 1928 and 1929.] It appears impossible in these circumstances to base any legitimate claim to Persian sovereignty over Bahrein on the provisions of the Treaty of 1822.

(4) *The Gold Coin alleged to have been struck at Bahrein in 1817*

Please see paragraph 47 above.

A Persian Mission appears to have visited Bahrein in 1816 or 1817 (paragraph 9 above) and it is conceivable that a coin might have been struck on that occasion. On the other hand, it would probably be extremely difficult to prove that the coin had not in fact been struck elsewhere, though with an indication that it had been minted at Bahrein. The incident is in itself of relatively small importance, and it would, it is suggested, be impossible for Persia to use such an incident, even if it could be proved, save in support of arguments of much more substantial character.

(5) *Payment of Peeshkesh, Offerings or Tribute at various Stages by Bahrein to Persia*

From paragraph 6 above it will be seen that tribute appears to have been paid by Bahrein to Persia in 1799. The rulers of Bahrein may also have offered to pay tribute in 1839 (paragraph 32) and appear to have offered to do so in 1860 (paragraph 67). In assessing the importance of the payment of tribute in 1799, or, if it then took place, in 1839 or 1860, it is relevant that such payment or promise of payment was immediately followed by the submission of the rulers of Bahrein, in 1800 to Muscat, in 1839 to the Egyptians, and in 1860 to the Turks. In estimating the importance of such payments as evidence of a recognition of Persian suzerainty, the arguments advanced by Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran in his Despatch No. 28 of March 1845, in which Colonel Sheil remarks that the Chiefs of Bahrein "had in all probability from time to time given peeshkesh, offerings, or tribute to Persia as a mark of superiority, as Kandahar and Herat still continue to do, *without an acknowledgment of subjection*"; and the comment thereon of the Secret Committee of the East India Company that "presents and complimentary messages do not imply an acknowledgment of sovereignty, and they have not been confined to Persia" are also relevant.

(6) *Flying of the Persian Flag by the Sheikh of Bahrein*

(a) The Persian flag was hoisted by the Sheikh of Bahrein in 1860. But as will be seen from paragraph 67 above, hardly had it been hoisted when, on the arrival of a Turkish emissary, it was lowered and the Turkish flag hoisted in its place. At a later stage in 1860-61 the Persian and Turkish flags were apparently flown side by side by the Sheikh. It appears difficult in these circumstances to base any substantial argument on the incident.

(b) The Notes addressed by the Persian envoy in London to the Foreign Office in February 1869 alleged that the Persian flag had been hoisted by Sheikh Md. bin Khalifah and that the Resident had in September 1868 bombarded the Sheikh's palace on which the flag was flying. There appears to be no foundation for the suggestion that the Persian flag was flying when the Resident reached Bahrein or that it was fired on (see paragraph 80). If previously hoisted it had, by the time of the Resident's arrival, been hauled down.

(c) In the undated letters from Sheikh Md. bin Khalifah communicated to the Foreign Office by the Persian envoy in April 1869, the Sheikh stated that he was hoisting the flag of the Lion and Sun over Bahrein. If, as seems probable from internal evidence, these letters date from the period of the abortive Persian Mission to Bahrein of 1860-61, it is relevant in assessing their importance that immediately after the reception of the Persian envoy, a Turkish envoy was received, the Persian flag hauled down and the Turkish flag substituted, and that in the early part of 1861 the flags of Persia and Turkey appear to have been flying side by side on the forts at Bahrein. There is nothing to show that either flag flew in Bahrein between the conclusion of the Convention of 1861 (paragraph 70) and 1868.

(d) In September 1869 the ex-Sheikh Md. bin Khalifah attacked the islands, and with the assistance of Sheikh Md. bin Abdullah killed the ruling Sheikh Ali. The Persian flag may have been hoisted on this occasion. But there is no reference to this in the detailed reports of the capture of the islands by Sheikh Md. bin Khalifah and Sheikh Md. bin Abdullah, or of the operations as the result of which those Sheikhs were reduced at the end of 1869. (Enclosure to Government of India's Despatch No. 7 of 25th January, 1870; Resident's Despatches of 11th September, 25th September, and 5th October, 1869.)

(7) *Letters from past Rulers of Bahrein admitting Persian Suzerainty*

It is by no means improbable that in 1799, 1816-17, and 1839, the rulers of Bahrein addressed letters to the Persian Government acknowledging Persian suzerainty over the island, and they appear certainly to have done so in 1860. But the only letters the text of which has ever been communicated to Her Majesty's Government are the two letters communicated by the Persian envoy in London in 1869. Those letters indeed categorically acknowledge Persian suzerainty over Bahrein and state that it has been uninterruptedly exercised in the past. But they appear to date from 1860, and the submission of Bahrein to Turkey and the hauling down of the Persian flag in the same year are, it is suggested, material in assessing the weight to be attached to them.

(8) *Declarations made by Her Majesty's Government to the Persian Minister in London, April 1869*

(a) These declarations are examined in paragraph 98 above. The text of the Note addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Persian envoy on 29th April, 1869, on which the subsequent Persian claims have to a considerable extent been based, is given in paragraph 85 above. The wording of that Note, and the general attitude adopted by Her Majesty's Government, as evidenced by their acquiescence in the despatch of a mission to Bahrein by Persia, undoubtedly afforded Persia justification for the inferences she appears to have drawn. But, as pointed out in paragraph 10 of the Note addressed to the Persian Minister on 18th February, 1929, and reproduced in Appendix I, Paper B, the Note in question, while very loosely expressed, was never intended to bear the interpretation now placed upon it by the Persian Government (*cp.* in this connection paragraphs 102 and 110 above), and in stating that due consideration had been given in the past by Her Majesty's Government to the Persian claim it did not in any way admit that that claim was valid. The Note, indeed, confirmed the intention of the British Government to continue to hold the Sheikhs to the treaty engagements which had been entered into with them as independent rulers.

(b) The undertaking given by Her Majesty's Government in the same correspondence to communicate in future with Persia before undertaking punitive action against the rulers of Bahrein is *prima facie* consistent with a recognition by Her Majesty's Government of Persian claims to that island. But it appears, however, in fact to have been no more than a courteous indication by His Majesty's Government of their desire to pay the fullest possible attention to any Persian claims. It will be observed that the first (and apparently the only) communication made to the Persian Government in discharge of this understanding, intimated to that Government the intention of Her Majesty's Government to proceed at once against the "Chief now in possession of Bahrein" consequent on his breach of the maritime peace and his attack on the Sheikh who had been placed in power at Bahrein by the British Government.

(9) *Closeness of Relations at the present Day between Persia and Bahrein*

The Sheikhs of Bahrein are strongly opposed to any recognition of Persian suzerainty (*cp.* paragraph 139). The Persian suggestion that relations are at the present time closer between Persia and Bahrein than between Bahrein and any other independent civilised State is without foundation. Relations are at least equally close with Saudi Arabia, and the closest relations are maintained in addition with Great Britain and with British India.

The Terms of the Treaties of 1809, 1814 and 1857 between the British Government and Persia

149. In addition to the nine arguments examined above, Persia has on more than one occasion appealed to the provisions of her treaties of 1809, 1814 and 1857 with the British Government in connection with her claim to Bahrein. Her appeal is based substantially on the fact that those treaties provide in certain circumstances for the evacuation of Persian territory occupied by British troops. The relevant passages of the treaties are as follows:—

(i) By the *preliminary Treaty of 1809* between His Majesty's Government and Persia, the Persian Government undertook not to "permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia either towards India or towards the ports of that country"; while His Majesty's Government undertook "in case any European forces have invaded or shall invade the territories of His Majesty the King of Persia" to "afford to His Majesty the King of Persia a force, or in lieu of it a subsidy, with warlike ammunition . . . and officers. . ."

Article 5 of the same treaty provided: "If a detachment of British troops has arrived from India in the Gulf of Persia and, by the consent of His Persian Majesty, landed on the island of Karak or any of the Persian ports, they shall not in any manner possess themselves of such places, and from the date of these preliminary articles the said detachment shall be at the disposal of His Majesty the King of Persia, the amount of which shall be settled in the definitive treaty."

Article 6 provided that "If the said troops remain by the desire of His Majesty the King of Persia either at Karak or at any other port in the Gulf of Persia" they shall be treated in a friendly manner by the Governor and arrangements made for the supply to them of provisions, &c., at fair prices.

(ii) *Treaty of 1814*.—Article (2) provides that "His Britannic Majesty further engages not to interfere in any dispute which may hereafter arise between the Princes, noblemen and great chiefs of Persia, and if one of the contending parties should even offer a Province of Persia with a view to obtaining assistance, the English Government shall not agree to such proposal, nor by adopting it possess themselves of such part of Persia."

Article 11 provided that "Should His Persian Majesty require assistance from the English Government in the Persian Gulf, they shall, if convenient and practicable, assist him with ships of war and troops. The expenses of such expedition shall be accounted for and defrayed by the Persian Government, and the above ships shall anchor in such ports as shall be pointed out by the Persian Government and not at other harbours without permission, except from absolute necessity."

(iii) The *Treaty of Peace of 4th March, 1857*, drawn up on the conclusion of the war between Persia and Great Britain, provided that "Peace being happily concluded between Their said Majesties, it is hereby agreed that the forces of H.M. the Queen shall evacuate Persian territory, subject to the conditions and stipulations hereafter specified" (Art. 2), and that "immediately on the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty the British troops will desist from all acts of hostility against Persia, and the British Government engages further that as soon as the stipulations in regard to evacuation by the Persian troops of the Herat and Afghan territories as well as in regard to the reception of the British Mission at Tehran shall have been carried into full effect, the British troops shall without delay be withdrawn from all parts, places and islands belonging to Persia. . . ."

If Bahrein were Persian territory and if it had been occupied by British forces at the times envisaged by the treaty provisions to which appeal is made by Persia, there might be some force in the Persian argument, though even then His Majesty's Government might claim that the fact that their actual relations with Bahrein had in no way been affected by the provisions of those treaties, and that Persia had made no protest at the time against any failure to implement those provisions clearly showed that Persia had accepted in the past the fact that Bahrein fell outside her territorial limits. In fact, neither

Aitch., XIII,
No. v, 53.

Aitch., XIII,
No. vii, 60.

Aitch., XIII,
No. xviii, 81.

in 1809, 1814 nor in 1857 was there any British occupation of Bahrein; while His Majesty's Government, never having admitted Persian sovereignty over Bahrein or regarded Bahrein as an integral part of Persia, have in the past adopted the attitude that the terms of the treaties referred to above are irrelevant for the present purpose. As stated by His Majesty's Government in 1906 in reply to a Persian Note which based the Persian claim upon the provisions of those treaties, "the treaties of 1809, 1814 and 1857 on this subject have always been scrupulously observed by His Majesty's Government, but have no bearing on the present question. His Majesty's Government have never admitted the ownership or sovereignty of Persia over Bahrein. Such a claim is in their view entirely inadmissible."

Review of the Persian Claim

150. It is relevant in the first place that from 1847 to 1913 the Turkish claim to Bahrein was pressed with at least equal vigour to the Persian claim, and that through much of that period the Turkish claim had a stronger practical justification than can be claimed by Persia since a period long prior to 1783, in that Turkey was the suzerain of the adjoining continental littoral of Arabia and held or preferred claims to both sides of the Gulf by which Bahrein is enfolded. Moreover, Muscat, which in the early part of the 19th century on more than one occasion established a temporary control over Bahrein and drew tribute from it, was deterred from urging its claims by force from 1829 onwards only by the attitude of His Majesty's Government, while the Wahabi Amirs brought effective pressure to bear on Bahrein and drew tribute from it, though latterly probably in respect only of Bahreini possessions on the mainland, at frequent intervals through the early part of the 19th century, and desisted only with their subjugation by Turkey in 1870. Persia, in other words, was up to 1913 one only of the claimants to Bahrein, and through much of the period 1847 to 1913 if anything a less insistent and to some extent a less plausible claimant than Turkey.

151. These considerations, however, apart, the general effect of a review of the history of Bahrein over the last 150 years and of an examination of the specific arguments put forward by Persia and referred to in paragraphs 148-9 above is to suggest that there is no solid basis for a Persian claim to suzerainty or sovereignty over the islands. The geographical remoteness of the islands from Persia and the fact that their population is Arab are admittedly not decisive arguments. The real weakness in the Persian claim appears to be that there has been no effective exercise of Persian authority in the islands since the expulsion of Persia by the ancestors of the present ruling house in 1783. Such incidents as the momentary hoisting of the Persian flag in 1860, its flying side by side with the Turkish flag in 1860-61, or the temporary tender of allegiance to Persia in 1799, 1816-17 and 1839 must be considered in relation to the history of the islands as a whole, in the period now under consideration, and in particular to the consistent claim of Turkey between 1847 and 1913 and to the absence of any sequel to such momentary acknowledgment of or appeals to Persian power; and they cannot carry the weight of a long dealing extending over a course of years. The remarks of the Government of India in 1870, quoted in paragraph 97 above, are relevant in this connection, as are the observations in paragraph 8 of the British Note to Persia of 18th February, 1929.

It may be added, too, that during the period from 1783 Bahrein has at various dates been in a position to enter into treaty engagements or discussions with neighbouring States such as Muscat (paragraph 26), Turkey (paragraph 103), the Egyptian Viceroy, Mehemet Ali (paragraph 34) and His Majesty's Government on a basis inconsistent with her being at the time subject to Persian jurisdiction. A further point of some importance is the absence, so far as available records show, of any reference to Persia by the Sheikhs of Bahrein, at any date since the conquest of Bahrein by the ancestors of the present rulers in 1783, on the occasion of their accession, or of any formal acknowledgment by Bahrein on such occasions of sovereignty or suzerainty such as might be expected from a Sheikh who regarded himself as a vassal of Persia. Nor does any protest at the absence of any such formal acknowledgment appear at any time to have been made by Persia.

152. The correspondence of 1869-70, to which particular attention has been paid by Persia in the past, and which may be thought the strongest contention that Persia is in a position to put forward, may indeed be quoted as evidence of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government at that period of the relation

of Persia to Bahrein. But it cannot be valid as against the Sheikhs, and while it is sufficiently loosely expressed to afford some justification for the construction which has been placed on it by Persia, it is relevant that the construction placed on it by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and supported by the Government of India, passed without challenge in 1871 (paragraph 102); that a similar interpretation was placed on it, with a minimum of preliminary discussion, in 1886 (paragraph 110); that at frequent intervals between 1870 and 1880 His Majesty's Government maintained the independence of Bahrein against Turkey (paragraphs 99-107 above); that so early as January 1870 they drew the attention of the Turkish Government to the British Note of 1851 (paragraph 61 above); and that His Majesty's Government have uninterruptedly maintained the independence of Bahrein against Persia and Turkey alike since the date of the correspondence in question.

153. The Sheikhs themselves appear, particularly in the early part of the past century, before their relations with Her Majesty's Government were placed on a more definite footing by the Agreements of 1880 and 1892, to have been guided by a consideration of their own immediate interests in deciding on the line of policy to be adopted towards the stronger rulers by whom they were surrounded. It is now more than three-quarters of a century since any appeal, however, flimsy, appears to have been made to Persia by Bahrein. The present Sheikh, Salman, who succeeded his father in 1942, referred in a speech shortly after his accession to "this country of ours, Bahrein, . . . fortunately an independent State", and asserted that he would "firmly adhere to the ancient and proven friendship with the British Government." His father and grandfather were both keenly apprehensive of any recognition of the Persian claim, and there is no reason to suppose that he is any less strongly opposed to it.

C.—Attitude of British Government, 1820-1934

154. From 1820 onwards His Majesty's Government consistently dealt with the Sheikhs as independent rulers. They concluded treaties with them on that basis in 1820, 1847, 1861, 1868, 1880 and 1892, and they have been prepared to maintain their independence by diplomatic, or on occasion by forcible methods against challenge from outside, whether from Persia, Turkey, Egypt or the Wahabis. They originally entered into relations with the Sheikhs and promised them a measure of protection (paragraph 16) in the interests of securing the peace of the Persian Gulf. In the early stages of those relations they appear to have been solely concerned to achieve this object (in 1820 they even offered their mediation, which was, however, not accepted by Persia, to secure the payment of tribute to Persia by the Sheikhs), and they restricted their interference with the internal affairs of the Sheikdom to the minimum required to secure the interests of British subjects. They were consistently reluctant to establish a protectorate over Bahrein in view of the probable local embarrassments in regulating the succession, &c., in which this might involve them, and in 1849 they formally declined a request by the Sheikh that he and the islands should be taken under British protection. In 1861 (paragraph 70) they gave the Sheikhs more categorical guarantees of protection in return for more binding undertakings. Their correspondence with the Persian Minister in London in 1869-70 shows the Home Government, however, still ready at that date to adopt the attitude that if any other Power would discharge the objects which had led Great Britain to undertake certain responsibilities in relation to Bahrein, she would gladly see them do so. Closer relations with the Sheikh and closer control over his freedom of action were established for the first time by the Exclusive Agreement of 1880. Relations became closer still with the conclusion of the Exclusive Agreement of 1892.

XV.—Reference to Law Officers of the Crown

155. This was the position in 1934 when it appeared possible that the Persian Government would bring the question formally before the League of Nations at its September session, and some discussion took place between the Foreign Office and the India Office as to the attitude which His Majesty's Government should adopt in the event of the matter being raised under Article 11 or Article 15 of the Covenant. As part of this examination, and in connection with the abortive treaty negotiations of 1934, the Law Officers of the Crown were asked to advise whether in their opinion Persia possessed any rights in or over Bahrein, and, if so, what the nature of those rights was. In their report the Law

Officers gave as their opinion that Persia had no rights either of sovereignty or suzerainty in or over Bahrein (the full texts of the submission and the report are included as Appendix II). E. 5011/2369/
91, 1934.

156. In the event no action was taken by the Persian Government to bring the issue before either the Council or the Assembly.

XVI.—Independent Status of Bahrein

157. Since that date further consideration has been given to the terminology defining the status of Bahrein, and the following considerations are placed on record:

In public pronouncements referring to the status of Bahrein the formula used has been: "an independent Sheikdom in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government," although the Persian Government (and, on occasion, the Turkish Government) have been informed that the islands are under British protection. In fact, even before the Exclusive Agreements of 1880 and 1892, the position of Bahrein was tending increasingly to approximate to that of a State under British protection. Those agreements, therefore gave formal recognition to a relationship between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government which was already well-established on the basis of the Treaties of 1820 and 1847 and the Friendly Convention of 1861, in which the Sheikh was described as the "independent ruler of Bahrein." On many occasions His Majesty's Government had expressed unwillingness to assume greater responsibility in relation to the islands (paragraph 56 above) (so long as their independence and the performance of the engagements undertaken by the Sheikh could be secured without their doing so), but it was necessary, nevertheless, to intervene on several occasions for the restoration of order or to enforce the implementation of his obligations by the ruling Sheikh.

There is no incompatibility between such interventions and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Bahrein, which was laid down in 1854 (paragraph 64 above), and, except in so far as intervention has been necessitated by a situation endangering the peace of the Gulf or the status of Bahrein, this principle has been adhered to ever since. Thus, there is no doubt that the internal, or domestic, status of the Sheikh is that of an independent ruler, exactly comparable with that of the rulers of one of the Malay States, of Zanzibar, and of many other territories, and that, from the point of view of English Constitutional Law, not only is the Sheikh an independent sovereign, but his territory is foreign territory and his nationals are aliens.

On the other hand, from the point of view of international law, the Sheikh has no independence at all, since by the Exclusive Agreements, he binds himself to abstain from entering into any agreement or correspondence with any other Power than Great Britain, and His Majesty's Government thus exercise control over his foreign relations and jurisdiction over foreigners in Bahrein. Internationally, therefore, the Sheikh has no status and his territory is, from that point of view, under the sovereignty of His Majesty, who governs it through a ruler who is independent only in the internal or municipal sense, and the parallel in the international sense also between Bahrein and the Malay States and other protected states is exact; the islands are not foreign but British territory, and the nationals of their ruler are British-protected persons and, therefore, nationals of His Majesty as much as British subjects are. This position has been maintained in many ways; in the defence of Bahreinis against oppression by the Persian Government, and, most notably, by the grant to the islands of Imperial Preference by regarding them as one of the "territories under His Majesty's protection" under Section 21 of the Import Duties Act, 1932.

The position in international law created by such treaties with native rulers as the Exclusive Agreements with the Sheikh of Bahrein, is fully discussed by the Arbitrator in his Award in the case between the United States of America and the Netherlands Government relating to the island of Palmas (or Miangas) (Permanent Court of International Arbitration, 4th April, 1928). The Arbitrator decided in favour of the Netherlands Government, who based their claim on the fact that they had been exercising effective sovereignty for a number of years, and he recognised that the actual exercise of sovereignty creates prescriptive rights which override a previous title. The Netherlands exercised sovereignty by virtue of treaties with the native ruler under the terms of which he retained his independence with regard to the administration of all internal affairs, and delegated control of his foreign relations to the Netherlands Government.

XVII.—1934-46

Establishment of Naval Base at Bahrein

E. 2586/23/34, 1935.
E. 2181/76/34, 1935.

158. Early in 1934 His Majesty's Government had bought sufficient land at Bahrein to provide for a combined naval and air base to take the place of the naval establishments at Henjam and Basidu, which it had been decided to relinquish. On 2nd April, 1935, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran handed a note to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs announcing this decision and the fact that the naval stations were being moved to Bahrein. In his reply M. Kazemi referred to "the right of the Imperial Government in connection with Bahrein, both for the present and for the future," but qualified his reservation by stating that he did not wish at that juncture to embark on a discussion of the question. At the same time M. Kazemi indicated that his Government might recognise the "independence" of Bahrein in return for assistance and concessions by His Majesty's Government in other matters. He also said that Bahrein was of no interest to Persia, though, on account of public opinion on the subject, the Persian Government could not abandon their claim without some return.

The Times, 4th April, 1935.
E. 2334/4/91, 1935.

159. On 3rd April, 1935, the Persian Minister in London wrote a letter to *The Times* commenting on a leading article on naval changes in the Persian Gulf, in which he stated that the Persian Government had never recognised a British protectorate over Bahrein, over which Persia had never relinquished sovereignty. In reply to a subsequent question in Parliament Sir John Simon stated that His Majesty's Government, who had been in close treaty relations with the rulers of Bahrein since 1820, did not regard, and had never regarded, the Persian claim as possessing any validity whatever.

Persian Government's refusal to recognise visas and endorsements for Bahrein

T. 9850/9850/378, 1933.
T. 62/62/378, 1933.

160. In 1933 the Persian Government began to refuse to visa passports which were endorsed for Bahrein and Kuwait, and a form of retaliatory action was taken by His Majesty's Government in consequence, although this was soon dropped owing to the complications which it involved, and specific endorsements for Arab States in the Persian Gulf on British passports were abolished.

E. 3680/139/34.
T. 7979/79/378.
T. 4849/1049/378.

In May 1934 His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran made representations on the matter to the Persian Government, but Mirza Baghir Kazemi alleged that the endorsement "Bahrein" on British passports was something new which was naturally not recognised by the Persian Government. Persia visa regulations issued in March 1934 contained (Chapter VI—Prohibitions) an instruction to refuse a visa for entry to Persia on passports "endorsed as valid for the journey to Bahrein or which bear a visa for Bahrein." No satisfaction was received as a result of the representations made to the Persian Government, and the difficulty was overcome by the issue for journeys to Bahrein of a temporary passport without the endorsement or visa for Bahrein.

Owing to the possibility of a harmful effect upon prospective treaty negotiations of continuing the argument on this subject, in 1934 it was allowed to lapse, and the practical success of the device of the temporary passport has precluded the necessity of raising the question since that date.

Treaty Series No. 7? (1936). Agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government regarding Transit Dues at Bahrein

E. 3922/16/25, 1936.
E. 6193/16/25, 1936.
E. 2837/2837/25, 1937.

161. In a note dated 30th May, 1936, the Minister for Foreign Affairs protested against the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government regarding Bahrein Transit Dues, which had been concluded in November 1935 and published in this country in May 1936. The Note stated that the Persian Government regarded the action of His Majesty's Government as a denial of Persia's indisputable rights, and stated that he must make all possible reserves in respect of present and future rights and interests of the Persian Government. A copy of this Note was sent by the Persian Government to the Secretariat of the League of Nations and to the Government of Saudi Arabia. A Note was addressed to the Persian Government in reply on the 1st October, reminding them of the views previously expressed by His Majesty's Government in the matter, and a copy of this Note was sent to the League of Nations for circulation to members. This called forth a rejoinder from the Persian Government, dated 6th May, 1937, which referred to the "indisputable rights" of the Persian Government, and stated that the arguments of His Majesty's Government were not regarded as convincing, and could not shake the

legitimate rights of Persia; a copy of this communication was not apparently sent to the League of Nations, and no action was taken by His Majesty's Government on it.

The Liabilities of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf

162. On 3rd February, 1937, the Under-Secretary of State for India was asked a question in the House of Commons relating to the liabilities of His Majesty's Government in the Persian Gulf. In reply he said that "the Arab States of Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Coast are in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government under which they enjoy in varying degrees His Majesty's protection." The Persian Ambassador made a protest at this statement, which he described as "inconsistent with the sovereignty of his Government over the Bahrein islands." The standard reply was given, which was acknowledged in a Note which referred again to the indisputable rights of sovereignty of the Persian Government over the Bahrein islands already set forth in the letter of 2nd August, 1928, (paragraph 140 above). No reply was sent to this further protest.

Treatment of Bahreinis in Persia

163. In 1934 considerable trouble was caused by the oppression of Bahreinis by the Persian authorities in Khuzistan. Many of them had not taken out Persian registration papers and found themselves involved in difficulties with the police and the registration authorities, who behaved in an exceedingly high-handed manner, beating and ill-treating the men concerned. Some of the victims had been born in Persia, and thus had dual nationality; some, though born in Bahrein, owned land in Persia. Even those born outside Persia who owned no land would not affect their status as Bahreinis by accepting Persian registration papers if they subsequently chose to leave Persia. All were accordingly advised to register and the trouble died down.

On 16th November, 1937, His Majesty's Minister addressed a Note to the Persian Government protesting against the action of the Persian authorities at Khorramshahr in confiscating the Bahrein registration papers of a Bahreini dhow and obliging the nakhuda to take out Persian papers before allowing him to leave the port. To this Note the Persian Government replied on 12th December restating the view that Bahrein was Persian territory, and adding that they regarded the protest as unjustifiable.

Bahrein Nationality and Property Laws

164. In February 1937 the Bahrein Government enacted a Nationality Law and a law regarding the ownership of immovable property in Bahrein by foreigners. The main object of these laws was to retaliate for the treatment of Bahreinis in Persia. The Persian Government addressed a Note of protest to His Majesty's Minister in Tehran on 13th June, stating that these laws were contrary to the sovereignty of Persia over Bahrein, and that they could not in any way impair the rights of the Persian Government. As on the occasion of the Persian protest of 1936 regarding the levy of transit dues at Bahrein (see paragraph 161), a brief reply was sent on 9th September stating that the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the subject had been set out on many occasions, and notably in the Note of 18th February, 1929. The intended notification applying the Bahrein Property Law to Persian subjects in Bahrein was published on 1st November. In a Note dated 28th December, 1938, the Persian Government duly protested against the notification, stating that it was now clear that the sole object of the Property Law was to impose restrictions on the ownership of property by non-Bahreini Persians who had settled in the island. A copy of this Note, which again referred to Persia's legitimate rights and denied the independence of the islands and the existence of any special British rights therein, was sent to the League of Nations. In this case it was decided not to pursue the matter with the Persian Government, and His Majesty's Government contented themselves with addressing a letter to the League of Nations on 12th March, 1938, stating that they had nothing to add to their Note to the Persian Government of 9th September, 1937.

Treatment of Persians in Bahrein

165. In June 1938 vigorous oral representations were made by the Persian Government about the treatment of Persian subjects in Bahrein, who, they alleged, were being expelled or imprisoned in connection with the Nationality

and Property Laws. It transpired that the action taken had nothing to do with these laws, but had been taken under a King's Regulation of 1937 which provided for the expulsion of all foreigners entering Bahrein without valid travel documents. It was explained that the application of this Regulation had, in practice, been restricted to indigents, with whom Bahrein had been flooded. The Persian Government let the matter drop and the question was not given any publicity in the vernacular press. An interesting feature upon which His Majesty's Minister remarks in his Annual Report, was that it marked a change in the attitude hitherto adopted by the Persian Government towards Bahrein. Though they were careful to maintain orally Persia's claim to sovereignty, and though their approach only amounted to enlisting the good offices of His Majesty's Government, the fact that diplomatic action was taken amounted in practice to *de facto* admission of His Majesty's Government's position in Bahrein.

Postal Services between Persia and Bahrein

166. The last occasion which can be traced on which correspondence passed between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government on the question of sovereignty over Bahrein was in connection with difficulties which had arisen regarding postal services between Persia and Bahrein. It is unnecessary here to enter into the details of a somewhat involved correspondence between 1939 and 1943, it being sufficient to record that, in Notes of 29th June, 1942, and 24th December, 1942, His Majesty's Legation at Tehran and the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs respectively reserved the claims of their Governments regarding the ownership of the islands.

Persian Government decree regarding import of Petroleum Products from Bahrein

167. Prominence was given by the Persian press in April 1946 to a decree of the Council of Ministers laying down that all petroleum products imported from Bahrein should be subject to the same dues and royalties as those levied on Anglo-Iranian Oil Company products. Satisfaction was expressed with this action "since the Persian Government and nation considered Bahrein an integral part of Persian territory." The quantity imported from Bahrein during the previous twelve months was extremely small, and this and other signs made a renewal of the claim to the islands appear to be imminent. Up to the end of 1946, however, the subject was not re-opened by the Persian Government.

Remarks of the Persian Prime Minister to the United States Ambassador

168. On 31st August, 1946, the United States Ambassador at Tehran paid a few hours' visit to Bahrein, and while there told the Political Resident that the Persian Prime Minister, Qavam as Sultaneh, had shown him the original of the letter of 1869 (paragraph 84 above) from Her Majesty's Government, upon which, he said, Persia mainly based her claim to the islands. He had added that at present he did not propose to pursue the claim with the United Nations or the International Court of Justice, as he thought it was unlikely to succeed owing to the strength of British influence in those bodies.

Recent references to Bahrein in the Persian Press

169. The subject of Bahrein came up, after a long silence, early in 1945 when articles appeared in the Tudeh papers (*Darya* of 7th January, and *Nida-yi-Haqiqat* of 11th January) which maintained that the islands belong to Persia, and that His Majesty's Government had, by implication, accepted Persian sovereignty over them in 1935. The evacuation of Bahrein was expected to take place at the same time as that of the rest of Persia. The second article charged His Majesty's Government with violation of Persian rights over the islands, and claimed that the Sheikh's agreement with the Standard Oil Company was illegal. The following month a poem was published in a Shiraz Tudeh paper on the same subject.

170. On 21st September, 1945, a leading article in *Nauruz-i-Iran* referring to a statement on the evacuation of Russian troops made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Majlis, called upon the *United States of America* to evacuate Bahrein and postpone the exploitation of the oilfields. Persia's right of ownership in Bahrein was said to be proved by records in the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

171. In February, March and May 1946 further press references occurred in the same vein. On 27th and 28th August the *Ahan* (Tudeh) asked that the question should be referred to the Peace Conference, and three other papers referred briefly to the claim on the following day.

172. On 12th December, 1946, the Tehran Radio reported a speech by a member of the crowd of Democrats in Tehran congratulating the Prime Minister on the Azerbaijan settlement. In it the Persian army was praised for its heroism and for hoisting the Lion and Sun "over the whole of this ancient State from Serakhs to Khanaqin, and from Aras to Bahrein."

173. Several Tehran papers have also recently taken up the cause of Bahrein. *Mashrutiyat* (Centre), in a series of articles written in December, states: "There is no difference between Azerbaijan and Bahrein from Persia's point of view . . . We favour the integrity of the entire country . . . Foreign penetration in any part of the island is intolerable to us . . . The Government should insist on the establishment of its power in Bahrein, just as it did in Azerbaijan."

174. Although history shows that it is not necessary to see the Soviet hand behind these claims, it must be recorded that they appeared in newspapers known to be sponsored by the Soviet, and that they are constantly echoed in the Soviet broadcasts as evidence of the "imperialism" of His Majesty's Government.

Research Department,
Foreign Office.
13th January, 1947.

APPENDIX I to No. 1

Paper B

NOTES EXCHANGED WITH THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT, 1927-29, RESPECTING THE PERSIAN CLAIM TO BAHREIN.

[E 5063/184/91]

(A)

M. Khan Mossaed to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 28.)

Persian Legation, London,

November 26, 1927.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to state that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has recently addressed a note to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, of which the following is a translation:—

"1. According to information received by the Persian Government, a treaty was concluded between His Britannic Majesty and Ibn Saud and signed at Jeddah on the 20th May last, of which article 6 is as follows:—

"His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies undertakes to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of Kuwait and Bahrain, and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government."

"2. The sovereignty of Persia over the Island of Bahrain being well founded, the Imperial Persian Government, at the time a special treaty was concluded between the British Government and the Sheikh of Bahrain, rightfully protested, and Lord Clarendon, in a letter dated the 29th April, 1869, addressed to the then Persian Minister in London, formally acknowledged the justice of that protest.

"3. You will realise that the insertion of article 6 in the above-mentioned treaty, in so far as it relates to Bahrain, is averse to the territorial integrity of Persia, and, consequently, incompatible with the friendly relations subsisting between two neighbouring countries.

"4. I therefore earnestly protest against the insertion of the above article in the treaty, and shall look forward to suitable measures being taken, as soon as practicable, by His Britannic Majesty's Government, with a view to its elimination.

"5. I have to add further that, Persia being a member of the League of Nations, the Imperial Persian Government, conformably to article 10 of the Covenant, which guarantees the territorial integrity of its members, have forwarded a copy of their note to the League of Nations, with the request that their protest may receive due consideration."

I beg leave to bring this matter to the notice of your Excellency for your kind consideration.

I have, &c.
HOVHANNES KHAN MOSSAED,
Persian Minister.

[E 220/51/91]

(B)

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Hovhannès Khan Mossaed

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 18, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 26th November, containing the formal protest which the Persian Government have seen fit to make against the terms of article 6 of the Treaty of Jeddah, concluded on the 20th May, 1927, between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies, on the ground that the reference in that article to the Islands of Bahrein is contrary to the territorial integrity of Persia.

2. In reply, I shall be grateful if you will inform your Government that His Majesty's Government are not aware of any valid grounds upon which the claim of the Persian Government to sovereignty over these islands is or can be based. Geographically, the islands are not a part of Persia, nor are the inhabitants of Persian race. His Majesty's Government are aware that during part of the 17th century and for some years during the latter part of the 18th century Bahrein was overrun and occupied by Persian troops, or by the followers of certain chiefs from the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf; but it appears to be established that in or about the year 1783 the Government of the Shah were dispossessed of the islands by an invasion of Arab tribes under the leadership of the direct lineal ancestor of the present Sheikh, and that since that date the islands have never at any time been under the effective control of Persia.

3. The Persian Government have on various occasions alleged that their claim to sovereignty over Bahrein has been recognised by His Majesty's Government. While it is not evident that, even if this assertion were justified, it would confer on Persia the right of ownership which on other grounds appears so difficult to establish, His Majesty's Government feel that they must once and for all declare this statement to be entirely inadmissible.

4. The special treaty relations between His Majesty's Government and the successive Sheikhs of Bahrein, to which reference is made in the Treaty of Jeddah, have now been in existence for more than a century, the first in the series of undertakings by which those relations are regulated having been signed in the year 1820. The agreements have throughout been concluded on the basis that the Sheikh of Bahrein is an independent ruler. His Majesty's Government do not deny that the claim to independence of the Sheikh is one which has from time to time been contested by the Government of the Shah, and in particular in the discussions which took place in 1869, to which reference is made in your note. I desire, however, to point out that your Government are under a complete misunderstanding in inferring from the terms of the communication made by the late Earl of Clarendon to the Persian Minister on the 29th April, 1869, that any recognition of the validity of the Persian claims to sovereignty in Bahrein was at that time intended. In that note it was stated that Her Majesty's Government had given due consideration to the protest of the Persian Government "against the Persian right of sovereignty over Bahrein being ignored by the British authorities," but it in no way admitted any such right. On the contrary, the whole tenor of the note should have made it clear that Her Majesty's Government maintained their right to enter into direct treaty relations with the Sheikhs of Bahrein as independent rulers; and while at the same time it indicated that Her Majesty's Government would gladly transfer to Persia, if she were able and willing to perform them, certain duties in the Persian Gulf towards the performance of which the treaty relations in question contributed, and offered, in view of the friendly feelings entertained by Her Majesty's Government towards Persia, to cause the Persian Government to be informed beforehand, when practicable, of any measure of coercion which the conduct of the Sheikhs might have rendered necessary, it is evident that no recognition of the validity of the Persian protest, or of the Persian claim to suzerainty, was thereby intended or implied. The note, in fact, as the Persian Legation at Constantinople was

reminded in December 1871 by Sir Henry Elliott, then Her Majesty's Ambassador in Turkey, contains nothing more than an acknowledgment that the Persian claim to suzerainty had previously been made. The numerous supplementary agreements entered into between the British Government and the rulers of Bahrein between 1869 and the present day have equally proceeded on the assumption that a claim to sovereignty in Bahrein on the part either of the Government of the Shah or of the Turkish Government could not possibly be admitted by His Majesty's Government.

5. The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards this question was still more clearly defined when in the year 1906 His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, on my predecessor's instructions, addressed to the Persian Government a note stating that "His Majesty's Government have never admitted the ownership or sovereignty of Persia over Bahrein, and such a claim is, in their view, entirely inadmissible. His Majesty's Government consider the Island of Bahrein and its inhabitants to be under British protection, and must decline to entertain any further representations on the subject." The note added that this reply had invariably been made to the Ottoman Government, which had on several occasions advanced a claim to Bahrein. In reply to this note, a formal protest was received from the Persian Government, in which their claim to sovereignty over Bahrein was based on an agreement, dated the 30th August, 1822, between Captain William Bruce, "the special commissioner of the British Government," and the Prince Governor of Shiraz. This agreement, however, as was pointed out in a reply from His Majesty's Minister on the 2nd January, 1907, and again on the 23rd February, 1907, was promptly disavowed at the time by the proper representatives of His Britannic Majesty, as having been entered into without authority, and His Majesty Fath Ali Shah also refused to recognise its stipulations, and expressed his displeasure that the Prince of Shiraz should have entered into any engagements with the British Government without his knowledge or instructions. In these circumstances, having regard to international law and custom, the agreement cannot be regarded as ever having possessed any binding force.

6. From the foregoing remarks you will observe that the Persian Government are not justified in supposing that His Majesty's Government either in 1869 or at any other time, intended to recognise that Bahrein was a part of Persia, and that, while they have, indeed, admitted that a claim on the subject has from time to time been put forward by the Persian Government, they have never admitted the validity of the claims which either the Turkish or Persian Governments have frequently put forward in the past. Their consistent endeavour in the matter of Bahrein has been to secure that the peaceful development of the islands and the welfare of the Arab inhabitants shall not be disturbed by unjustified attempts on the part of their neighbours to subject them to a foreign domination. They are not prepared to contemplate any departure from this policy.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 4249/51/91]

(C)

Mr. Parr to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 363.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Acting Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd August, on the subject of Bahrein.

Tehran, August 6, 1928.

Enclosure in (C).

M. Pakrevan to Mr. Parr.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

Téhéran, le 2 août 1928.

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître sa réponse à la lettre du 18 janvier 1928, relative aux îles de Bahrein, que son Excellence le Secrétaire d'État Sir Austen Chamberlain a adressée au Ministre de Perse à Londres.

Les motifs invoqués par l'honorable Secrétaire d'État pour opposer une fin de non-recevoir à la juste protestation du Gouvernement impérial, formulée dans sa lettre du 22 novembre 1927, contre la clause relative aux îles de Bahreïn contenue à l'article 6 du Traité de Djeddah du 20 mai 1927, entre Sa Majesté britannique et le Sultan Abdol Aziz-Ebn-Séoud, ne sauraient en rien convaincre le Gouvernement impérial et le détourner un instant de la voie dans laquelle il s'est engagé pour la légitime défense de son incontestable droit de souveraineté sur les îles de Bahreïn.

2. Mais, avant d'en venir à l'étude et au sujet des postulats sur lesquels s'appuie le Secrétaire d'État pour repousser la protestation persane et affirmer la légitimité de la politique britannique, je tiens à attirer l'attention de votre Gouvernement sur ce principe juridique d'ordre international :

Un territoire appartenant à un État souverain ne peut en être légitimement détaché tant que le droit de propriété n'a pas été transféré par cet État à un autre État, par un acte officiel, en l'espèce un traité, ou que son annexion à un autre État ou que son indépendance propre n'ont pas été reconnues officiellement par le légitime propriétaire de ce territoire.

Or, comme toute vérité historique, c'est l'évidence même que les îles de Bahreïn appartiennent à la Perse. Jamais il n'a existé un État indépendant connu sous le nom de Bahreïn. La Perse n'a jamais renoncé à sa souveraineté sur ces îles, comme elle ne l'a jamais cédée à un autre État, ni jamais reconnu aucun des cheikhs de ces îles comme des chefs indépendants.

Nous sommes loin de disconvenir qu'il est souvent arrivé dans l'histoire de la Perse que des khans, gouverneurs, cheikhs ou autres chefs locaux se sont soulevés contre l'autorité du pouvoir central, se soumettant sitôt après ou vivant un temps plus ou moins long en état de rébellion, fréquemment se battant entre eux, le plus fort s'emparant du pouvoir local, mais restant, comme ses adversaires, soumis et subordonné au Gouvernement central : il va de soi que ces rivalités, ces querelles intestines n'ont jamais pu porter atteinte au droit de souveraineté ni à l'intégrité du pays.

Cela posé, je déclare, au nom de mon Gouvernement et de la façon la plus catégorique, que les îles de Bahreïn font partie intégrante de la Perse et qu'il ne peut, par conséquent, admettre que l'insoumission momentanée ou plus ou moins prolongée d'un cheikh quelconque puisse aucunement porter atteinte au droit souverain de la Perse sur Bahreïn.

Dans l'état actuel des usages internationaux, il ne peut jamais être question de demander à un État, en temps de paix, de renoncer à ses droits de souveraineté sur une partie quelconque de son territoire, sous le prétexte que les habitants de ce territoire ne parlent pas la langue nationale de l'État souverain ou que ce territoire est, par sa position géographique, en fait détaché de la mère-patrie par la mer. Cette vérité, le Gouvernement britannique, moins que tout autre pays, ne peut la méconnaître. Les considérations d'ordre ethnique et géographique ne peuvent à la rigueur se poser que pour justifier les prétentions d'un État d'annexer un territoire nouveau.

En outre des droits de la Perse sur Bahreïn, il est notoire que les rapports de ces îles avec elle, tant ethniques qu'économiques, sont beaucoup plus développés qu'avec n'importe quel autre pays indépendant et civilisé du monde.

Bahreïn a constamment et sans interruption fait partie de la Perse dans les siècles passés, sauf cependant durant l'occupation portugaise de 1507 à 1622, date à laquelle le Gouvernement persan en a repris possession.

Jamais les Cheikhs-Gouverneurs de Bahreïn n'ont, même dans les siècles passés, exercé leurs fonctions à titre de chefs indépendants, mais bien plutôt comme chefs de tribu, à l'exemple de khans locaux de certaines parties de la Perse, qui, il y a à peine quelques années encore, exerçaient leurs fonctions de gouverneurs à titre permanent et parfois même héréditaire, mais toujours sous la dépendance et le contrôle du pouvoir central.

Les Cheikhs de Bahreïn ont toujours reconnu la souveraineté persane et cela non pas seulement jusqu'à la fin du 18^e siècle. Des documents postérieurs et authentiques existent, où ils déclarent leur entière soumission et leur fidélité au Gouvernement central ; sans omettre d'ajouter, ce qui est une preuve incontestable de dépendance, qu'ils payaient l'impôt qu'ils devaient à l'État.

Il est manifeste que cet état de choses n'a cessé qu'à partir du moment où les cheikhs ont été incités à l'insoumission, à l'instigation d'un État étranger, sous forme de contrainte, de menaces ou d'ingérence directe.

3. S'il est constant que la Perse n'a jamais douté de son droit de souveraineté et de propriété sur Bahreïn, il est avéré qu'il fut un temps où le Gouvernement britannique n'en doutait pas non plus. Nous en trouvons la preuve

dans la correspondance échangée avec le Secrétaire d'État, feu le Comte de Clarendon. Après avoir pris connaissance des documents communiqués par la Légation de Perse à Londres et après en avoir conféré avec son collègue, le Secrétaire d'État des Indes, le Comte de Clarendon dans sa lettre du 29 avril 1869 déclare :

“ The British Government readily admit that the Government of the Shah has protested against the Persian right of sovereignty over Bahrein being ignored by the British authorities, and they have given due consideration to that protest.”

Ainsi après avoir pris connaissance des faits et documents, il déclare prendre en due considération la protestation par laquelle le Gouvernement impérial affirme son droit de souveraineté.

Nous prétendons qu'il est impossible de découvrir dans les termes dont se sert le Secrétaire d'État de l'époque un sens autre et de leur donner une interprétation autre que celle qui tombe sous le sens.

Cela est si vrai que le noble Lord se voit obligé de justifier la nature des relations entretenues par son Gouvernement avec les Cheikhs de Bahreïn, ce qui ne peut s'expliquer que vis-à-vis du Souverain légitime, et de restreindre la politique britannique à leur égard à un simple contrôle sur la piraterie, la traite des esclaves et le maintien de l'ordre dans le Golfe. Il convient de citer, à cet effet, la partie de sa lettre qui s'y rapporte :

“ I beg to assure you that the British Government hold the Sheikh to these engagements *solely* for the purpose of preventing piracy and slave trade and of maintaining the police of the Gulf.”

Il n'est ici nullement question d'un droit pour l'Angleterre sur ces îles, ni de l'indépendance de Bahreïn et de ces cheikhs.

Et la reconnaissance de la souveraineté persane sur Bahreïn est ensuite affirmée de la façon la plus éclatante :

“ If the Persian Government are prepared to keep a sufficient force in the Gulf for these purposes, this country would be relieved of a troublesome and costly duty, but if the Shah is not prepared to undertake these duties, Her Majesty's Government cannot suppose His Majesty would wish that in those waters disorder and crimes should be encouraged by impunity.”

Ce qui revient à dire que, si le Gouvernement persan est en état de faire la police du Golfe, le Gouvernement britannique se considérera libéré “ de la lourde et coûteuse tâche ” qu'il s'est imposée à cet effet et que, par conséquent, il se retirera pour laisser le Souverain légitime exercer ces devoirs, qui donc lui reviennent réellement.

Lord Clarendon ajoute :

“ and in regard to this question, I have the honour to state to you, whenever it is practicable to do so Her Majesty's Government will cause the Persian Government to be informed beforehand of any measures of coercion against himself which the conduct of the Sheikh of Bahrein may have rendered necessary.”

Ce qui ne peut s'expliquer que par la nécessité de rendre compte au Souverain légitime.

Les déclarations très explicites de Lord Clarendon et l'engagement formel du Gouvernement britannique en 1869 sont une preuve éclatante tant de la fragilité des droits que s'est arrogés le Gouvernement britannique que de la souveraineté de la Perse sur les îles de Bahreïn.

Cela étant, le passage du paragraphe 3 de la lettre de l'honorable Secrétaire d'État britannique, dans lequel il prétend que, même au cas où la Perse aurait raison d'affirmer que le Gouvernement britannique a admis sa revendication sur Bahreïn, cela ne conférerait pas à la Perse un droit de propriété sur ces îles, nous demeure inintelligible.

Nous n'avons jamais prétendu que la reconnaissance par le Gouvernement britannique de notre droit sur Bahreïn créait ce droit, pas plus que nous ne pouvons accepter que sa méconnaissance de ce droit nous l'enlève. Il est demeuré, indépendamment de toute opinion étrangère, pour les raisons que nous avons établies. Il n'est tout de même pas sans intérêt de relever que le Gouvernement britannique, qui nous conteste aujourd'hui ce droit, l'ait lui-même, au cours de l'histoire, plus d'une fois reconnu.

4. Le seul argument invoqué, à plusieurs reprises, par le Gouvernement britannique, pour refuser de reconnaître la souveraineté de la Perse sur Bahreïn, se base sur le fait qu'il est entré en relations directes contractuelles avec les Cheikhs-Gouverneurs de Bahreïn.

A cet aveu, le Gouvernement répond en posant les questions suivantes :

Le fait d'avoir enfreint les règles élémentaires du droit international crée-t-il un droit et autorise-t-il son auteur à s'en prévaloir pour en tirer les conclusions qui conviennent à sa politique ?

En effet, si un gouverneur ou un chef local d'une partie quelconque du territoire d'un État souverain entre en relations directes avec un État étranger, sans l'autorisation expresse du Gouvernement central, cela a-t-il une valeur juridique en droit des gens ?

Un État étranger a-t-il le droit de conclure des accords avec des gouverneurs ou des chefs locaux, à l'insu du Gouvernement dont ces chefs ou gouverneurs dépendent ?

Mais si, néanmoins, ce principe incontesté du droit international se trouve avoir été transgressé par un gouverneur ou chef local, volontairement ou par contrainte, ou si l'État étranger, passant outre aux règles communes du droit des gens, est entré en relations contractuelles avec ces gouverneurs ou ces chefs rebelles, le droit de l'État souverain sur ces parties de son territoire où ces accords illégaux ont eu lieu sera-t-il prescrit ?

Le gouverneur ou le chef rebelle pourra-t-il légitimement se prévaloir de ces accords avec l'étranger pour prétendre à une autonomie ou une indépendance quelconque ?

Le Gouvernement impérial, chaque fois qu'il a eu connaissance de semblables accords, n'a jamais manqué d'élever à leur encontre une énergique protestation officielle.

5. Les déclarations du Ministre d'Angleterre à Téhéran en 1906, auxquelles il est fait allusion dans la lettre de l'honorable Secrétaire d'État—déclarations tendant à rejeter l'affirmation par la Perse de sa souveraineté sur Bahreïn et à prétendre au protectorat britannique sur ces îles—ne donnent aucune force nouvelle à la thèse anglaise.

A ces déclarations, le Gouvernement impérial a répondu par une protestation catégorique, appuyée, entre autres, sur cet argument que ses droits sur Bahreïn étaient corroborés dans l'accord, en date du 30 août 1822, conclu entre le Capitaine William Bruce et le Prince Gouverneur de Chiraz.

Cet accord aurait été "immédiatement désavoué, à l'époque, par les représentants compétents de Sa Majesté britannique comme ayant été conclu sans les autorisations nécessaires."

Mais, même désavoué, il reste un document historique d'une inappréciable valeur. Il permet, en effet, de fixer, telles qu'elles étaient, les situations respectives du Gouvernement persan et du Gouvernement britannique par rapport à Bahreïn et à ses cheikhs. La vérité historique qui ressort de cet accord, c'est l'affirmation et la confirmation de la main même du Capitaine Bruce que les îles de Bahreïn faisaient partie de notre Province de Fars.

Aucun désaveu n'infirmera jamais ce point d'histoire définitivement élucidé dès 1832 par une autorité britannique, bien placée pour en connaître.

On peut supposer à ce désaveu tous les motifs qu'on voudra, sauf évidemment le fait que le Capitaine Bruce avait reconnu que Bahreïn faisait partie de la Perse, puisque la susdite lettre de Lord Clarendon, postérieure de 47 ans, corrobore et même renforce, comme nous l'avons ci-dessus établi, la reconnaissance de l'état de fait émanant du Capitaine Bruce.

D'autre part, quand on dit que Fath Ali Chah lui-même a désavoué cet accord, ce n'est certes pas parce qu'on y reconnaissait que les îles de Bahreïn dépendaient de son Gouvernement.

Sans répit, ni trêve, la Perse ne s'est pas lassée de proclamer sa souveraineté et cela même aux temps les plus troubles de son histoire.

En effet, le Gouvernement persan, dans sa réponse du 10 août 1907 aux notes du 2 janvier 1907 du Ministre britannique à Téhéran, relatives au désaveu de l'accord du 30 août 1822, déclare :

"L'accord de 1822, même non exécuté, comme vous le prétendez, ne peut aller à l'encontre des conséquences qui s'en déduisent. Les autorités officielles britanniques, à ce moment-là, ont constaté, tels qu'ils étaient, l'état et la situation juridique des îles de Bahreïn. Elles les ont certifiés d'après ce qu'elles ont vu et reconnu. Si, par la suite, l'accord intervenu n'a pas été

exécuté, cela ne peut nullement porter atteinte au principe de la reconnaissance du droit de la Perse sur les îles par les autorités britanniques, et c'est au sujet de ce principe que le Gouvernement persan ne peut s'attendre que le Gouvernement britannique méconnaisse le droit traditionnel de la Perse sur ces îles."

6. De l'accord de 1822 jusqu'à ce jour, aucun titre valable n'a été acquis par le Gouvernement britannique. Il n'avait donc pas le droit d'empiéter sur le droit de souveraineté de la Perse sur Bahreïn par le traité qu'il a conclu avec le Sultan Abdol Aziz-Ebn-Séoud en mai 1927.

C'est pour ces considérations que le Gouvernement impérial a protesté et qu'il maintient sa protestation contre l'article 6 du Traité de Djeddah du 20 mai 1927, relatif aux îles de Bahreïn.

Mon Gouvernement espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique se rendra aux considérations historiques et juridiques ci-dessus invoquées et qu'il reconnaîtra volontiers qu'une telle disposition ne peut avoir d'effet que si elle a été conclue avec l'État persan, souverain légitime des îles de Bahreïn.

Veillez, &c.

F. PAKREVAN.

[E 853/33/91]

(D)

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Hochannès Khan Mossaed

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 18, 1929.

IN a note dated the 18th January, 1928, I had the honour to inform you, in reply to your note of the 26th November, 1927, respecting the claim advanced by your Government to the islands of Bahreïn, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were not aware of any valid grounds upon which the claim of the Persian Government to sovereignty over those islands was or could be based. Some months later, on the 2nd August, 1928, the Persian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran a further note explaining in detail the reasons which have led his Government to consider themselves justified in advancing such a claim. I now have the honour to request that you will convey to your Government the following reply :—

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have examined with the greatest care the views set forth in the Persian Government's note of the 2nd August, and have endeavoured to extract from the many unsupported declarations that Bahreïn forms an integral part of Persia (a statement which, as I have already indicated in my note under reference, bears no relation to geographical facts), the essential arguments on which this claim is based. They note that the Persian Government do not in any way base their claim on the alleged recognition of their rights in the past by His Majesty's Government. So far as can be deduced from their note under reply, their claim is, in fact, founded on three main arguments: Firstly, on uninterrupted possession except for the period of Portuguese occupation between 1507 and 1622; secondly, on an alleged principle of international law that a territory belonging to a sovereign State cannot be lawfully detached so long as its annexation by another State or its independence have not been officially recognised by the lawful owner of the territory; and, thirdly, on documents of a date later than the end of the 18th century, in which the sheikhs of the islands are alleged to have declared their submission to the Persian Government, and on the alleged payment by them of tribute to the Persian Government. After full examination of these arguments His Majesty's Government have reached the conclusion, for the reasons given below, that they entirely fail to substantiate a Persian claim to sovereignty over the islands at the present day.

3. In the first place, the statement that "Bahreïn has always and uninterruptedly formed part of Persia in past centuries, except during the Portuguese occupation from 1507 to 1622" is not one which can be allowed to pass unquestioned. I have already drawn attention to the evident fact that geographically this assertion is misleading. Historically it is almost equally misleading. The earlier history of the islands before 1507 is obscure, but it cannot seriously be maintained that they were subject to Persian sovereignty all through the Arab, Mongol and Tartar invasions and the anarchy of the Middle Ages. On the contrary, modern historians have expressed the opinion that from the 11th to the beginning of the 16th century the inhabitants of Bahreïn were subject to chiefs

of their own race; and, among contemporary writers, the Arabian geographer, Idrisi, writing in the latter half of the 12th century, stated categorically that the island was then governed by an independent chief. It is, therefore, impossible to accept the view that the island was continuously subject to Persia before 1507. Between the years 1507 and 1622 the islands were occupied by the Portuguese, as the Persian Government themselves admit. The period of Persian rule began in 1622 and ended in 1783, when the Persian troops were finally driven out of the islands by the ancestors of the present Sheikh of Bahrein, but it is not to be supposed that even during this period of Persian ascendancy, Persian rule was continuous and unchallenged, or that it brought peace and prosperity to the inhabitants. The Persian occupation after the expulsion of the Portuguese was of uncertain duration, but it seems to be established that about the year 1718 a descent was made upon the island by the Omani Arabs, who then occupied it for a short period. In the middle of the 18th century control appears to have passed into the hands of the once powerful Huwala Arabs, who even at the present day are strongly represented there, though in 1753 Persia was again able to assert her ascendancy by conquest. In 1783, however, the troops of His Majesty the Shah were finally driven out by the Utubi Arabs, and the authority of Persia ceased, never to be re-established.

4. It will be evident from the brief historical summary contained in the preceding paragraph that such historical evidence as can be adduced in favour of the Persian claim must rest mainly upon intermittent occupation between the years 1622 and 1783, a period which comprises at least two periods of Arab rule. On the other hand, a period of approximately equal length between 1783 and the present day has elapsed during which no dominion has been exercised in the islands by Persia, and Arab rule has been uninterrupted. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government cannot but regard the claim of Bahrein to independence from Persia as abundantly established.

5. It is in the light of the historical events summarised above that the second argument of the Persian Government must be examined, viz., that part of their note now under reply in which they affirm as an alleged principle of international law the statement that "a territory belonging to a sovereign State cannot be lawfully detached so long as the right of ownership has not been transferred by this State to another State in virtue of an official act, in this case a treaty, or so long as its annexation by another State or its independence have not been officially recognised by the lawful owner of the territory." Even if this statement could be accepted as valid, it would still be necessary for Persia to prove that she is, or ever has been, the lawful owner of Bahrein, and that such rights as she may have acquired in former ages by conquest and the exercise of force outweigh those not only of the Portuguese, but of the Arab inhabitants themselves.

6. His Majesty's Government, however, deny without hesitation that any such principle, if alleged to be of universal application, forms part of international law. The assertion that the consent of the dispossessed State is invariably required to validate a change of sovereignty is contradicted both by international practice and the facts of history. Moreover, it would, if it existed, seriously prejudice the maintenance of peace and international order. It would be open to any State to advance a claim to territory, of which it has not for centuries been in effective possession, on the ground that its loss of possession in distant ages had not been confirmed by a subsequent treaty. To assert such a legal principle would be to assert that on a disputed question of territory the one factor that is decisive is the expressed will of one of the disputants. On the contrary, in cases where a territory has effectively established its independence of the former sovereign, a treaty by which the disposed owner recognises its independence is in effect chiefly valuable as conclusive evidence that, in the view of the former sovereign, such independence has been effectively established. In such cases the effective establishment by the territory of its independence is the deciding factor in the question of international title, and in the case of Bahrein His Majesty's Government regard as wholly untenable the proposition that effective possession and administration by the present ruling family for 145 years, during which these rulers have been independent of Persia, and during which no Persian authority has been exercised in their dominions, can be affected by the mere consideration that the Persian Government have not set their signature to a document formally recognising the fact of their independence.

7. It is, moreover, abundantly clear from historical precedents that the theory of the necessity for the formal consent of the dispossessed State is not one which has ever obtained international acceptance. The revolted Spanish colonies in South America were diplomatically recognised as independent

States by the United States Government in 1822 and by the British Government in 1824, many years before their independence was formally admitted by Spain. The independence of Texas in 1837 and that of Panamá in 1903 were recognised by the United States, and subsequently by Great Britain and other European Powers, long before Mexico and Colombia had ceased to look upon those territories as revolted provinces. In these instances, to which others could, if necessary, be added, the effective establishment of independence was clearly regarded by the Powers as the ruling factor in the situation, and the consent of the dispossessed State was not held to be a condition *sine qua non* of a valid transfer or acquisition of territory. In the case of Bahrein, whose sheikhs have now been in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government for more than a century as independent rulers, it was thus not necessary for His Majesty's Government to await the consent of Persia before such recognition could be accorded.

8. The only other argument advanced by the Persian Government in support of their claim is the statement that the sheikhs of Bahrein at some time later than the end of the 18th century declared in writing their entire submission and fidelity to the Persian Government, and that they paid tribute to the Persian Government. Although the Persian Government do not give any details in corroboration of this assertion, and although it would probably be difficult at the present day to prove the authenticity of any documents which may be in their possession, His Majesty's Government are perfectly prepared to admit the possibility that such documents may exist. They do not, however, consider that the existence of such documents, or even evidence, were this forthcoming, of payments by the Rulers of Bahrein to the Government of the Shah can be regarded as establishing the validity of Persia's claim. They have always been well aware that the unfortunate rulers of the islands, surrounded by warlike and more powerful States which menaced their independence, professed on various occasions during the first sixty or seventy years of the 19th century an unwilling allegiance to Muscat, to Persia, to Turkey, to the rulers of the mainland of Arabia, even to Egypt—to any Power, in short, who would agree to offer them protection and seemed at the time in a strong enough position to do so; and that at different times for short periods they paid tribute to Muscat, Egypt, or the Wahabi Arabs of the mainland. Any argument based on payment of tribute would, therefore, be available in support of a claim to sovereignty over Bahrein by any of the States to which tribute was, in fact, paid, and, in any case, it is evident that this timid and vacillating policy pursued on occasion by his predecessors cannot be held to affect the position of the present sheikh, who is firm in his determination to resist the Persian Government's claims, and has empowered His Majesty's Government to refute them on his behalf, in virtue of the treaties which give them the right of defending Bahrein from external aggression.

9. In view of the fact that the Persian Government do not base any part of their claim on the alleged recognition of that claim by His Majesty's Government in the past, it seems unnecessary here to reply in detail to the various arguments by which the Persian Government endeavour to show that their claims have received British recognition in the past. I have already, in my note of the 18th January, 1928, explained that it has never on any occasion been the intention of His Majesty's Government to admit the validity of Persia's claims, and I must now ask the Persian Government to believe that a further full and careful examination of the contemporary records confirms that statement in its entirety. Ever since the year 1820, when His Majesty's Government first entered into special treaty relations with the Sheikh of Bahrein without any reference to the Government of the Shah, they have acted on the assumption that the sheikh is an independent ruler. In 1822, when Captain William Bruce was recalled for having negotiated the terms of an agreement with the Prince Governor of Shiraz without their authority, the main reason recorded for his recall and for the prompt disavowal of this tentative agreement is that "it acknowledges the King of Persia's title to Bahrein, of which there is not the least proof." No clearer statement could possibly have been made of the views held by His Majesty's Government at that date, more than a century ago; they have never since seen any reason to alter their opinion.

10. The Earl of Clarendon's note of the 29th April, 1869, to which the Persian Government devote so large a part of their note now under reply, was certainly never intended to bear the interpretation now placed upon it by the Persian Government. As was pointed out in my note of the 18th January, 1928, it admitted that the Persian Government had advanced a claim to Bahrein, it

stated that due consideration had been given to their claim, but it did not admit that their claim was valid. It even affirms the intention of the British Government to continue to hold the sheikhs to the treaty engagements which had been entered into with them as independent rulers. His Majesty's Government are entirely unable to admit that an implicit acknowledgment of the validity of the Persian claims is constituted by the reference in that note to the considerations which led to the establishment and the maintenance of those treaty relations; nor can they agree that the dependence or otherwise of Bahrein on Persia can in any way be affected by the fact that in entering upon and maintaining their treaties with the sheikhs they were principally moved by a desire to suppress piracy and the slave-trade and to maintain the police of the Gulf, duties which the Persian Government themselves were not in a position effectively to perform. It is true that at that time Her Majesty's Government were mainly influenced by the consideration that they, like Persia, were interested in the safety of the Persian Gulf for commerce, and that they would gladly have accepted Persia's co-operation in maintaining order had her naval position admitted of it; but, although they did not consider Persia's claims to ownership to be valid, they were not at that time directly concerned in refuting them. The special treaties by which they eventually agreed to accept the control of the sheikh's foreign relations were concluded at a later date.

11. I must in this connexion invite the Persian Government to take note of the fact that there is no conceivable ground for the suggestion in the last paragraph of the second section of your Government's note under reply that the independent status enjoyed by the rulers of Bahrein can in any sense be represented as the result of "rebellion at a foreign State's instigation." This suggestion is one which His Majesty's Government repudiate as entirely unjustifiable. When in 1820, consequent on their suppression of the piratical activities of the independent rulers of the crucial coast of Oman, they found it necessary to consider the position in regard to Bahrein, nearly forty years had elapsed since the conquest of this island by the ancestor of the present sheikh, and during those years Persia had exercised no dominion in the islands and appeared to have taken no measures to re-establish her position. They had accordingly no hesitation in entering into negotiations and concluding a treaty with the independent ruler without prior reference to the Government of the Shah. Their object, as stated by Lord Clarendon in 1869, was the suppression of piracy and the maintenance of peace in the Gulf; they strictly confined themselves to the measures necessary to attain that object, and while it might have been open to them to establish their dominion over the sheikh, they did not choose to do so, but contented themselves with an arrangement to secure the safety of international shipping without imposing on themselves the burden of administration. They maintained this position not only in 1820 but on other occasions in subsequent years, and notably in 1848, when they declined to accede to the sheikh's request that his dominions should be incorporated in those of Her Majesty the Queen. The treaty of 1820, by which the Sheikh of Bahrein bound himself to abstain from plunder and piracy by land and sea, from the slave traffic and from inter-tribal war was followed in 1847, in 1856, and 1861 by further treaties designed to secure the same objects—the suppression of slavery, and the general pacification of the Gulf in the interests of international shipping. The British Government concluded all these treaties with the sheikh as an independent ruler, and consistently refused throughout to admit the Turkish, Persian and other claims to sovereignty over his dominions. It was not until the treaty of 1861 that Her Majesty's Government, in return for the sheikh's undertaking to abstain from maritime aggression, war and piracy, assured him in return of their support against similar aggression, nor till a still later period in 1880 and 1892, that they took upon themselves the unqualified liability for the foreign relations of that ruler, under which he has now invoked their assistance in repelling what he not unnaturally regards as a wholly unprovoked attempt on his independence by a foreign Government.

12. In conclusion, His Majesty's Government cannot refrain from expressing their surprise that the Persian Government should have referred in this correspondence to article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, under which the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League; and that they should seemingly imagine that the terms of this article lay an obligation on members of the League to support Persian pretensions to an island which is separated from Persia by the whole width of the Persian Gulf, and over which Persia has exercised no authority for 145 years.

13. It will be evident to the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have carefully weighed the arguments advanced in the note now under reply, and that although they have found no reason to modify their previous opinions, their attitude is dictated by their genuine conviction that those arguments are untenable, and is in no way inspired by a policy hostile to Persia's legitimate aspirations. They cannot believe that the true interests of Persia can be served by a continued refusal to recognise the long-standing independence of the State of Bahrein. They are, indeed, hopeful that the Government of the Shah, whose enlightened domestic policy they have long followed with friendly interest, will acknowledge the desirability of establishing good relations with Persia's neighbours, and, realising that their present antiquated claim cannot properly be sustained and is an insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of such good relations with the Government and people of Bahrein, will on further consideration desist from its pursuit.

14. A copy of this note has been sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Paper C

[E 975/33/91]

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

*Communiqué au Conseil et aux États
membres de la Société*

[C. 39.M.23.1929.VII.]

Genève, le 13 février 1929

Les Iles Bahrein

Note du Secrétaire général

LE Secrétaire général a l'honneur de communiquer au Conseil et aux États membres de la Société des Nations la lettre en date du 13 janvier 1929, de M. F. Pakrevan, Gérant du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Perse, ainsi que le document y annexé.

M. le Secrétaire général, *Téhéran, le 13 janvier 1929.*

En rapport avec ma lettre datée du 2 août 1928⁽¹⁾, relative aux îles de Bahrein, j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer à titre d'information pour les membres de la Société des Nations copie de la lettre adressée à son Excellence Sir Robert Henry Clive, Ministre de Sa Majesté britannique à Téhéran, le 5 janvier 1929.

F. PAKREVAN,
Gérant du Ministère des Affaires
étrangères de Perse.

Copie de la Lettre adressée par le Gérant du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Perse à son Excellence Sir Robert Clive, Ministre de Sa Majesté britannique à Téhéran.

M. le Ministre, *Téhéran, le 5 janvier 1929.*

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de votre Excellence sur ce qui suit :

Jusqu'à présent, les Persans qui se rendaient à Bahrein n'étaient munis que du permis nécessaire pour se rendre d'un port persan à un autre, et aucune difficulté ne leur était apportée à l'accomplissement de leur voyage.

Mon Gouvernement vient d'apprendre que des ordres auraient été donnés d'exiger des Persans se rendant à Bahrein un passeport, comme si Bahrein était hors de la Perse.

Le changement ainsi apporté à une pratique ancienne, qui constituait la reconnaissance par les autorités britanniques mêmes des droits incontestables de

(1) Voir document C. 413. M. 131. 1928. VII.

la Perse sur Bahreïn, ne saurait affaiblir la portée de cette reconnaissance, surtout qu'il coïncide avec le moment où la question entière pourrait être résolue par la Société des Nations. Il semble qu'en tout état de cause il eût été préférable d'attendre, avant de rien modifier au *statu quo*, jusqu'à ce que cette question ait été réglée par la décision de la Société des Nations ou par un accord amiable entre les deux Gouvernements.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial se voit obligé de protester énergiquement contre la tentative faite pour porter atteinte aux droits du pays et entraver le libre passage des Persans d'un point à un autre du territoire national.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence qu'aucun passeport ne sera accordé à un Persan pour se rendre à Bahreïn et que la responsabilité des dommages causés aux ressortissants persans, au cas où les autorités britanniques maintiendraient une exigence injustifiée, sera à la charge de ces autorités mêmes, sans préjudice de toutes autres sanctions utiles que le Gouvernement impérial se réserve de prendre, comme par exemple la défense d'entrer dans les ports persans aux bateaux ayant à leur bord des passagers qui ne seraient pas en règle avec les prescriptions et le point de vue du Gouvernement impérial.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer en outre que le Gouvernement impérial se voit obligé d'adresser copie de la présente note au Secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

F. PAKREVAN,
Gérant du Ministère des Affaires
étrangères.

Paper D

[E 690/193/91]

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General, League of Nations

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Téhéran, le 17 janvier 1930.

M. le Secrétaire général,

A PLUSIEURS reprises, notamment par des communications qui vous ont été adressées le 23 novembre 1927 et le 2 août 1928, le Gouvernement impérial a informé le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations et l'a prié de porter à la connaissance des Etats membres que les îles de Bahreïn étaient partie intégrante de l'Empire de Perse et que les prétentions du Gouvernement britannique à leur propos restaient infondées.

Mon Gouvernement a le regret de devoir une fois de plus faire entendre une protestation formelle, du fait que, dans le texte de la deuxième partie de l'Annexe I à la Convention internationale concernant les Statistiques économiques, les îles Bahreïn sont indiquées comme territoire statistique distinct, rangé sous la rubrique: "Dominions, Colonies, &c. . . . britanniques" (G. 505.M.167.1929.11, page 25, No. 59). Il doit être entendu que l'indication fournie dans le document officiel émanant de la Société des Nations, et intitulé "Conférence internationale économique concernant les Statistiques économiques" (Genève, 1^{er} octobre 1929), n'a aucune valeur réelle et ne préjuge en rien de l'attribution des îles en question, lesquelles sont et demeurent persanes.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères :
M. FARZINE.

Paper E

[E 4460/193/91/1930]

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Téhéran, le 24 juillet 1930.

M. le Secrétaire général,

J'AI l'honneur de communiquer au Secrétariat, afin qu'il en soit donné connaissance par ses soins à tous les Etats membres de la Société des Nations, copie

de la traduction d'une lettre que je viens d'adresser à la Légation britannique pour protester contre une nouvelle infraction aux droits souverains de la Perse sur Bahreïn.

Je vous prie, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères :
M. O. FOROUGHI.

Enclosure in Paper E

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Clive (Tehran)

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Téhéran, le 23 juillet 1930.

M. le Ministre,

D'APRES une nouvelle parue dans divers journaux, notamment dans le *Near East and India* et le *Bagdad Times* des 5 et 18 juin dernier, un syndicat anglais aurait obtenu du Cheik de Bahreïn une concession pour l'exploitation des pétroles de l'île et, le Major Holmes, représentant dudit syndicat, y aurait commencé les travaux.

Or, les îles de Bahreïn étant partie intégrante de la Perse et le droit de souveraineté de la Perse sur ces îles étant hors de conteste—ainsi qu'il a été prouvé au Gouvernement de votre Excellence et à la Société des Nations dans nos lettres du 26 novembre 1927 et du 2 août 1928 rappelant la reconnaissance expresse de votre Gouvernement en 1869 des droits de souveraineté de la Perse sur ces îles—mon Gouvernement proteste énergiquement contre la concession en question et toute autre concession qui ne serait pas accordée directement par le Gouvernement persan dans les îles de Bahreïn et déclare les considérer comme nulles et non avenues.

J'éprouve du regret à me trouver contraint, en dépit de l'esprit d'équité que je me plais à reconnaître à votre Gouvernement, de renouveler à ce sujet de temps en temps nos protestations.

Il va sans dire que pareils actes et la méconnaissance des droits incontestables de la Perse sur ces îles de Bahreïn ne sauraient en rien affaiblir ces droits et que mon Gouvernement se réserve de réclamer et demander la restitution de tout profit résultant éventuellement de la concession en cause, sans préjudice de tous dommages-intérêts y relatifs.

Veillez agréer, &c.

FOROUGHI,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Perse.

Paper F

[E 5768/782/91]

M. Sepahbody to Secretary-General, League of Nations

Délégation persane auprès de la Société
des Nations, le 14 octobre 1932.

M. le Secrétaire général,

J'AI l'honneur de vous faire connaître que l'Administration postale des Indes va incessamment mettre en circulation un certain nombre de timbres portant la surcharge des îles de Bahreïn pour les besoins du service postal desdites îles. Cette mesure étant une nouvelle atteinte à la souveraineté de la Perse sur les îles de Bahreïn, le Gouvernement impérial s'est empressée de protester officiellement contre cette mesure auprès de la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique à Téhéran.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de votre Excellence, je la prie de vouloir bien communiquer cette lettre aux membres de la Société des Nations.

Veillez agréer, &c.

A. SEPAHBODY.

Paper G

[E 3945/2369/91]

*M. Avenol to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 15.)*League of Nations,
Geneva, June 12, 1934.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a communication dated the 22nd May, 1934, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia relative to the Bahrein Islands. This communication, in conformity with the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, will be transmitted to the Members of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

J. AVENOL, *Secretary-General.*

Enclosure 1 in Paper G

M. Kazémi to M. Avenol.

M. le Secrétaire général,

Téhéran, le 22 mai 1934.

FAISANT suite à la lettre que son Altesse Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan Foroughi, mon prédécesseur, avait adressée en date du 24 juillet 1930 à l'honorable Sir Eric Drummond, ex-Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations, j'ai l'honneur de communiquer au secrétariat, afin qu'il en soit donné connaissance à tous les États membres de la Société des Nations, la traduction d'une lettre que je viens d'adresser à la Légation des États-Unis d'Amérique à Téhéran au sujet des îles Bahreïn.

Je vous prie, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
B. KAZEMI.

Enclosure 2 in Paper G

M. Kazémi to Mr. Hornibrook.

(Traduction.)

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 22 mai 1934.

IL y a bientôt quatre ans, mon Gouvernement a appris pour la première fois, par la voie de la presse étrangère, qu'un syndicat anglais a obtenu la concession de l'exploitation des gisements pétrolifères de Bahreïn et a commencé certains travaux dans ladite région. Étant donné que Bahreïn fait partie intégrante du territoire persan et que les droits de souveraineté du Gouvernement impérial sur les îles susmentionnées sont indéniables, une protestation énergique a été faite en cette occasion auprès de la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique à Téhéran contre la façon d'agir dudit syndicat, qui avait illégalement obtenu cette concession et avait procédé à l'exploitation des richesses de ce territoire et par là avait violé les droits de souveraineté de la Perse.

Copie de cette lettre de protestation a été communiquée au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations, qui, selon la demande du Gouvernement persan, l'a portée à la connaissance de tous les États membres.

Conformément aux informations reçues tout récemment par le Gouvernement impérial, la concession des pétroles de Bahreïn vient d'être obtenue par la Standard Oil Company of California, laquelle s'est livrée à des opérations d'exploitation et a déjà extrait de grandes quantités de pétrole.

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer la sérieuse attention de votre Excellence sur ce qui précède et de lui faire savoir qu'une telle concession ou toute autre acquise par la Standard Oil Company ou une autre compagnie quelconque n'ayant pas été obtenue du Gouvernement persan, dont les droits de souveraineté sur les îles Bahreïn sont incontestables, mais des autorités légalement incompétentes et n'ayant aucun droit d'accorder de pareilles concessions, est considérée comme nulle et non avenue et est l'objet de vives protestations de mon Gouvernement,

Paper H

[E 2304/728/91]

No. 653/25.

Objet : Convention.

Perse : Correspondance du Bureau
indo-britannique de Bahreïn.Bureau international de l'Union postale universelle,
Berne, le 26 janvier 1933.

Monsieur,

J'AI l'honneur, à la demande de l'Office de Perse, de vous communiquer la lettre reproduite ci-après que je viens de recevoir de cet office :

“ Me référant à votre circulaire No. 5787/229 du 24 août 1932, relative à l'émission prochaine de timbres-poste indo-britanniques portant en surcharge le mot ‘Bahreïn’, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que, les îles de Bahreïn appartenant à la Perse, les correspondances reçues desdites localités munies de timbres-poste non persans seront traitées comme des correspondances non affranchies et ne seront remises aux destinataires que contre perception de la double taxe d'affranchissement selon le tarif intérieur. Je vous prie de vouloir bien porter ce qui précède, par la voie de circulaire, à la connaissance des offices de l'union.”

La circulaire mentionnée par l'Office persan annonçait, de la part de l'Office indo-britannique, l'émission prochaine d'une série de timbres-poste indo-britanniques portant en surcharge le mot “Bahreïn,” valables seulement pour l'affranchissement des envois mis à la poste au bureau indo-britannique de Bahreïn.

Ce bureau est indiqué à la page 72, 2^e colonne, du dictionnaire des bureaux de poste (édition de novembre 1926) publié par le Bureau international.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Directeur,
GARBANI-NERINI.

No. 3341/124.

Objet : Convention.

Inde britannique : Usage de timbres-poste
surchargés “Bahreïn” au bureau de
poste de Bahreïn.Bureau international de l'Union postale universelle,
Berne, le 20 avril 1933.

Monsieur,

J'AI l'honneur, à la demande de l'Office de l'Inde britannique, de vous communiquer, en traduction, la lettre ci-après que je viens de recevoir de cet office :

“ Me référant à votre circulaire du 26 janvier 1933, No. 653/25, relative à l'émission envisagée de timbres-poste indo-britanniques surchargés ‘Bahreïn’, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que les îles de Bahreïn ne sont pas territoire persan et que, par conséquent, le Gouvernement persan n'a aucun droit d'ordonner quels timbres le Cheik de Bahreïn doit émettre. Le Cheik, à la demande duquel un bureau de poste indo-britannique a été entretenu pendant plusieurs années à Bahreïn, est dans ses droits souverains lorsqu'il demande au Gouvernement de l'Inde britannique de pourvoir à l'émission de timbres-poste surchargés ainsi qu'il est prévu présentement. Je vous prie de vouloir bien porter ces faits à la connaissance de tous les membres de l'union.”

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Directeur,
GARBANI-NERINI

SUBMISSION OF THE QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
PERSIAN CLAIM TO BAHREIN TO THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE
CROWN BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE (1934)

[E 5011/2369/91/1934]

Foreign Office to Law Officers of the Crown

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1934.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of Secretary Sir John Simon, to transmit to you the papers noted in the accompanying list and to request the favour of your opinion on the subject of the rights claimed by Persia in the Archipelago of Bahrein.

2. Bahrein is a small archipelago lying on the Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf and almost land-locked by the Arabian province of Hasa in the dominions of Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and by the peninsular of Qatar, which is the territory of the independent Arab Sheikh of Qatar. The population of Bahrein is essentially Arab by race, though since the beginning of the present century there has been a considerable influx of Persian nationals.

3. The archipelago is of considerable commercial importance. The pearl banks by which it is surrounded make it the centre of a pearl trade which, in good years, is of very considerable dimensions, while oil has recently been discovered there. Its strategic position in the centre of the Persian Gulf, always important, has become still more so of late years with the development of the air route to India and the possibility that it may be desirable to use the island as a British naval station.

4. A historical memorandum prepared by the India Office, and dealing in detail with the history of Bahrein both before and after 1783 is attached (Paper A). It is conceived that the answers to the question as to which your advice is desired will depend almost entirely on the view taken of the historical facts there set out, and it has therefore been thought necessary to state those facts in detail. The situation may, however, be summarised as follows:—

5. The Sheikdom was for some time prior to 1783 under Persian rule. The Persians were in that year driven out of the islands by Arabs from the mainland of Arabia under the leadership of the direct ancestor of the present ruling house, in whom sovereignty has rested since that date. Claims to sovereignty, or possibly in some cases suzerainty, over Bahrein have repeatedly been preferred by Persia since 1783. They were also preferred by Turkey (suzerain up to the war of the adjoining mainland) with great insistence on a number of occasions between 1847 and 1913, in which latter year the Turkish Government finally recognised the independence of the island; and they have been put forward in the past by Muscat; by Egypt; and by the Wahabi Amirs of the Arab mainland. Tribute was last certainly paid to Persia in 1799. It has at one time or other between 1800 and 1870 been paid also to Muscat, to Egypt, and to the Wahabi Amirs, although in the case of the last-named, at any rate in the more recent period, possibly only in respect of possessions on the mainland of Arabia. Bahrein, at least since 1820, has consistently been regarded as independent by His Majesty's Government, who have been in special treaty relations with its rulers on that basis since that date. Those treaty relations (which have throughout involved contingent liabilities for protection) were strengthened in 1861, while by engagements contracted in 1880 and 1892 the ruling house have undertaken obligations which place their external relations in the hands of His Majesty's Government and preclude them from ceding territory save to, or with the consent of, His Majesty's Government.

6. In 1927, 1928 and 1929 important notes were exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government in regard to the latter's claim to Bahrein, of which copies have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for communication to the States Members of the League. Copies of these notes are attached as Paper B. On five other occasions since 1927 the Persian Government have addressed protests to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, or communicated to him copies of protests against alleged violations of their sovereignty, which they claim over the Bahrein islands. Copies of the Persian Government's letters to the Secretary-General of the League are attached as Papers C-G. In the first four of these latter cases, His Majesty's Government thought it unnecessary to return replies. In the case of the latest Persian protest (Paper G), His Majesty's Government have drawn the attention of the Secretary-General to their notes

Bahrein:
Persia's
rights of
sovereignty
or suzerainty.

to the Persian Government of January 1928 and February 1929 (see Paper B) and requested him to circulate this reply to the Members of the League. In January 1933, the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union circulated to the members of the union a protest from the Persian postal authorities regarding the proposed issue of Indian postage stamps, surcharged "Bahrein," and in April the bureau circulated the reply of the Indian postal authorities (Paper H).

7. On political and strategical grounds it is regarded as of the first importance to retain the *status quo* in Bahrein and to continue to reject the claims put forward by Persia. His Majesty's Government, however, are anxious, to enable them to consider how best to deal with any further assertion of the Persian claim, for the advice of the Law Officers as to whether Persia possesses any rights in Bahrein.

8. While the Persian claim has been asserted with great insistence over a very long period of years, the grounds adduced in support of it have varied from time to time and have never been stated by the Persian Government in any very great detail. The fullest expression of the Persian attitude is that contained in the notes of the 26th November, 1927, and the 2nd August, 1928. The various arguments which from time to time Persia has advanced in support of her claim are as follows:—

- (1) The history of the islands prior to 1783. Persia contends that an appeal to history shows that prior to this date the islands were from a remote period subject, and tributary, to her.
- (2) The absence of Persian consent to the detachment of Bahrein, admittedly at one stage prior to 1783 a Persian possession, from Persia; and the fact that Persia has never recognised the islands as independent and has consistently urged a claim to them.
- (3) Certain provisions of the treaty (unratified and disavowed by both parties) concluded between Captain Bruce, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the Minister of the Prince Governor of Shiraz, in 1892.
- (4) A gold coin alleged to have been struck at Bahrein in 1817.
- (5) Payment by Bahrein at various stages of "peeshkesh" offerings, or tribute to Persia.
- (6) Flying of the Persian flag by the Sheikh of Bahrein.
- (7) Letters from past rulers of Bahrein admitting Persian suzerainty.
- (8) A note addressed by His Majesty's Government in April 1869 to the Persian Minister in London.
- (9) Closeness of relations at the present day between Persia and Bahrein.

9. The arguments referred to in the preceding paragraph are briefly examined in paragraphs 147-152 of the historical memorandum (Paper A) attached, which suggests the conclusion that they afford no solid basis for a Persian claim to sovereignty or suzerainty over the island of Bahrein.

10. Apart from the arguments based on historical events, the only important legal consideration which has been advanced by the Persian Government in support of their claim is that contained in paragraph 2 of the note addressed by the Acting Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran on the 2nd August, 1928 (p. 46, Paper B). You will observe that a detailed reply to this argument was made in paragraphs 5-8 of the note addressed by Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Persian Minister in London on the 18th February, 1929 (pp. 50 and 51, Paper B). Reference may also be made in this connexion to the article entitled "Sovereignty, Seisin and the League" by Sir John Fischer Williams (*British Yearbook of International Law*, 1926, p. 24).

11. I have accordingly the honour to request you to take the enclosed papers into your consideration, and to advise, in the light of the facts stated in the historical memorandum (Paper A), the various arguments which have been employed on either side in the course of the discussion of this question, and of any other considerations which may appear to you to be relevant, whether, in your opinion, Persia possesses any rights in or over Bahrein, and if so what the nature of those rights is.

12. The question of the future policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Persia, as to which the Ministerial Middle East Sub-Committee may have to take important decisions at any moment, may be to a considerable extent dependent upon the nature of your opinion on the above point, and Sir John Simon would therefore be grateful if it were possible for you to furnish your opinion at a very early date.

I have, &c.
G. W. RENDEL.

- * (A) Historical memorandum prepared by India Office.
 † (B) Notes exchanged with Persian Government between 1927 and 1929.
 (C) Letter from Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated the 13th January, 1929, communicating copy of note to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.
 (D) Copy of letter from Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated the 17th January, 1930.
 (E) Copy of letter from Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated the 24th July, 1930, enclosing copy of note to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated the 23rd July, 1930.
 (F) Letter from M. Sepahbodi, Persian representative to the League of Nations, to Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated the 14th October, 1932.
 (G) Letter from Secretary-General of the League of Nations, dated the 12th June, 1934, communicating copy of note from Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to United States Minister at Tehran, dated the 22nd May, 1934.
 (H) Two circular letters from the Director of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union, dated the 26th January, 1933, and the 20th April, 1933, communicating a protest from the Persian postal authorities and the reply of the Indian postal authorities respectively.

* See footnote to Index.

† For Papers B-H see Appendix I.

Report

The Persian claim to sovereignty over Bahrein appears to be based upon the view that from time immemorial the islands were Persian territory, and that by virtue of the fact that Persia has never expressly recognised their independence, coupled with various assertions of sovereign right on the part of Persia, and of admissions from time to time of the Persian claims on the part of the rulers of Bahrein and of His Majesty's Government, Persian sovereignty has never been lost.

The facts as narrated in the historical memorandum prepared by the India Office do not, in our opinion, support this view. There is no satisfactory evidence of any kind that at any date before 1783 Bahrein was incorporated in Persian territory. The most that can be said is that there was a period of Persian occupation at the beginning of the 17th century, and that for a short period in the 18th century a *de facto* control was exercised by a Persian Governor. Whether this control ever acquired the character of *de jure* sovereignty may be doubted, but, in our opinion, the expulsion of the Persian garrison in 1783 never to return makes it impossible to rely upon what had happened before that event.

The later history of Persian claims to sovereignty over the islands affords no evidence of any recognition either by His Majesty's Government or by any other sovereign power of Bahrein as Persian soil. The Bruce Treaty of 1822 cannot be relied on, while the three treaties of 1809, 1814 and 1857 appear to us to be wholly silent as to Persian rights over Bahrein. The British note of 1869 is the high-water mark of any admission of Persian rights. Even this note, however, falls far short of a recognition of sovereignty, and nothing said or done thereafter gives any support to Persian claims.

Even if Persia were able as a matter of historical fact to show that Bahrein had been Persian territory prior to 1783, the fact that she has never expressly recognised Bahrein's independence affords, in our view, no foundation for her present claim. We agree with the arguments on this point in paragraphs 5 to 8 of Sir Austen Chamberlain's letter of the 18th February, 1929.

Upon a review of all the facts as stated in the memorandum and of the arguments advanced in the course of the correspondence in recent years, we are of opinion that Persia has no rights, either of sovereignty or suzerainty, in or over Bahrein.

T. W. H. INSKIP.

D. B. SOMERVELL.

Law Officers' Department,
 July 31, 1934.

CHAPTER II—SAUDI ARABIA

E 1095/1095/25

No. 2

ANNUAL REPORT ON SAUDI ARABIA, 1946

Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Mr. Bevin. (Received 5th February)

(No. 14)

Sir, *Jedda, 26th January, 1947*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a political review of events in Saudi Arabia during the year 1946.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Bagdad, to His Majesty's Minister at Amman, to the British Middle East Office, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 2

Annual Report on Saudi Arabia, 1946

Introduction

1. Except for Transjordan's emergence as a sovereign independent State, local echoes of which are recorded at some length below, and corollary rumours of Iraqi-Transjordan agreement for the unification of defence arrangements, foreign policy and communications, the year 1946 was marked in Saudi Arabia rather by an intensification of tendencies already manifest than by any new and startling developments. King Ibn Saud's mistrust of Hashemite animosity, which is not unreciprocated, was sharpened by the events of the year, as also was his resentment at American official support for the aims of political Zionism. Saudi Arabia's dependence on American financial assistance, and the personal extravagance and administrative irresponsibility which aggravate this need, were alike even more painfully apparent than in 1945. His Majesty's goodwill towards his British friends continued, fortunately, undiminished by various major and minor frustrations; and it was satisfactory that some material British assistance, in the provision of hospital equipment and of a small military training mission, could be made available to Saudi Arabia, at the King's request.

Domestic

2. During the year, King Ibn Saud's personal and sovereign authority remained complete and unchallenged throughout his wide dominions, and the unprecedented phenomenon of public security and tribal peace, even among the wildest elements of the desert, continued to surprise the most cynical observer. This imposition of discipline upon highly intractable nomad freebooters is Ibn Saud's greatest single achievement. It is unlikely to survive him.

3. The subsidies, in cash and in kind, with which the King compensates the tribes for the excitements and profits of raiding are, of course, an incessant drain on the country's revenues. The large extravagances of the Palace and of Ibn Saud's pullulating brood of princelings are blatant in contrast with the misery and malnutrition of the masses. Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, the Minister of Finance, diligently anticipates every proper and improper demand from Riyadh; and a small rash of pamphlets critical of him and his cronies appeared in May on the Haram walls in Mecca. The Hejaz, which used to be sole beneficiary of the Moslem Haj, grumbles that all pilgrimage revenues are now syphoned off into Nejd. With some evidence that years are taking their toll of the King, all who can do so seem to be feverishly milking the country's resources and laying up treasure abroad, against the day when Ibn Saud's death, which cannot be very long delayed, jolts them from their gilded chairs.

4. The chaos in Saudi Arabian Government finances, indeed, defies description, nor is reference to this entirely out of place in a political review. After years of British (later, Anglo-American) subsidy, and of unfailingly generous accommodation by the American Oil Company and the United States Government in the matter of advances and credits, the Government is, if not pauperised, completely demoralised, and no flickering sense of financial responsibility remains. The major nuisance, apart from the concentration of all business in the hands of Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman, is the Minister's insistence that the dollars accruing from oil revenues must never be considered, or

treated, as dollars only. They represent to him a means of acquiring United States gold—purchases of Mexican gold also are rumoured—which can be flown into the Middle East and bartered at a premium. Because of this greed for the ultimate piastre profit on dollars and gold, and this refusal to use dollars at their normal exchange rate, orders for essential food-stuffs requiring sterling payment are held up while Saudi dollars lie in a bank in New York, and pilgrimage dues are pledged a year in advance in an effort to obtain alternative sterling. King Ibn Saud himself has no sense of figures; 10,000 or 10 million mean much the same to him; and this weakness is exploited to the full by his many parasites. In December, the Minister of Finance stated that he had to send 3 million riyals monthly to Riyadh, for the next ten months, over and above ordinary revenues, and that these had to be acquired with foreign exchange. The reasons for this remarkable demand are mysterious, and may be sinister. The sum involved represents 10 million dollars per annum or rather more than the net revenue from oil royalties for the year.

5. From the latest information received, the net oil royalties payable in 1946 are likely to total 8 million dollars, with an estimated 14 million dollars payable in 1947. Against this, the Arabian American Oil Company have a claim of 11 million dollars in respect of earlier advances, which they may or may not find it expedient to press. There is also an obligation to the United States Government of about 2 million dollars for surplus War Department material, supplied on five years' credit. In August 1946, a further 10 million dollar line of credit, earmarked for certain specific commodities, was made available by the Export-Import Bank. This can be drawn on until 15th June, 1948. As if these obligations were not enough, King Ibn Saud has, since his visit to Egypt, been pursuing, with a concentration and obstinacy rare outside the nursery, the project of a 330 mile railway across the desert from Dammam, on the Persian Gulf, via Hasa and Al Kharj, to Riyadh. The latest American estimates of its cost are less than one-half of their earlier proposals and set the initial expense at 20 million dollars. As merchandise can only move one way, since Riyadh has nothing to export, the project is probably too uneconomical to attract commercial exploitation.

6. Such comprehensive dependence upon American financial assistance alarms many

thinking persons in this country, and, inevitably, His Majesty's Government are blamed for allowing American domination of Saudi Arabia's finances and economic life. I should not myself assume as axiomatic that the Americans will ever pull tight the noose they now have around the Saudi neck; their own interests dictate a more generous attitude. But the noose is there, and it is not always an oil company that starts a quarrel with Government. The natural jealousy of an oriental country at sight of huge alien profits made from its own resources may sooner or later work here, as in Iran; and many here regret Ibn Saud's large and irresponsible drafts upon the future. However, the latest multi-million dollar deal by which the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum have acquired a large share in the Arabian American Oil Company may, before very long, boost Saudi oil royalties to unimaginably high levels, and thus enable effortless liquidation of the debts which now loom so ominously in the Crown Prince's future.

7. In a country where all decisions reflect the moods of a most politically-minded potentate, even the simplest economic developments are politically interpreted. In the matter of civil aviation, for instance, King Ibn Saud asked His Majesty's Government in January for five British aircraft, with personnel, for the internal air communications of Saudi Arabia and for charter flights abroad; also for a training team to instruct Saudi pilots and ground staff. The aircraft offered were, unfortunately, not only quite inadequate in numbers, but were not possessed of the minimum range necessary for security in flying over this wide territory. Negotiations were further complicated by misunderstandings about financial responsibility. When the question of supplying internal air-services was dropped, in May, His Majesty's Treasury resisted also the provision of a training team; and no effective advance was made in this particular by the end of the year.

8. As an alternative arrangement, having acquired five Dakota aircraft from United States army stocks in Egypt, Ibn Saud signed an agreement with Messrs. Trans World Airlines in July, by which the American company operates these aircraft, with possible additions, for the account of the Government, within and outside Saudi Arabia. There is an implicit programme of regular services to other Middle East territories; but at present Trans World Airlines raids made,

in "Saudi Airlines" uniform, upon Egypt and other countries have been unorganised and spasmodic.

9. Ibn Saud returned to Riyadh after the pilgrimage by air, and is said to be an enthusiastic convert to air travel. He has certainly lost all interest in motor transport, probably because of the scandalous racketeering in this branch of Government activity; and when in July Captain Hart and his British colleagues resigned in disgust from their Augean task of cleaning up the Government garage and transport services, the King took the opportunity of handing these over to commercial exploitation. The King's realisation that a locomotive cannot be diverted to casual and wide-ranging unofficial tours partly explains his insistence on the project for a railway between Riyadh and the Persian Gulf; but there is also a strategic angle to his thinking on this subject.

10. Strategic thinking also doubtless inspired Ibn Saud's request to His Majesty's Government for the provision of a British Military Mission to train the Saudi army, which, after reference to Washington, was approved in June. The officer commanding the mission, Brigadier J. E. A. Baird, O.B.E., arrived at Taif in early January 1947, and the rest of the team were expected to join him before the end of that month. The mission has been reduced, by His Majesty's Treasury insistence, to a strength far below that originally intended by the War Office, and has to work within an overall budget of £40,000 annually. It will therefore have to set its sights very low, and most of the staff will have to do double jobs. But there is every evidence of real keenness on both sides, and the Amir Mansour, who is Minister of Defence, may be relied on to be helpful. Few less rewarding tasks can be imagined than that of inspiring with military virtues the ragged urban types who compose the regular Saudi army. But complete pessimism would not be justified, and the political value of the mission may be very great. To Ibn Saud, no doubt, its presence represents not only a counterweight to American economic influence and a source of strength for his most obvious instrument of internal authority, but also an insurance premium against aggression from Trans-Jordan and Iraq, where other British officers and men are somewhat similarly engaged.

11. British efforts to associate neighbouring Middle East countries with the work of the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit in Saudi Arabia, more particularly on the

financial side, were not enthusiastically received; and the work of the British Unit was again financed by His Majesty's Government. King Ibn Saud's feelings towards this unit continued to be coloured by his personal resentment at the 1945 locust infestation of his gardens at Riyadh and Al Kharj, but he reacted cordially to the unit's resumption of activity at the beginning of the 1946-47 season; and public appreciation of the results obtained, which a more rapidly effective bait now makes more dramatically manifest, appears to be growing apace. Delayed rains, and consequent lack of locusts, affected the unit's programme at the end of the year.

12. The pilgrimage passed off with no untoward incident. Arafat Day fell on 2nd November. Possibly as the result of His Majesty's Minister's warning to Ibn Saud that the extremely high pilgrimage dues charged were defeating their own object, some reduction in the dues current in 1945 was made. This reduction benefited only those pilgrims—a considerable majority of the whole attendance—who made the visit to Medina as well as the pilgrimage to Mecca, for it was based on a diminished transport charge but left the total Government impost constant at maximum level. Pilgrims visiting Mecca only paid more than ever. In any case, the number of pilgrims from overseas rose steeply to a figure of 62,800; a fifty per cent. increase over last year. Indian pilgrims alone increased from 9,000 to over 20,000. These, as usual, were of all the most noisily clamant in protest against local dues, local prices and other discomforts.

13. A tiresome decision, announced during the summer by the King, withdrew from "Takruni" pilgrims their traditional exemption from all but quarantine dues here. These are the Nigerian and Shanqiti pilgrims from British and French West Africa, who travel on foot across Africa to the Red Sea from their distant homes, spending two, three or more years on the road. Anything impeding the flow of their movement may have echoes in the Sudan, where they supply much of the casual labour in the cotton fields. Strong representations by His Majesty's Minister availed to secure postponement of their liability to full pilgrimage dues (a matter of £35 more than the £5 they pay at present) until next season; but the King's decision, which seems to be inspired partly by considerations of public security in the Hejaz, partly by a belief that Sudanese and others

were passing themselves off as Takrunis, will mean disappointment and hardship to many poor folk now on the road; and an increase in "illegal immigration" by dhow from the Sudan or Eritrea, with its risk of yellow fever infection, may be expected.

Foreign Affairs

14. Beyond Saudi Arabian frontiers, the major apprehensions of King Ibn Saud—apart from his unceasing terror of Russian aggressiveness—were political Zionism and Hashemite expansion. Of these two preoccupations, the latter was made acute by British abandonment of the Transjordan mandate and by publicity given to Hashemite designs for a "Greater Syria" and for a closer union of the Iraqi and Transjordan administrations; the former, by British failure to stem the tide of Jewish immigration and other evidences of the abandonment of His Majesty's Government's 1939 White Paper policy, and by the unexpectedly pro-Zionist findings of the Anglo-American commission of enquiry.

15. Three members of this commission visited the King in Riyadh in middle March, and in view of the vehemence with which the Arab case was then presented to them, their later report came as a shock to Ibn Saud. Later developments were harmonised by the Arab League, and Saudi Arabia was represented at the Palestine Conference in London by the Amir Feisal and Shaikh Hafez Wahba. But a flutter of messages between Ibn Saud and President Truman embittered October. The King, who has always claimed to have promises of moderation and reason from the late President Roosevelt, violently resents American official endorsement of the demands of extreme political Zionism. He has convinced himself, to his own distaste, that transatlantic pressure alone dictates present British policy in Palestine. On the subject of Jewish terrorism, his argument is that the alarm expressed by Arabs in the past is now seen to be justified, and that the Arabs must never be exposed to the aggression of an unscrupulous nationalism against which the British Empire is, apparently, unable to defend itself.

16. Palestine means much to the King, but he has not the same keenly personal interest in its affairs that sharpens his concern with all that affects Transjordan and Iraq. The aggrandisement of the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, with its possible consequences in frontier disputes,

has given Ibn Saud more worry than anything else during the year.

17. His Majesty's Government's decision to establish Trans-Jordan as a sovereign independent State was reached at the beginning of January, and advance news of this intention was conveyed to King Ibn Saud, then on an official visit to Egypt, by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo. The King was formally assured that the interests of Saudi Arabia would be borne in mind during the negotiation of an Anglo-Transjordan treaty.

18. In a memorandum to His Majesty's Government, dated 18th January, Ibn Saud welcomed the grant of independence to a sister Arab State, but expressed some apprehension of future Transjordan activity hostile to Saudi Arabia, "especially if undertaken in co-operation with the Iraqi Government," and asked for clear assurances that the change of status of Transjordan would not be allowed by His Majesty's Government to have such consequences. He made other points of importance, *e.g.* :—

- (a) That the Hadda Agreement of 1925, defining the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan, was, by Article 14, valid only for so long as His Majesty's Government hold the mandate for Transjordan. Ibn Saud reserved his right to claim frontier modifications in consequence.
- (b) That the Saudi claim to Aqaba and Maan was automatically revived by His Majesty's Government's abandonment of their mandatory position.
- (c) That Saudi Arabia's claim to a direct territorial connexion with Syria also required settlement.

19. Some examination of these claims, to Aqaba and Maan and to a direct connexion with Syria, may be useful, since they contain the seeds of much future trouble.

20. The claim of Ibn Saud to Aqaba and Maan, as successor in interest to King Hussein of the Hejaz (the father of King Abdullah of Transjordan), has considerable historical authority and finds general support in Moslem sentiment. When the victorious Wahhabi forces were advancing on the Northern Hejaz, however, in 1925, His Majesty's Government, who had no wish to see the fanatical Ikhwan on the borders of Palestine, displayed strong forces along the Mudawwara-Aqaba line and, later, used much pressure in negotiation to obtain the incorporation of the Aqaba-Maan area in Transjordan. In an

annex to the Treaty of Jeddah of 20th May, 1927, Ibn Saud declared himself unable to accept this British point of view, but he expressed willingness to respect the *status quo* "until favourable circumstances permit a final settlement of the matter." This concession was made to His Majesty's Government, and it is fair to say that it would not have been made to anyone else. With the abandonment of His Majesty's Government's special position in Transjordan, the Hejaz claim is vigorously restated. His Majesty's Government are debarred by their past attitude from any new and objective consideration of this claim; and Ibn Saud has been left in no doubt that they cannot press King Abdullah to admit a claim which they themselves have always resisted.

21. Ibn Saud's demand for a direct territorial connexion with Syria has, in law, a much flimsier basis than his claim to Aqaba and Maan, but far transcends this in urgency in His Majesty's own mind. The King pressed strongly for a corridor to Syria in the negotiations with Sir Gilbert Clayton which led up to the Hadda Agreement of 2nd November, 1925, but this was refused; partly on grounds of "the imperial interest involved" at that time. Instead, article 13 of the Hadda Agreement guaranteed freedom of transit across Transjordan territory to *bona fide* Nejd merchants; but the King complains that this concession has been vexatiously applied and, in any case, does not cover the needs of tribal migration or camel-trading caravans.

22. Some years after signature of this agreement it transpired that the co-ordinates prescribed therein as marking the north-eastern starting point of the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan are over 20 miles distant from the particular geographical feature (the Jebel Anaza) prescribed elsewhere as marking the terminal point of the frontier between Nejd and Iraq. An error of survey thus seemed to give Ibn Saud a corridor to Syria just where he wanted it; and this fact he has not failed to exploit.

23. It appears, indeed, that the existence, by an accident of erroneous cartography, of an apparent gap between the terminal points of the Iraq-Nejd and the Transjordan-Nejd frontiers defined by treaty, and the occasion of change resulting from British withdrawal from mandatory responsibilities in Transjordan, have provoked, though not created, an insistence in the mind of Ibn Saud upon the necessity of untrammelled communication with Syria.

This, fundamentally, derives from nomad instinct and historical practice, both of which Ibn Saud holds have been thwarted by British pressure, after the break-up and subsequent balkanisation of the Ottoman (Arab) Empire. As ruler of the Beduin of Nejd and the Jebel Shammar, he has always resented the restrictions upon freedom of movement imposed by arbitrary frontier-lines, unknown in the desert before the 1920's. The liberty to come and go, without fences, was interrupted by action taken by His Majesty's Government in their purely temporary capacity as mandatory for Iraq and Transjordan. The circumstances of the moment have therefore brought to a head, and inflamed, old frustrations of imperious strength. Their main aggravation is, of course, due to Ibn Saud's not unreasonable fears lest the substitution of independent Hashemite authority for the benevolently impartial authority of His Majesty's Government may lead to the physical fact of encirclement sinister and hostile implications.

24. In the event Ibn Saud's "interests" received less consideration than he thought proper. No guarantees about "aggression" by Iraq and Transjordan were given to him, but a general assurance of British interest in friendly Saudi-Hashemite relations was conveyed. He was given no hope of British encouragement for his claim to Aqaba and Maan. As regards the corridor to Syria, King Abdullah undertook to regard the Hadda Agreement, with its concession of transit for merchants, as still in force, if Ibn Saud would make a similar declaration. In Ibn Saud's somewhat biased opinion, short of ignoring the existence of the Hadda Agreement altogether not much less could have been done to satisfy his demands. He was informed that it was open to the Saudi Arabian and Transjordan Governments to reach a settlement of outstanding frontier questions by direct discussion, or by employing the methods laid down in the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This he interpreted as an invitation to split the Arab League wide open.

25. By their manner of withdrawing from their mandatory position in Transjordan His Majesty's Government appeared to Ibn Saud to have unilaterally disengaged themselves from a specific treaty-relationship with himself and, as a result of their new detachment, to have left him to settle the thorniest of frontier problems with a sworn enemy of his person and dynasty. The natural animosity of the Hashemites of Amman and Bagdad

towards the Nejd ruler at whose hands they and their fathers suffered disgrace and disaster is a constant preoccupation to Ibn Saud. The publication of the then Amir Abdullah's notorious "Memoirs," in which he attacks Ibn Saud and his family religion and holds his advisers up to public contempt, revealed a waspish and malicious temper, and Ibn Saud was with some difficulty restrained from the publication of a journalistic retort. Although he sent a cordial telegram of congratulations to Abdullah on achieving kingship, the change in the status of Transjordan, and subsequent talk of an Iraqi-Transjordan Agreement for the unification of defence arrangements, foreign policy and communications, have added a sharp edge to anxieties already sufficiently alarmed by Abdullah's constant monarchist propaganda in Syria. As usual, in troubled times, Ibn Saud sought the assistance of His Majesty's Government. Despite the most careful explanations, he is still unable to understand their detachment.

26. In a series of long and sterile exchanges His Majesty pressed, throughout the year, for the association of the British Government with the discussion of developments resulting from their abandonment of the mandate, and His Majesty's Government, no less consistently, refused to have any part in such discussions. An approach made to the Transjordan Government by the Saudi Arabian Government elicited the response that, in the opinion of Amman, there was no frontier problem to discuss, and some pressure on Abdullah was needed to obtain a change of attitude. Finally, both rulers authorised their delegates at the Palestine Conference in London to initiate discussions, but this occurred too late to be useful, and only one inconclusive meeting was held. The matter was left over to a later date. During the Amir Faisal's visit to Amman at the end of the year no politics were discussed; and the establishment of a new understanding between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, to replace the treaty relations formerly existing between Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government as the mandatory Power, seemed as remote at the end as at the beginning of 1946. At present, the Saudi Arabian Government refuse even to recognise a change in the diplomatic representation of Transjordan in this country, and insist on regarding His Majesty's Minister as still protecting Transjordan interests.

27. Iraq and Transjordan are inseparable in King Ibn Saud's mind as a potential

source of trouble to himself, but no specific new incident with Iraq arose, fortunately, to mar 1946. The presence of Rashid Aly al Gailani in Saudi Arabia was a constant irritant to the Regent throughout the year. The somewhat acrimonious correspondence of 1945 was followed, in January, by a final note from the Saudi Arabian Government, rejecting the Iraqi arguments for extradition as invalid according to the relevant treaty. This note was based on the opinion of a judge of the Egyptian Court of Appeal, whose services were made available to the Saudi Arabian Government by King Farouk. At the same time Ibn Saud sent a personal letter to the Regent of Iraq, regretting his inability to meet his wishes and offering to send one of his sons to Bagdad as negotiator or hostage. So far as is known, this offer has never been acknowledged. Nor did the Regent accept a British suggestion that Rashid Aly might be sent to the Seychelles.

28. Some alarm was felt in Bagdad when Rashid Aly accompanied the King on pilgrimage to Mecca, and remained there, with those members of his family who had been sent from internment in Italy, after His Majesty's return to Riyadh. There is every reason, however, to believe that he is under close, if discreet, surveillance wherever he may be in Saudi Arabia, and he is likely to return to Riyadh when he has sent his women-folk away to some more clement place in the Near East.

29. Relations with the Yemen, the Levant States and Egypt continued to be most cordial. The Lebanon and Saudi Arabia exchanged their first Ministers, and the Amir Faisal and his brother the Amir Mansour, with a suite of some thirty army officers, attended the celebrations at Damascus in April which marked the final withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria. The opportunity was taken by the Amir Faisal to pay the official visit to both Syria and the Lebanon to which he had been invited in February.

30. King Ibn Saud's own State visit to King Farouk was magnificently organised by the Egyptian authorities. His Majesty left Jeddah on the Egyptian Royal yacht, accompanied by an imposing Egyptian "Mission d'Honneur" and by a very large suite; he spent the period 9th-22nd January in Egypt, and returned, again by *Mahroussa*, on 25th January. A flood of new experiences, and the strain of a full official programme, completely exhausted the old man; but the visit was memorable. For the first time Ibn Saud saw, used and

fell in love with a railway; and for the first time he saw the impeccable ceremonial drill of well-trained troops. Expectations of a return visit by King Farouk during the pilgrimage, which led to vast local expenditure on building and furnishing a guest palace in Mecca, were not realised.

31. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was Saudi Arabian delegate at the various meetings of the Arab League during 1946. In the league's discussions he seems to have kept more or less to the middle of the road, with a tendency to ebullience in matters of no direct concern to his Royal master. Mention must also be made of the Amir Saud's presence at the meeting of heads of States invited by King Farouk to Inshass in May. The Crown Prince represented his father, who felt unable to make the journey, but King Ibn Saud named King Farouk as his spokesman during the discussions.

32. In the wider field of United Nations activity, the Amir Faisal was the principal Saudi Arabian representative. He attended the first assembly in London and also later meetings in New York.

33. Of the Western Powers, France played no part in Saudi Arabian affairs in 1946, though a comparatively large North African pilgrim contingent received careful advertisement. The Netherlands Minister, who has a 2,000-strong Indonesian colony in Mecca, was embarrassed by the nationalistic activity of a small pressure group, which enforced the return to the legation of most of the Dutch passports held, with a consequent withdrawal of Netherlands Government relief, and loud appeals to Ibn Saud for alternative assistance. During a visit to Riyadh, His Majesty's Minister suggested to the King that such political ferments in the Holy Places might well be discouraged, and steps were apparently taken to that end; but there is evidence that some assurances of Saudi sympathy were conveyed to Indonesian leaders in Egypt.

34. The rôle of the United States in Saudi Arabia's economic life has already been recorded in paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 above. The latest developments in the

oleo-political field can only enhance this preponderance of influence. It remains to be seen whether these developments also act restrainingly upon American official attitudes towards the claims of political Zionism.

35. As compared with the favours and facilities accorded by the Americans in 1946, the material assistance given or promised by His Majesty's Government seems slight. But it is essentially useful, and may well be fruitful. The equipment of a fifty-bed military hospital at Taif and of an Ophthalmological Institute to be built at Jeddah, for which a British specialist director has been found, were welcome gestures; and the provision of a Military Mission met Ibn Saud's urgent request. On the other side of the balance, the British subsidy, slashed by one-half to £1½ million in 1945, ceased altogether in 1946. Food supplies from the pool controlled by the British Supply Mission in Cairo fell alarmingly short of the minimum guaranteed in December 1945. His Majesty's Government's policy in Palestine and Transjordan was, to put it mildly, uncongenial to the King, and His Majesty's Minister heard some straight talk from Ibn Saud on these points.

36. Equal sincerity of speech is, however, allowed in return, and this imposes something of a moral obligation on His Majesty's Minister to raise with the King issues not directly of British concern. As an example, Ibn Saud's relative neglect of the Hejaz in favour of his beloved Nejd, with its results in local ill will, was frankly represented to the King as ill-advised. No obvious improvement has followed this homily, but it served to ventilate a subject not usually broached to His Majesty. His reception of those remarks, as of the news that there would be no more British subsidy, was entirely friendly. Indeed, as suggested in last year's report, Britain need only fear a diminution of Ibn Saud's goodwill if, by evil chance, he finds himself obliged to choose between the dictates of his religion and his race and the loyalties of his oldest friendship.

E 1988/46/31

No. 3

CONVERSATION WITH HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS AMIR SAUD

Mr. Attlee to Mr. Graftey-Smith (Jedda)

(No. 42)
Sir,

Foreign Office,

14th March, 1947

His Royal Highness Amir Saud came to see me on 28th February. He was accompanied by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Saudi

Arabian Minister in London, and by Fuad Bey Hamza, who acted as interpreter.

2. His Royal Highness said he wished to give me in the strictest confidence an account of what had taken place at his

interviews in Washington with President Truman, Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Marshall. He did this because of the close friendship between his country and Great Britain.

3. He had explained at these conversations in Washington that the new friendship between Saudi Arabia and the United States was not intended, in the mind of his father the King, in any way to supplant the old friendship for Great Britain. Ibn Saud would never forget how much he owed to Britain throughout his career. He hoped, however, that it would be possible to maintain good relations both with Great Britain and with the United States and that there would be no conflict between the two Great Powers in their attitude to Saudi Arabian affairs.

4. While in Washington His Royal Highness had also discussed the question of Palestine. He had received assurances that the Arab point of view was now more fully understood there and that the Government of the United States would in future play a more neutral part in discussions on Palestine. The Amir was therefore all the more surprised to learn that President

Truman was reiterating his demand for 100,000 more Jewish immigrants.

5. It had also been part of the Amir's mission to obtain financial assistance from the United States in various economic developments which his father wished to undertake in Saudi Arabia. These included a railway from the capital, Riyadh, to Dammam on the coast of the Persian Gulf. An American technical commission had reported that the proposed developments would cost approximately 40 million dollars, of which 20 million would be spent on the railway. The United States Government had decided that they could not themselves finance the building of the railway for fear that this would give rise to Russian suspicions of their intentions in the Persian Gulf. It had been arranged, however, that the financing of the railway should be done by the Arabian American Oil Company, and that the United States Government would provide 20 million dollars for the other projected developments.

I am, &c.

C. R. ATTLEE

E. 2799/369/25

No. 4

REPORT ON 1945 PILGRIMAGE TO THE HOLY PLACES OF THE HEJAZ

Mr. Clarke to Mr. Bevin. (Received 1st April)

(No. 50)

Jedda,

Enclosure in No. 4

Sir, 24th March, 1947

With reference to Mr. Ellison's despatch No. 18 of 10th February, 1946, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying report on the 1945 (A.H. 1364) Pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz. I am indebted to Mr. Vice-Consul Ousman, to Mr. Shah Jehan Kebir, Indian vice-consul, and to Dr. Ghulam Mustafa, Indian medical officer, for the compilation of the report.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office, the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, the Governor-General of the Sudan, the High Commissioner for Palestine, the Governor of Nigeria, and the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

GUY H. CLARKE.

Report on the Pilgrimage of 1364 A.H. (A.D. 1945).

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(1) Introductory and General

Before Saudi Arabia had digested the news of the defeat of Nazi Germany, came the unexpected news of the surrender of Japan. People of the Hejaz, already hard-hit economically under the Saudi régime, had suffered much during the years of war; and eagerly expected a resumption of the pilgrimage traffic on pre-war scale. Indian, Javanese and Malay pilgrims especially, were awaited in numbers adequate to compensate for the loss sustained during the war period. Malayan and Javanese pilgrims could not, however, perform the pilgrimage; and the number of Indians was also restricted by inevitable shipping difficulties.

2. A total of 41,915 pilgrims landed at Jedda from overseas, as compared with 37,857 in 1944. Shortage of steamships, and the high rate of dues and charges prescribed by the Saudi Arabian Government, kept the total low.

3. Again in 1944 the system of pre-collection of pilgrimage dues in the pilgrims' countries of origin was applied by the responsible Governments, but the Government of India refused to adopt this procedure for Indians. Indian pilgrims unfortunately disregarded the instructions to bring Indian rupees for payment of pilgrimage dues, &c., and gold for non-tariff items only. They brought sovereigns in order to profit on the exchange, but were disappointed, because the rate swung against them. Eventually the Saudi Arabian Government agreed to accept from Indian pilgrims Egyptian and sterling currency besides Indian rupees. This reduced complaints, but gave rise to other difficulties. Pre-collection of dues in India would have prevented any loss of this kind.

4. The Middle East Supply Centre made special provision for the needs of pilgrims, but the Saudi Arabian Government did not open controlled-price retail establishments, and pilgrims had to purchase their food-stuffs from the market at the very high prices normal in this country.

5. No company or private individual organised the overland transport of pilgrims from Iraq, Koweit, &c., but according to Saudi returns sixteen pilgrims came overland by motor vehicles.

6. The Arab Car Company and the Saudi authorities concerned made fairly satisfactory arrangements for the despatch of pilgrims from Jedda on disembarkation to their destination, and congestion in Jedda was largely avoided. The position as regards the transport of pilgrims to Arafat was not so satisfactory, owing

to abuses by the drivers who, instead of keeping to a proper schedule, picked up pedestrians along the road for money-down, to the prejudice of pilgrims who had paid in advance for their transport. Those Indian pilgrims who had paid for their transport to Arafat by camel, but preferred to journey on foot for religious reasons, were refunded a sum of twenty rupees per head by private arrangements.

7. Some improvement was made in the new road built between Mecca and Arafat, by half metalling it. This helped traffic considerably, but complete satisfaction cannot be achieved in the absence of any regulations about speed. Driving is very furious, and accidents took place on the return journey from Arafat, when all have to leave the plain at the same time.

8. On the pilgrims leaving the country, their persons and luggage were searched to prevent the smuggling of gold, but, unlike 1944, the search was carried out in the Customs, both by the Customs officials and the coastguard authorities jointly. No complaint was heard in this respect.

9. The presence of King Abdul Aziz in Mecca with his family and retinue, for long periods before and after the Haj, inconvenienced the pilgrims somewhat in their performance of the "Tawwaf," owing to security measures taken by the local police.

10. Some Indian pilgrims were grieved to find that large crowds of pilgrims of both sexes circumambulated the Kaaba together within a very limited space. As a result of their representations, instructions were issued to the police to segregate the sexes.

11. The usual pilgrimage banquet took place on Sunday, 11th November, 1945, and was attended by selected pilgrims of all nationalities. The King presided. Speeches were curtailed by the Amir Mansour, who was acting in the absence of his brother, the Amir Faisal, as Viceroy, and only the King's poet read out the usual lengthy eulogy of the King. A Palestinian pilgrim made an attempt to speak, but was stopped by Amir Mansour. King Abdul Aziz delivered a speech, addressing the guests, in which he dwelt on the unity of God, the blessings of Islam, the Moslems' duty towards their religion, and Palestine.

12. The "Kiswa," the cover of the Holy Kaaba, was sent as usual from Egypt in charge of an Amir-al-Haj, who, this year, was Ibrahim Abdul Hadi Pasha. The latter did not show the enthusiasm and energy of his predecessor, Abdur Rahman Azzam Pasha.

13. The system of dealing with the estates of deceased British pilgrims by the

Saudi Arabian Government remained unsatisfactory, as mentioned in paragraph 15 of the 1944 report. After long correspondence and delay, the Saudi Arabian Government handed over the estates of deceased British pilgrims of the Moslem years 1361, 1362 and 1363 (1942-44) to the British Legation. As a result of their inaction, the return tickets of some pilgrims became invalid, and the heirs of the deceased pilgrims thereby suffered. The question of the disposal of pilgrims' effects has become a genuine nuisance.

14. Pilgrimage Day, the 9th of Dhu'l Hijja, fell on Wednesday, 14th November, 1945.

15. Climatic conditions on Arafat day were excellent. The general health of the pilgrims was unusually good.

16. Some seventeen pilgrims from the U.S.S.R. came by air.

17. Among the notables who made the pilgrimage were the following:—

Ibrahim Abdul Hadi Pasha and Abdul Hamid Badawi Pasha from Egypt; Mamud el Hawati from Yemen; Shaikh Al Glawi from Morocco; el Habib el Jaloodi from Tunis; Dr. Bomali from Algiers; Sir Mohammed Noor, Nawazadi Pari Banoo and Mr. Saidullah Khan from India, and Sir Mohammed Meccan Mericer from Ceylon.

18. Some Indian pilgrims brought money and clothing for free distribution amongst the poor in the Hejaz, besides the wheat sent by Sind before the pilgrimage season.

19. Pilgrims of South and East Africa who travelled direct from Mombasa and Zanzibar suffered very much after the Haj, as they waited for months at Jedda for shipping. They held single tickets only of the line which transported them to Jedda; a very undesirable circumstance. Some left for India, some for Egypt and Sudan, and the remaining few sailed on 15th January, 1946, for Mombasa.

20. Some difficulty arose owing to the absence of any one responsible office or officer in the Saudi Administration exclusively for pilgrimage affairs. With the appointment of Shaikh Ibrahim Shoura as Mudir el Haj, matters improved.

(2) Statistics

The following tables have been compiled from information unofficially obtained from the Saudi authorities concerned, and some discrepancies occur between these figures and those supplied from other sources.

The Mogul Line, the Haj Line, the Khedivial Mail Line and the Misr Line were engaged in pilgrimage traffic in 1945. Some of the ships of the British India Line were also chartered (?)

TABLE (A)

Number of Pilgrims arriving by Sea and landing at Jedda arranged by Nationality

Nationality	1944	1945
<i>India and Far East—</i>		
Indian	4,660	9,373
Dutch East Indies	4	7
Chinese	1	54
<i>Africa—</i>		
North African and Libyan	397	217
Egyptian	10,468	15,875
Sudanese and Shangitis	1,769	926
West African	5,269	5,480
Somali and Eritrean	35	71
Abyssinian	5	62
Senegalese	4	163
Zanzibari	15	22
Cape Town	2
Uganda	17
<i>Arab Countries—</i>		
Syrian and Lebanese	7,541	4,610
Iraqi	467	378
Kurd (Iraq and Syria)	222
Palestinian and Transjordan	5,371	1,221
Yemeni	69	166
Hadhrami and Adenese	781	1,338
Hejazi (South Arabia)	838	1,330
Persian Gulf (including Muscat, Oman and Bahrain)	5	50
<i>Miscellaneous—</i>		
Afghan	1	18
Bokheran	17	66
Persian	5	24
Turkish	135	223
Total	37,857	41,915

N.B.—Indians shown above are those who came by sea, either from Indian port direct or from other parts of the world.

TABLE (B)

Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation

Countries of embarkation	1944	1945
<i>India and Far East—</i>		
India	4,532	9,216
<i>Africa—</i>		
Egypt	26,058	25,719
Suakin	7,142	6,391
Mombasa and Zanzibar	245
<i>Arab Countries—</i>		
Aden	125	72
<i>Miscellaneous countries—</i>		
Aden and Massawa	171
Aden and Jibuti	28
Massawa	30
Jibuti	43
Total	37,857	41,915

TABLE (C)
Number of Ships transporting Pilgrims to the Hejaz and number of Pilgrims carried under each Flag

Flag	Number of voyages	Number of pilgrims
1944—		
British	29	26,471
Egyptian	16	11,386
French
	45	37,857
1945—		
British	32	31,840
Egyptian	24	10,032
French	1	43
	57	41,915

(3) Quarantine

The quarantine arrangements for the pilgrims coming overland and by sea were the same as last year. The Saudi Arabian Government did not maintain a quarantine station at *Al-Arid* for Iraqi pilgrims coming overland this year.

Kamaran.—All the Indian pilgrims ships called at Kamaran.

Suakin.—Arrangements were similar to last year.

Jedda.—The Saudi Arabian quarantine staff were the same as last year. No cases of smallpox or other infectious disease were notified.

(4) Health

The Saudi Arabian Public Health Department declared the pilgrimage clean, and this was confirmed by the Indian medical officer as no case of any infectious disease came to his notice during the pilgrimage days at *Mecca* or *Muna*. Diarrhoea, dysentery, bronchitis and catarrh of the air passages were the general complaints, specially among old and infirm Indian pilgrims. Besides the above, malaria and pneumonia were the most common diseases.

There was no noticeable change in the staff and working of the Saudi medical services except that a new surgeon, Dr. Maleeh Sinnoo arrived to work in Mecca hospital during the Haj season. He is reported to be a good surgeon.

Jedda.—There is no separate hospital for infectious diseases. Infectious cases are isolated in one wing of the local hospital. The General Hospital is short of medicines and surgical supplies and only emergency operations are undertaken.

Mecca, Medina and Taif hospitals. Arrangements were the same as usual.

Government of India Dispensaries

Jedda.—As usual the dispensary was open to the public throughout the year except for a fortnight when Dr. Ghulam

Mustafa, the Indian Medical Officer, assisted by Dr. Abdur Rahman Khan and the permanent and temporary staff of Jedda and Mecca dispensaries respectively, formed the Indian Medical Mission and lead the mission to Mecca, Muna and Arafat for the service of pilgrims during the Haj days. During the season pilgrims of all nationalities attended the dispensary in large numbers. The daily attendance at the dispensary remained high throughout the year. During the season the attendance was unusually high as notices were posted for the information of pilgrims, and medical assistance was rendered to them at all times of the day and night, irrespective of dispensary hours. The Government of India furnished medicines and medical and surgical supplies as far as war conditions permitted.

Mecca.—The dispensary functioned from 28th September, 1945, to 29th December, 1945. The head dispenser was put in charge to conduct the work, and another dispenser sent later to assist him as the attendance increased. This was done as the Government of India could not send the doctor and the dispenser for Mecca by the first pilgrim steamer. The dispensary was open to the public and to pilgrims of all countries. The total number of cases treated in the Indian dispensaries during the year 1945, is as under:—

Jedda	62,526
Mecca	8,221
Muna	326
Arafat	7
	71,080

Out of these 17,535 were Indian, 147 Europeans, and the rest Arabs and others.

The attached table shows the percentage of various diseases treated during the year 1945:—

Serial No. and Name of Disease	Percentage
1. Areolar tissue	5.200
2. Ascities	0.400
3. Blood and spleen	6.015
4. Breast diseases	1.002
5. Circulatory system	1.312
6. Diarrhoea	1.101
7. Deficiency	0.121
8. Diabetes	0.025
9. Digestive system	14.123
10. Dysentery	0.008
11. Ear Diseases	5.092
12. Eye Diseases	12.210
13. Generative system	1.013
14. Glands	0.078
15. Gonorrhoea	2.161
16. Injuries	2.114
17. Labour cases	0.417
18. Liver diseases	0.014
19. Locomotion	0.197
20. Malaria	24.052
21. Nervous system	1.421
22. New growth	0.110

Serial No. and Name of Disease	Percentage
23. Nose	0.629
24. Pneumonia	0.518
25. P.U.O. and diseases due to infections	0.216
26. Respiratory	7.150
27. Rheumatism	5.300
28. T.B. lungs and others	0.012
29. Syphilis	0.410
30. Urinary system	1.324
31. Ulcers	6.225
Grand total	100.0

The following is the list of surgical operations performed in the Indian Dispensaries during the year 1945:—

Serial No. and Name of Operation	Total No.
1. Extraction of teeth	1,828
2. Excision of sinuses	324
3. Circumcision	23
4. Injection I.V.	4,529
5. Do. I.M.	3,241
6. Do. S.C.	3,017
7. Lumbar puncture	30
8. Eye operations	494
9. Opening of abscesses	2,575
10. Litholapaxy	1
11. New growth, and cyst	40
12. Nose	16
13. Piles	30
14. T.B. glands	23
15. Removal of F. bodies	37
16. Do. of sequestra	5
17. Scraping of ulcers	609
18. Setting of fractures	12
19. Suturing of wounds	154
20. Tapping hydrocele	8
Grand total	16,996

The Indian Medical Officer, recognising the poor condition of the people, made free visits to deserving cases at their homes and did not charge a single pilgrim for visits.

Other Foreign Medical Services

The Egyptian medical arrangements were the same as last year. The Netherlands Dispensary at Mecca functioned throughout the year with Anglo-Dutch co-operation.

The Palestine Medical Mission encamped outside the cities where the public and pilgrims could not take full advantage of their services. Dr. Atabani assisted by Dr. Bukhari and other staff formed the Sudan Medical Mission. Although encamped outside Jedda, they set up a temporary hospital and rendered very good service to the public and pilgrims.

Legation Medical Staff

Dr. Ghulam Mustafa acted throughout the year and was confirmed on 2nd October, 1945, as the Indian Medical Officer attached to His Majesty's Legation, Jedda, when Dr. Ghulam Hussain reverted to his original post in India. No substitute arrived in place of Qazi Mohammed Younis, 3rd Dispenser, who returned by

s.s. *Khosrou* to India on 16th January, 1945, and so Mr. Abdullah Malabari, the dresser, continued to act in his place as dispenser throughout the year. Mr. Mohammed Shaffi Choudhri, head dispenser, sailed for India on completion of his three years' service by s.s. *Akbar* on 11th January, 1946, leaving the staff short by two dispensers. Replacements are expected to arrive soon from India.

(5) Internal Transport

As there was no remarkable increase in the number of overseas pilgrims over that of the previous year, no particular difficulty was experienced in respect of the transport of pilgrims from Jedda to Mecca and Medina. There were cases of breakdown of lorries, shortage of petrol, &c., but relief reached in time in all the cases. It may be interesting to note that one batch of pilgrims took three days to reach Mecca from Jedda—a distance of 45 miles on an asphalt road.

The usual difficulties arose about the arrangements for the journey from Mecca to Arafat. Many improvements in this respect would be possible if there were more goodwill and co-operation on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government officials, one of whom was heard to remark that the best course was to pretend to be deaf during the season. There was some resentment among pilgrims who had paid money in advance, but could not get transport.

The journey to Medina after the Haj by motor vehicles was made difficult by heavy rain and flood; and rash driving led to numerous accidents on the Medina road. In many cases pilgrims had to remain on the way for several days, without food, water and help. Sir Mohammed Noor and Moulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqi were eloquent about their experiences. Pilgrims complained of very high fares and minimum comfort.

(6) Customs

Customs arrangements were the same as in 1944. There was no very strict examination of pilgrims' baggage, and a few silver coins in the hands of the unpaid officials helped in taking out otherwise dutiable articles.

(7) Religious Policy

The Committee of Virtue functioned as usual. Pilgrims did not experience any hardship due to the presence of the committee. Some pilgrims reported that the Nejd guards posted round the railings of the Prophet's Tomb at Medina, in order to prevent the pilgrims from touching the railings, seized the pilgrims by their hands

and encouraged them to touch the railings in hope of getting a few piastres. Indian pilgrims paid these guards heavily.

The epithets of the Holy Prophet written in gold on the walls of the Haram in Medina, which were demolished by the fanatic Wahhabi Qadhi in Medina, were rewritten on the same places as a result of wide agitation and protest from all quarters, especially by the Egyptians. Same epithets were, however, not written, but epithets of general type were rewritten on the walls.

(8) Mutawwifs

Mutawwifs who cater for Javanese and Malayan pilgrims were again disappointed, as no pilgrims from those countries came on Haj, though the war was over.

Mutawwifs for other nationals were happy to get clients. The failure of the Saudi Arabian Government to pay a proper share of the dues to the mutawwifs compelled them to make money by such means as they could. Mutawwifs' agents in Jedda and mutawwifs in Mecca made money from Indian pilgrims by manipulating currencies. For Government dues and transport charges they charged Indians the currency which was profitable to their interests, but eventually paid these sums in to the Treasury in the currency which was cheaper at the moment. Pilgrims complained and in some cases recoveries were made. Mutawwifs and wakils of Indian pilgrims also made money by attempts to obtain passages for their clients out of turn by returning vessels. The system of "first come, first served" facilitated these illegalities.

(9) Pilgrimage Tariff

As a result of protests made by Indian and Egyptian pilgrims in the previous year against the arbitrary rate of exchange fixed for the tariff items, pilgrims were asked to pay in their national currencies and no mention of riyals appeared in the schedule. Indian pilgrims who did not pay in advance were warned to bring Indian rupees with them to pay for the tariff items and sovereigns for non-tariff items. They did not heed these instructions and brought only sovereigns with them, purchased in India at rupees 53 to a sovereign. When they wished to buy rupees on the Jedda market the rate was rupees 48 to a sovereign, a sharp decline from the pre-pilgrimage season rate of rupees 76 to a sovereign. Temporary arrangements were made with a money-changer to accept sovereigns from Indian pilgrims at the

rate of rupees 76 only for the amount of tariff items, but when the Indians began to rush with all their sovereigns to make a profit the money-changer closed down his shop and ran away. His Majesty's Minister took up the matter with the Saudi Arabian Government, and obtained permission for Indian pilgrims to pay the tariff items in other currencies also, Egyptian and sterling, if they wished and as a result Indian pilgrims began to pay their dues, &c., in Egyptian pounds, which enabled them to make considerable saving in exchange. On the arrival of the mass of Indian pilgrims and of the rupees they brought with them, the sovereign improved to rupees 78.

In the schedule of tariffs, the Saudi Arabian Government divided the payment under four heads: (1) Pilgrimage to Mecca, &c., by camel, (2) Pilgrimage by lorry, (3) Pilgrimage and Medina visit by camel, and (4) Pilgrimage and Medina visit by lorry. The minimum amount payable was rupees 323.6 or £E.23.63½ piastres. Indian pilgrims greatly resented compulsory payment for transport as some of them wanted to walk on foot to Mecca and Arafat.

(10) Indian Pilgrimage

The Indian pilgrimage began in 1945 with the arrival of s.s. *Alavi* on 4th October; the last arrivals were by s.s. *Khosrou* on 6th November. Besides these direct sailings, some Indians came from the Sudan, East Africa, South Africa, Iraq, Egypt, the Persian Gulf and England.

The Mogul Line and the Haj Line engaged in the pilgrimage traffic from India this year.

The following table gives the number of ships run, voyages effected, and pilgrims carried to and from India by the Mogul Line and the Haj Line respectively:—

MOGUL LINE	
<i>Outward from India</i> —	
Number of ships	5
Number of voyages	6
Number of pilgrims	7,540
<i>Homeward to India</i> —	
Number of ships	5
Number of voyages	7
Number of pilgrims	7,338 ⁽¹⁾
HAJ LINE	
<i>Outward from India</i> —	
Number of ships	1
Number of voyages	2
Number of pilgrims	1,676
<i>Homeward to India</i> —	
Number of ships	1
Number of voyages	2
Number of pilgrims	1,707 ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ This figure includes persons who purchased fresh tickets for return to India.

The following table shows the movement of return traffic, with details of the number of ships available on given dates for repatriation of pilgrims, the number of pilgrims awaiting repatriation and the number actually repatriated:—

Dates	Number of ships in port	Pilgrims awaiting embarkation	Pilgrims despatched	Pilgrims remaining
1945—				
November 25	2	3,055	1,446	1,609
November 26	1	1,699	752	947
November 29	1	964	964	...
December 24	2	4,370	1,363	3,007
December 25	1	3,740	955	2,785
December 31	1	3,438	1,121	2,317
1946—				
January 6	1	2,381	1,038	1,343
January 11	1	1,407	1,407	...
February 15	1	102	102	...

Return of Pilgrims to India: General

The "Batch" system, which was introduced in 1944 for the first time in the Indian pilgrimage, was replaced by the old system of "first come, first served," during the year under review. A large number of pilgrims tried to take undue advantage in booking their passages, but both the pilgrims and their associates were very severely dealt with. No concession was shown to any pilgrim in any circumstances but it cannot be definitely said that all attempts were checked. There may have occurred some cases of pilgrims who booked their passages by illegal means and escaped detection.

Pilgrims who travelled by the Mogul Line boats were much inconvenienced by the constant change of programme of homeward-bound sailings. The legation were able to secure the concession for Indian pilgrims to stay in Medina till they were wanted by the legation before the sailings of ships, without payment of extra charges, but this arrangement also did not give complete satisfaction. Enraged pilgrims besieged the Indian Vice-Consulate on 1st January, 1946, and showed some violence. These changes of programme involved the Mogul Line in the payment of compensation allowance under Section 209A of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act to 1,038 Indian pilgrims, amounting to rupees 2,186. The Haj Line had to pay under similar circumstances to six Indian pilgrims a sum of rupees 6. A certain number of pilgrims holding Mogul Line return tickets travelled back to India by purchasing fresh tickets on the Haj Line, to save two days' wait. The last Indian pilgrim boat, s.s. *Alavi*, sailed from Jeddah on 15th February, 1946, transporting destitute Indian pilgrims and *Muhajirs*.

Food, Accommodation, &c., on Board the Pilgrim Ships

Pilgrims travelling by the Mogul Line were very severe in criticism of the arrangements made for supplying food during the voyage. The quality of food-stuffs was reported to be inferior. On the contrary, pilgrims travelling by the Haj Line expressed their satisfaction in respect of food supply, both as to quality and quantity. Reports by the Amirs ul Haj dealt with these subjects. The question of accommodation on board requires solution. All efforts at the ports of embarkation in India to mark blocks, &c., are futile when the coolies begin to load baggage and pilgrims begin to embark. The system of storing heavy luggage in the holds also proved troublesome in the absence of any arrangements for delivery of luggage to pilgrims on their landing in Jeddah.

Suitable persons were appointed as "Amirs ul Haj" by the legation on the return journeys on the same lines as were followed in the past. Again this year, the proposed standard system of reports by the Amirs ul Haj was not adopted by the Government of India.

Pilgrim Passes

It is essential, in the interests of the pilgrims themselves, that photographs should be affixed to the pilgrim passes. The question of religious sentiment no more arises, since these pilgrims, if they want to visit Iraq, have to have photos on the pilgrim passes.

Registration

The usual arrangements for registration of pilgrims worked satisfactorily. Of the Indian pilgrims shown as arriving by sea, 8,566 were registered at this legation. Reports of loss of pilgrim passes and steamer return tickets were properly dealt with, and pilgrims were not inconvenienced in any way on this score.

Destitutes

Eighty-eight destitute Indians were repatriated to India at the expense of the Government of India. The following routes of access were adopted by them:—

Route of Access

(a) Overland—	
Via Gwadar-Mascat-Mokalla-Yemen	33
Via Gwadar-Dobai-Riyadh	2
Via Bombay-Bahrein-Nejd	6
Via Karachi-Mokalla-Yemen	2
Via Bombay-Mokalla-Yemen	1
Via Gwadar-Basra-Koweit-Nejd	4
Via Makran-Mokalla-Yemen	2

(b) By sea—	
Return ticket holders (Bombay)	20
Return ticket holders (Karachi)	9
Return ticket holders (Calcutta)	1
	30
Single ticket holders (Bombay)	6
Single ticket holders (Karachi)	2
	8
	88

Banking Facilities

The principal banking concerns in Jeddah are the same as in previous years: the Netherlands Trading Society, which has branches in India, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Company, whose Indian correspondents are the National Bank of India. Pilgrims who brought drafts on the Netherlands Trading Society complained that they were offered Egyptian pounds at an unfavourable rate.

Those who wished to leave surplus cash in safe custody were allowed to deposit it at the Indian Vice-Consulate. Arrangements were made to pay them out of their deposits, in accordance with their needs, at Mecca, Muna and Medina. The amount so deposited was rupees 38,952, all of which was withdrawn by the depositors during their stay in the Hejaz.

(11) Palestinian and Transjordan Pilgrimages

According to Saudi quarantine returns, 1,221 Palestinian and Transjordan nationals entered the port of Jeddah on pilgrimage, a decrease of 4,150 on the previous year's total of 5,371.

No figures are available regarding pilgrims who travelled overland.

With the exception of the members of the medical mission and a few independent travellers, all Palestinian and Transjordan pilgrims were carried to and from this country in the s.s. *Shiralla*. No complaints were received regarding shipping facilities, and the ships sailed to schedule on both outward and homeward journeys.

The medical mission, in the charge of Dr. Hassan Shukri el Khalidi, arrived at Jeddah in the s.s. *Talodi* on 5th October, 1945, and sailed for Suez on the return journey to Palestine on 2nd December, 1945. Vehicles and equipment were unloaded and loaded with the help of Izzedine Bey Shawa, through the courtesy of the manager of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, at the syndicate's pier. The camp was located conveniently for pilgrims on high ground some 200 yards from the town gates. The mission visited Medina between 16th and 28th October, and proceeded to Mecca for the pilgrimage on 17th November. Dr. Khalidi and his

staff performed their duties with enthusiasm and efficiency, and their services were highly appreciated in both medical and clerical capacities.

The mission was joined by Abdulhadi Effendi Irfan, special representative of the Palestine Broadcasting Station, on 6th October.

Emergency travel documents were issued to pilgrims who reported the loss of their pilgrim booklets.

(12) Sudanese Pilgrimage

According to Saudi quarantine returns, 926 Sudanese and Shanqitis entered the port of Jeddah from Suakin for pilgrimage, as compared with 1,769 for the previous year. As usual, the Shanqitis included in the total were few.

Pilgrims were carried to and from this country in ships of the Khedivial Mail Line. During the return season the usual complaints were received from pilgrims who had to wait from six to eight days in Jeddah for a ship.

The medical mission in the charge of Dr. Atabani, medical inspector, arrived at Jeddah on 18th October, and was followed for the medical officer, Dr. Bukhari, on 6th November. The field hospital was located on the site occupied by the mission of the previous year, approximately two miles along the Jeddah-Mecca road, and was ready to receive patients on 21st October.

The field hospital at Jeddah was closed on 9th November, and the mobile dispensary and all members of the mission proceeded to Mecca. After the return from Muna, on 17th November, the mission divided. The medical inspector, the medical assistant and two Momarideen remained at Mecca and opened the dispensary. The medical officer and the remainder of the staff returned to Jeddah to reopen the field hospital.

On 29th November the medical inspector, accompanied by two Momarideen, left Jeddah to open the dispensary at Medina. The dispensary was closed on 24th December, and the medical inspector returned to assume charge of the field hospital at Jeddah, in time to permit the medical officer and other members of the staff to pay a short visit to Medina.

The medical officer, sanitary overseer, Bash Momarid, staff midwife, three Momarideen and the cook returned to the Sudan on 16th January, 1946. The medical inspector, the medical assistant and the remainder of the staff, with vehicles, returned in the last ship on 4th February.

The work of the mission, efficiently and courteously performed by Dr. Atabani and his staff, was greatly appreciated not only by the pilgrims, but by the local Saudis and others, more than 7,000 of whom availed themselves of the facilities offered.

(13) West African Pilgrimage

Saudi quarantine returns show that 5,480 West Africans entered the port of Jedda from Suakin for pilgrimage, as compared with 5,269 the previous year. Although the Saudi returns do not differentiate between British and French nationals, it is estimated that approximately 70-75 per cent. of the total were British.

They were carried to and from the Sudan in ships of the Khedivial Mail Line. Although the ships failed to sail to scheduled dates during the return season, and the waiting periods between ships ranged from four to nine days, no serious complaints were received from West African pilgrims.

Again this year, a large number of West Africans benefited from the medical facilities so generously offered by the Sudan Medical Mission.

The illicit dhow traffic from the Eritrean coast continues to increase. Although no official figures are available, the West African sheikhs report a steady flow of pilgrims from the southern part of Jizan, Qunfida and Lith.

Only 470 pilgrims travelled under the auspices of the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme, and during the return season 325 pilgrims were refunded a total sum of £E.322·695 m/ms.

Emergency certificates were issued to pilgrims who satisfactorily proved the loss of their pilgrim passes.

(14) Somali Pilgrimage

Under the heading "Somalis and Eritrean," Saudi quarantine returns show that seventy-one pilgrims entered the port of Jedda on pilgrimage as compared with thirty-five the previous year.

As usual, no figures are available of pilgrims who travelled overland from Aden.

During the return season eleven pilgrims were refunded the total sum of £E61 17s. 6d.

Emergency certificates were issued to pilgrims who satisfactorily proved the loss of their pilgrim passes.

(15) Pilgrimage of the Inhabitants of the Colony and Protectorate of Aden

Under the heading "Adenese and Hadhramis," Saudi quarantine returns show that 1,338 pilgrims disembarked at Jedda for pilgrimage, as compared with 781 the previous year.

No figures are available regarding pilgrims who travelled overland.

As usual, there were numerous complaints during the return season regarding the lack of shipping facilities. A number of pilgrims who travelled from Aden in the Khedivial Mail Line steamer, steamship *Talodi*, were subjected to great inconvenience and expense when they were obliged to wait in Jedda for nearly a month for a return passage.

During the return season emergency certificates were issued to pilgrims who satisfactorily proved the loss of their travel documents.

(16) Zanzibar and East African Pilgrimages

Saudi quarantine returns show that twenty-two Zanzibaris and two pilgrims from Uganda entered the port of Jedda for pilgrimage.

(17) South African Pilgrimage

According to Saudi quarantine returns only two South Africans entered the port of Jedda for pilgrimage.

(18) Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian Pilgrimage

Saudi quarantine returns do not, as usual, differentiate between the countries of North Africa, and show a total of 217 pilgrims from those territories disembarked at Jedda, 160 of whom were, according to official figures published by the civil Affairs Branch, General Headquarters, Middle East Forces, natives of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.

During the return season 126 pilgrims were refunded a total sum of £E.1,260·000 m/ms.

ANNUAL ECONOMIC (A) REPORT ON SAUDI ARABIA, 1946

Mr. Grafftey-Smith to Mr. Bevin. (Received 19th June)

(No. 89 E.)
Sir,

Jedda,

14th June, 1947

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my Annual Report, Economic (A) for 1946 for the preparation of which I am indebted to Mr. J. T. Davis, Second Secretary (Commercial).

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Export Promotion Department, Board of Trade.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 5

Annual Economic (A) Report for 1946

Introduction

1. During the war years the virtual state of siege experienced by Saudi Arabia in common with other Middle East countries, combined with an influx of precious metals and foreign currencies as the result of the Anglo-United States subsidy and the rapidly expanding activities of the Arabian American Oil Company, produced an acute rise in the internal price level and an accumulation of foreign exchange for which no immediate outlet could be found. Saudi Arabia was to some extent saved from the inflationary consequences of what may be computed to be a tenfold increase in the volume of riyals in circulation, by the native propensity to hoard silver rather than employ it in competitive bidding for the limited volume of available goods and services. In the absence of statistics, official or otherwise, no exact measure of the degree of inflation is possible, but from common observation it would appear that the cost of living has since 1939 increased fourfold in terms of sterling and of silver, and 50 per cent. in terms of gold.

2. The effect of the discontinuance of the Anglo-United States subsidy at the end of 1945 upon the public finances of Saudi Arabia was mitigated by a rapid increase in oil royalties paid by Aramco and the re-establishment of the annual pilgrimage at about the 1938 level. The fundamental disequilibrium in the economy of the country, due to restricted imports coinciding with a vast increase in available means of payment, has not, however, been without effect upon public finance. Since

1939 revenue has increased perhaps sixfold, but the budget remains unbalanced. Squandermania and speculation play a part in the increase, but inflation is in the main responsible. Since so large a proportion of the Government's revenue is received in the form of foreign exchange, the budgetary problem cannot be resolved until the volume of imports has been substantially increased. The deflation implicit in this course is unfortunately bound to bring further problems in its wake, with consequent risk of political disturbance. A fall in the general price level, which will of course affect all property values, seems bound to evoke reaction from the propertied classes in general, and the new-rich, from the Royal Family downwards, in particular.

3. Oil developments since 1939 have provided the Saudi Arabian Government with a revenue, and Saudi Arabia as a whole with foreign exchange earnings, comparable with those derived from the Pilgrimage. Concurrently, the general expansion of prices and incomes throughout the Moslem world promises a profitable succession of pilgrimages. Profound internal changes may result from this situation. Nejd is no longer economically dependent upon the Hejaz, and internal stresses may thereby be relieved. A rising standard of living implies a modification of traditional habits, and opens the door a little wider to Western influences.

Finance and Currency

4. No details of the budget relating to the Moslem year 1365 (corresponding very approximately to the year 1946) are available, but some indication may be gleaned from a comparison of estimates for the years 1364 and 1366; it being understood that these estimates lend themselves to very wide interpretation.

	Million riyals	
	1364	1366
Expenditure	110	160
Revenue—		
Royalties paid by concessionary companies	5	75
Pilgrimage tariff receipts	10	25
Anglo-United States subsidy	44	...
Sale of Government-imported stores	19	25
Customs	4	20
Taxes		
	82	60
Deficit	28	

Alternative versions of the budget for 1366 state expenditure at 170 million riyals and revenue at 130 million riyals, leaving a deficit of 40 million riyals.

5. It may be doubted whether the Minister of Finance himself could give a rational justification for this startling increase in expenditure from the 1939 level of 25 to 30 million riyals. Departmental budgeting is virtually unknown, but in this connexion there is reason to believe that expenditure by the Ministry of Defence in 1947 will absorb the sum of 13 million riyals.

6. The very small proportion of revenue derived from internal taxation is noteworthy, as also is the scale of Government trading. In effect the Government derives its revenue principally from taxing Saudi Arabia's exports, visible (oil) and invisible (pilgrims), a practice which leaves it peculiarly exposed to the consequences of any world-wide trade recession.

7. If present trends continue, the revenue of the Saudi Arabian Government will undergo a further considerable degree of expansion. It is possible that by 1950 oil production will have attained the rate of 25 million tons a year, implying royalty payments of the order of \$40 million annually, or 160 million riyals at present rates of exchange. An annual pilgrimage of the order of 100,000, a level attainable on present indications, would bring in perhaps 45 million riyals. Customs revenue totalling 60 million riyals is not beyond the bounds of possibility. The upper limit of revenue hovers therefore about the 300 million riyal mark—perhaps ten times the aggregate of the Saudi Arabian Government's pre-war revenues. A radical overhaul of Saudi Arabia's archaic system of internal taxation could add a considerable sum to a total already impressive in relation to the former fortunes of the Saudi Arabian Government, but the administrative revolution implied is not at present within the bounds of practical politics.

8. The complete lack of any mechanism for financing the short-term needs of the Saudi Arabian Government, involves both the Ministry of Finance and the trading community in serious recurrent embarrassment, aggravated by the highly seasonal nature of the flow of revenue. It is therefore not surprising that pre-war plans for the establishment of a National Bank of Saudi Arabia have from time to time been taken out of cold storage. Since the prerequisite for the establishment of such a bank seems to be a large unsecured loan

to the Saudi Arabian Government, it is not surprising that foreign banking concerns have not rushed to accept the privilege offered to them.

9. Prolonged negotiations, begun in the summer of 1945, in anticipation of the termination of the Anglo-United States subsidy, materialised in August 1946 in the grant of a \$10 million line of credit from the Export-Import Bank, to be expended largely upon consumer goods and the minting of riyals. Further loans of \$20 million for development projects, and a similar sum for the construction of a railway from Damman, on the Persian Gulf, to Riyadh, are still in course of negotiation. In addition to this indebtedness, the Saudi Arabian Government has anticipated oil royalty payments to the tune of \$11 million.

10. The effective link between the Saudi Arabian currency and the currencies of the outside world is provided by the bullion markets of Cairo, Bagdad and Bombay. It follows that the exchange situation in present circumstances is very unstable, and that this instability is likely to continue.

Foreign Trade

11. No returns of overseas trade are published in Saudi Arabia—it may even be doubted whether any are compiled—and up-to-date returns are lacking for Saudi Arabia's principal supplies. Where statistical criteria are available they almost invariably serve to confound general impressions. It follows that any review of the present situation must be confined to generalities.

12. Three of Saudi Arabia's principal sources of supply before the outbreak of war in 1939—Germany, Italy and Japan—are virtually excluded at the present time. Both Egypt and India have imposed export restrictions which particularly affect those countries' principal exports to Saudi Arabia. On the other hand the current rate of import from the United States and the United Kingdom is incomparably greater than in pre-war days. A statistical summary of United Kingdom trade with Saudi Arabia is given in appendix A.

13. The effect of payment in kind, on a Government-to-Government basis, of the Anglo-United States subsidy during the later war years, has been to give the Saudi Arabian Government a taste for State trading. This continues, ostensibly by reason of its revenue raising possibilities, but also, it is to be feared, because of the

opportunities of personal gain offered to a corrupt and underpaid bureaucracy.

14. An acute shortage of food-stuffs and consumer goods is evident to-day. The profit margin on imported goods is excessive. This situation is due not so much to an actual insufficiency of imports by reference to pre-war totals, although instances of this in relation to particular commodities, chiefly food-stuffs, are many; but to a revolutionary rise in the available means of payment for imports.

15. Foreign interest in the import trade of Saudi Arabia has not been lacking. The initiative in this matter came from the Americans, when in 1945 Messrs. American Eastern Inc. opened a branch in Jeddah. In November 1946 the old-established firm of Sharqieh Ltd. was absorbed into the Mitchell Cotts (M.E.), Ltd., group of companies, the services of Mr. St. John Philby being retained. Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan), Ltd., continued to expand their commercial activities in Jeddah. Towards the end of the year enquiries were received from Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie & Co. (Bahrain), Ltd., indicating that the firm intended shortly to establish a branch in Ras Tannura. Local reactions to foreign intrusions have been mixed. Messrs. American Eastern Inc. have throughout experienced hostility amounting at times to sabotage. Messrs. Mitchell Cotts (M.E.), Ltd., largely insured themselves against local reactions by employing Mr. St. John (alias Haji Abdullah) Philby's influence. The establishment of a native Chamber of Commerce in Jeddah is perhaps also indicative of local reaction; at any rate the President of the Chamber has on occasion expressed his resentment at the activities of foreign firms in the Hejaz.

16. A most unfortunate development, prejudicial to the credit standing of virtually all importing firms, has been the action of the Saudi Arabian Government in financing short-term needs by forced loans upon the merchant community. These loans often assume an indirect form. The Government places orders for commodities abroad, either for its own use or for resale on arrival, and neglects to pay the importer until some considerable time has elapsed.

Agriculture

17. The Arabian American Oil Company continues to administer the cultivation, under the most modern methods of irrigation, of the oasis at El Kharj. 3,000

acres are at present utilised, and the project may eventually be extended to another 3,000 acres. The real value of this undertaking lies not in the volume of food-stuffs produced—this is infinitesimal in comparison with the country's needs—but in experience gained in applying modern methods to Saudi Arabian conditions, and in stimulating interest in official circles.

18. Very conflicting reports have been received respecting the rainfall of the winter of 1946-47. There was heavy rainfall on the West Coast in November and December, but in the interior it appears to have been much below average. The practice of distributing Royal largesse to bedouin in the Nejd has led to the abandonment of many marginal areas formerly exploited by these nomads.

Industry

19. Aramco's production of crude oil rose from a level of approximately 100,000 barrels a day in January 1946 to 200,000 barrels a day by December 1946. A daily rate of 500,000 barrels by 1950 is contemplated.

20. Considerable publicity has been given to the impending sale of 40 per cent. of Aramco's stock, at present held by the Standard Oil Company of California and by the Texas Oil Company, to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and to Messrs. Socony Vacuum. This sale is, at the time of writing, still impeded by the reactions of the Compagnie Française des Pétroles. Its object appears to be to extend to Aramco the marketing facilities of the older-established American companies, and to assist the raising of new capital for the long-mooted Transarabian pipe-line project. At the present time the bulk of Aramco's production is sold to the United States Navy in the Pacific, but this outlet cannot be counted upon indefinitely to absorb Aramco's rapidly growing production.

21. The operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate continue at an even tempo, in spite of a somewhat precarious financial situation. The company is in practice obliged to sell its refined product in the United States at the United States Treasury price, which concedes no element of compensation for sharply increased operating costs in Saudi Arabia. No dividend was paid to shareholders in 1946. Production in 1946 totalled \$1,700,000 of gold concentrates and over \$800,000 of by-products, chiefly silver and zinc.

22. Towards the end of the year enquiries concerning the possibility of installing a modern cotton spinning and

weaving mill in the Hejaz were put forward, but this project seems to have died a natural death.

Transport

23. With the resignation of the last British transport adviser to the Saudi Arabian Government in June 1946, the attempt to maintain a public monopoly of motor transport, ill-omened but long-persevered in, was finally abandoned. The Arab Car Company acquired the old Government service lock, stock and barrel, and, with it, powers to monopolise the transport of pilgrims and Government stores. The capital of the company was expanded to 12 million riyals for this purpose.

24. No vehicle census returns are at present available, but it would appear that the rate of arrival of cars and trucks of British and United States origin in 1946 sufficed to meet all immediate demands. Four hundred and sixty-two automobiles of all varieties were cleared through the customs at Jedda during the year. No information is available respecting imports through other harbours.

25. Unhappy experience with motor transport has fortified a nascent interest in railways on the part of Ibn Saud and his advisers. Schemes for the construction of a railway from Damman to Riyadh, the renovation of the long disused Hejaz Railway to Medina and the possible extension of the latter to Jedda, have been pressed with unwonted energy. It seems inevitable that the capitalisation and construction of the first and last of these schemes will be purely American, a monopoly of Messrs. International Bechtel Incorporated, with financial assistance provided by Aramco. The repair of the Hejaz railway within the Hejaz is to be a charge on the railway's profits elsewhere.

26. A landmark in the history of transport in Saudi Arabia is provided by the establishment of a Government-operated air-transport service, entitled Saudi Arabian Airlines. At present this service is maintained by employees of Messrs. T.W.A., seconded to the Saudi Arabian Government for this purpose, and it uses eight Douglas C-47-B machines. Although chiefly employed in carrying Saudi officials and mail, fare-paying passengers are accepted, and flights to Cairo are regularly scheduled, if not regularly undertaken.

27. Work on the extension and equipment of the airport at Dhahran, under the auspices of the United States Army continued throughout the year. It received a considerable impetus as a result of the

transfer of Army personnel and stores from Payne Field, following upon the acquisition of that airport by the Egyptian Government. In principle this airport is available for the use of all commercial air transport services, but in practice the attitude of the Government to flights over Saudi Arabian territory will tend to limit its usefulness.

28. In the case of sea transport, a welcome sign of the times has been the resumption of direct sailings from the United Kingdom by vessels of the Blue Funnel Line, and from the United States by vessels of the Isthmian Line. The expense, delay and damage consequent upon the transshipment of goods from other Red Sea ports have long been a serious impediment to trade. The Khedivial Mail Line has exploited its virtual monopoly of transshipment traffic in a most extortionate manner, and it is perhaps not surprising that several Saudi Arabian importers have acquired L.C.T.s from the Disposals Mission in Cairo, with a view to handling this class of traffic on their own account.

State Undertakings and Utilities

29. During the year 1946, the consciousness of new-found wealth and the prospect of American loans for development projects induced in Saudi official circles an ecstasy of good intentions. Apart from the railway schemes already mentioned, the following projects were mooted: deep-water harbours at Jedda and Damman; improvements to the airport at Riyadh; a radical overhaul and re-equipment of the internal system of radio communications; automatic telephone exchanges in Jedda and Mecca; the electrification of Jedda, Mecca, Taif and Riyadh; main water supplies and complementary sewerage schemes for Mecca and Jedda; a new Customs House and Hotel at Jedda; a hospital at Mecca and an ophthalmic hospital at Jedda. Perhaps the most obvious and immediate need of the country—a tolerable road network—is conspicuously absent from this list.

30. No tangible steps were taken in 1946 to accomplish any of the major projects, but at the time of writing (May 1947) work on the Jedda water scheme is far advanced. The contract in this case was awarded to a British firm, Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey & Co. (Sudan) Ltd., and their speed of execution has been most gratifying. The Egyptian Ministry of Wakfs has undertaken the water and sewerage schemes in Mecca, and good progress is reported.

31. The fate of the remainder of these projects, with the exception of the deep water jetty, seven miles long, which Messrs. Aramco are constructing at Damman, appears to depend directly upon the outcome of the American loan negotiations mentioned in paragraph 9. It is not likely that such a revolution in the amenities of life in Saudi Arabia can be effected without considerable friction and delay. It is to be regretted that relatively few and minor contracts will fall to the lot of British contractors, since the Americans have a jealous regard for the way in which their loans are expended. The extent to which local capital will be available for some of the schemes is problematic; local capitalists are naturally deterred by the heavy handed interference of the administration, and the old habit of hoarding bullion rather than investing in productive assets is still strong.

Social

32. Wages, except in the case of certain restricted groups of skilled workers, have in general tended to lag far behind price increases. The resulting social misery is accentuated, in the case of the relatively large numbers of employees of the administration, by a seemingly ineradicable Government habit of payment of wages in arrear. The Government's attitude towards social unrest is of a ruthlessly suppressive character. Strikers have on occasions been publicly flogged, and in one instance it is known that the death penalty was threatened.

33. At the other extreme, Ibn Saud has distributed largess to the bedouin of the Nejd with prodigal munificence. Although this charitable action has undoubtedly served to maintain internal order and security during difficult phases in the war years, its principal effect has been to pauperize the recipients, who have left their tribal areas in order to encamp themselves at Riyadh as Ibn Saud's poor relations.

34. Inflation has also served to create a large, and in the main objectionable, class of *nouveaux riches* in commercial and official circles. They view the future with

justifiable anxiety, but in many cases they have taken the precaution of investing large nest-eggs abroad—a consideration of some importance in relation to any study of Saudi Arabia's foreign exchange resources.

Appendices

A.—United Kingdom Exports to Saudi Arabia

Year	£
1937	89,980
1938	97,968
1939	104,660
First quarter, 1946	50,381
Second quarter, 1946	92,913
Third quarter, 1946	198,516

Imports from Saudi Arabia

Year	£
1937	58,397
1938	28,629
1939	23,241
First quarter, 1946	6
2nd quarter, 1946	4,344
Third quarter, 1946	22,172

These figures were supplied by the Statistics Division of the Board of Trade.

B. The following information respecting imports cleared through the Customs at Jedda during the year 1946 was received from the United States Legation, which had in turn procured them unofficially through a relative of the Director of Customs in their employ. Their value is dubious:—

Commodity	Kilog.	Number of cases, crates or sacks
Wheat	12,772,200	182,460
Sugar	5,118,955	60,223
Flour	3,655,742	55,080
Rice	2,218,429	46,216
Millet	407,671	3,169
Oranges	255,560	6,389
Sorghum	238,631	2,065
Dates	166,805	3,524
Lentils	247,908	2,304
Tea	165,230	5,000
Cooking oils	85,700	2,516
Onions	55,620	1,236
Tyres	356,306	6,433
Tubes	31,252	585

Commodity	Number
Automobiles	462
Batteries	2,419
Radios	109

HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA, 1947

Mr. Clarke to Mr. Bevin. (Received 9th July)

(No. 98. Confidential)

Sir, *Jedda, 1st July, 1947*
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

I have, &c.
GUY H. CLARKE.

Enclosure in No. 6

*Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda, 1947***Egypt**

After serious ulcer trouble, Awad el Bahrawi Bey left Jedda on a stretcher on 7th March, 1947, and he has now been appointed to a post in the Egyptian Foreign Office. During his prolonged absences, the legation has been in the charge of Ahmed Gabr Bey, a former consul in Bombay, who, in his turn, was invalidated back to Cairo in May, suffering from high blood-pressure.

It has been announced in Cairo that the new minister is to be Mohammed Taher el Emari Bey, but he has not yet arrived in Jedda.

France

M. Saadeddine Bencheneb presented his letters as French Minister on 19th April, 1947, in succession to M. Max Rageot, who left Jedda on 5th April on retirement from the French diplomatic service.

M. Bencheneb is an Algerian Moslem born in Algiers in 1907, the son of the late Mohammed Bencheneb, a noted Arabic philologist. He himself has taught Latin and Greek and has been professor of Arabic literature at Algiers University. He reads and writes German, and possesses perfect French.

He promises to be an understanding and pleasant colleague. His wife, who is of a Marabout family of Shereefian stock, expects to join him in the winter, with numerous children.

He is also accredited to the Yemen, and left Jedda to present his letters to the Imam on 5th June, 1947.

Iraq

The Iraqi Legation in Jedda has been without a minister since the last report was written, and has been in the charge of Sayed Sami el Sakkar since March 1946.

Sayed Sami el Sakkar, who was formerly vice-consul at Jerusalem, is a graduate of the American University at Beirut. He is about 27 years old and speaks fluent English. He is an incorrigible snooper.

Netherlands

Dr. H. Dingemans presented his letters on 5th December, 1945.

Dr. Dingemans was serving in Jedda at the outbreak of the war, when he adopted so rigid an attitude of neutrality as to invite suspicion of a pro-German bias. He was, however, on leave at the time of the German occupation of Holland and remained there until his country's liberation. His experiences have effectively removed any tendency towards Nazi sympathies which he may once have had, and he and his wife, though somewhat stiffly starched, do their best to be co-operative.

He visited Aden and the Hadhramaut, which has a traditionally close connexion with the Netherlands East Indies, for three weeks in March-April 1947.

He is presumably the last Dutch representative in Jedda, since the post will probably be filled by an Indonesian in due course.

Syria

Haidar Mardam Bey (Syrian Personalities No. 95) presented his letters as Syrian Minister on 25th May, 1947.

He brings with him a history of administrative appointments and a welcome intention of practical activity—*e.g.*, in the organisation of the Syrian pilgrimage. He speaks adequate French.

Turkey

M. Rifki Refik Pasin presented credentials as Turkish Chargé d'Affaires on 17th February, 1947. He was formerly consul-general in Beirut.

He and his charming little wife are a welcome addition to local society, for they have inner resources of culture and humour which contrast with the "veulerie" of most Levantine diplomatists in Jedda. Their son, now at Istanbul University, was at a preparatory school in England. Both M. and Mme. Pasin speak French and English.

United States

Mr. James Rives Childs presented his letters as United States Minister on 29th June, 1946.

He was formerly in charge of the United States Legation in Tangier, from 1941, where his relations with His Majesty's representative seem to have been good, with occasional bad patches. He was secretary in Cairo between 1930 and 1933, and was then something of a "fellow-traveller" and had written, under a *nom de plume*, an autobiography of pinkish colour. It has been learned confidentially that his pro-Russian proclivities prevented his appointment as minister in Bagdad in 1945. He is an expert breaker of cyphers and was employed in the United States Government's "Black Office" during the first world war.

He has shown himself to be a friendly and co-operative colleague, but seems to lack the devotion of either his staff or his rapidly growing colony.

He visited Sanaa in October 1946 and presented his letters as the first United States Minister to the Yemen. He has remained in fairly close contact with Seif-ul-Islam Abdullah ever since.

He is physically unimpressive, with a consequential tendency to pomposity, but fundamentally good-hearted. He has a remarkable collection of XVIIIth century French literature, and contemplates a monograph on the libertine writers of that period. He has also written a book about American, British and French Foreign Office organisation.

His wife, a White Russian lady, is very pleasant and intelligent, but cannot stand Jedda heat. Her mother, who spent some part of the winter in Jedda, has to be seen to be believed.

Representatives Accredited also to Other Governments**China**

There is no Chinese diplomatic representative to Saudi Arabia, but the Chinese Government maintain a permanent office building in Jedda. It is open only during the Pilgrimage Season, when Mr. S. M. Wang habitually comes down from Cairo to take charge as vice-consul. He is a pleasant colleague, who includes English and Arabic among the many languages with which he is familiar.

Lebanon

Sami al Khoury, Lebanese Minister to Egypt, presented his letters as Lebanese Minister to Saudi Arabia on 11th March, 1946, and left almost immediately for Cairo. The legation was for long in the charge of a portly young Effendi, Assad el Assad, but following another fleeting visit by the minister in February 1947, Assad Bey went on vacation, leaving Salah el Munzer Bey, a Christian, in temporary charge. Assad Bey failed to return at

ARABIA: AUDIENCE WITH KING IBN SAUD

Mr. Clarke to Mr. Bevin. (Received 19th September)

(No. 129)

Sir, *Jedda, 15th September, 1947*

In the course of my audiences with King Ibn Saud at Hofuf on 11th and 12th September, upon which I have reported elsewhere, His Majesty, after stating that he continued to place his confidence in His Majesty's Government because he was convinced that Great Britain, and Great Britain alone, had the interests of the Arab peoples at heart, referred briefly to his relations with the other leading nations of the world. Of the United States King Ibn Saud said that his relations were based upon financial considerations and the development of his country. Since the Americans had come to Saudi Arabia, he said, he had never heard a single word spoken by them against Great Britain, and

this fact had made him realise the close and cordial relations between the two countries.

2. Of the Soviet Union King Ibn Saud said that he had been approached on three occasions to receive a Soviet diplomatic mission in Jedda. Though he wished to have friendly relations with all other countries, he said that he had rejected these approaches because he would rather die than receive a Soviet representative in his country.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Moscow and to the British Middle East Office, Cairo.

I have, &c.

GUY H. CLARKE.

SAUDI ARABIA: PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS BY HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 10th December)

(No. 167)

Sir, *Jedda, 30th November, 1947*

In continuation of my telegram No. 386 of 27th November, 1947, I have the honour to submit the following account of the presentation of my Letters of Credence as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz ibn Abdarrahan al Faisal al Saud at Riyadh on 24th November, 1947.

2. I had arrived at this post on 31st October but my Letters of Credence were delayed and did not reach here till 20th November. During the interval two members of the Diplomatic Corps had presented their Letters to the Amir Saud, who was in the Hejaz: he is, of course, the eldest son of the King, but he does not appear to have been appointed either Viceroy or Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs: the Ministry, however, explained that His Royal

Highness was representing his father in accordance with the latter's wish that his son should begin to take over various royal duties. At the suggestion of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs I called on the Amir in a private capacity before my Letters arrived, but when they came I asked the Ministry to arrange that I should go to Riyadh, on the grounds that the first presentation of an ambassador's Letters ought to be done with a strict adherence to the usual diplomatic rules.

3. An aeroplane was provided for me on the morning of 24th November, and I took with me Mr. Philip Adams, second secretary, and Mr. Gerald Fleming Rodgers, second secretary. The Amir Abdullah al-Faisal, son of the Minister for Foreign Affairs (now in the United States), accompanied me, together with a few other officials and an escort of soldiers. After

a somewhat stormy flight, largely through rain-clouds, we arrived at the Riyadh aerodrome about 11 a.m., some three hours after we had left Jedda. A large concourse of officials was waiting to greet the aeroplane, among whom were Fuad Bey Hamza, Shaikh Ibrahim Muammar (previously Qaim-Maqam of Jedda), and Rushdi Malhas. As there was just time for us to salute His Majesty before he retired from his public audience-hall for lunch we were hurried to the Murabba' Palace and ushered into the royal presence forthwith. His Majesty received us very kindly, standing up to return my bow with a salute, and at once asked me to sit down beside him and have a talk. In reply to my enquiry he said he was feeling very well indeed, the only thing troubling him being his knees, which were not what they once were owing to rheumatism and an old wound. He asked me when I wished to present my Letters, and readily assented to receive them that afternoon at 4.30 p.m.

4. We then took our leave and were driven to the Badi'a Palace, which lies some distance away on the other side of a watercourse named the Wadi Hanifeh. I arranged various small details with Fuad Bey Hamza and Rushdi Malhas, handing to them a copy of the small speech which I had prepared in English and Arabic. Having put on our uniforms, we were taken back to the Murabba' Palace with an escort at 4 p.m. His Majesty received me in the same place as before, and as before motioned me to sit by his side as soon as he had acknowledged our salutes and shaken hands. I handed to him the two Letters, and with his permission stood up to deliver my speech in Arabic: I had not been able to learn it by heart, but read it out from a typed copy. His Majesty listened carefully and at the end said he had been very pleased to hear my remarks: he quite agreed that the occasion was unique and it was a source of much pleasure to greet his first ambassador, who would, he was sure, continue in the same path of friendship which other British officials had always taken, so that the guiding principle of his life, friendship and sincerity with the British, would always be observed. The rest of his conversation was mostly concerned with trivialities: he asked after various old friends in England, invited me to dinner on the next evening, observed that as my white uniform looked rather cold he would send me a suit of Arab clothes, and congratulated me on being clever enough to bring the first rain of the season with me, a very good omen indeed.

5. On the following day we were bidden to the royal presence at 10.30 a.m. but found a little difficulty in reaching that place as the dry watercourse, owing to the rain of good omen, had become a considerable river during the night. The conversation of that audience was concerned with a long statement of His Majesty's grievance against the Hashimite family, as I have already reported separately. I will only mention here the following few points which may have some general interest: he was evidently very put out about the flight from Riyadh of two young Shaikhs of the Ibn Rashid family as a result of which he was having trouble with the Shammar tribe: he had made up his mind that British policy towards him had changed slightly some two years ago (he was probably referring to the independence of Transjordan): he was careful to mention that he had imprisoned the Iraqi rebel Rashid Ali Gailani, placing him under a guard of soldiers: and he said how sorry he was that things had gone wrong in India. He said he had advised the Indian Moslems not to try to get rid of the British all at once, but they had not listened to him, and "now things are very bad for them but not bad for you."

6. On that evening we were bidden to a banquet at the Palace, beginning at 6 p.m. A most bounteous spread of food covered a very long table, including a series of huge dishes each bearing not only a complete cooked sheep but also pieces of camel-meat. His Majesty at the head of the table had Abdur-Rahman Azzam Pasha on his left and me on his right, and throughout the meal he was in excellent spirits. He asked me whether I liked camel and, on hearing that I had never tasted it, he ordered a large piece to be placed before me and advised me what were the best parts of that animal to eat. He half apologised for not being used to knives and forks and recommended me to try a bowl of tamarind soup, into which he kept dipping pieces of bread and then putting them into his mouth. He commiserated with Azzam Pasha for having no wife, saying that that was indeed a trying state of affairs: and then he gave me a detailed description of several peculiar habits of his friend Philby, who, for instance, never would sleep in a bed and seemed to like making himself uncomfortable. His Majesty soon rose from table and took us into the audience chamber once more, leaving the mountainous stores of food for the swarms of servants and soldiers, and after them perhaps most of

the population of his capital, to devour. Toothpicks were then brought to His Majesty, who passed several on to me saying that it was a very good rule to use them after every meal: on hearing that I had some false teeth he expressed some concern and thanked God that he had never had false teeth yet. Two kinds of scent were then brought in and His Majesty honoured me by anointing my palms with the scent three times. The King then made an Arabic joke about scent, the point of which was a play on words between "scent" and "ladies": this with a sly look at Azzam Pasha; and he went on to say that he was proud of resembling his own prophet Muhammad, who, according to well-established tradition, liked three things—prayer, scent and women. Censers containing burning wood of an aromatic odour were then brought in for us to inhale, and soon afterwards His Majesty dismissed us and we were home soon after 7.15 p.m. We travelled back to Jedda by aeroplane the next morning.

7. I had heard a great deal about the rheumatism and the alleged senility of the King before I went to see him. But to my great relief I saw no sign of anything wrong with him except the weakness in his knees. He seemed to me to be every bit as alert and as intelligent as he was when I last saw him in 1940. He was clearly extremely irritated by the flight of the two young men referred to above, and that had brought out all the hatred for his family enemies which is always smouldering in his heart. But I feel sure that his control over his kingdom is just as complete and his judgment and quickness of decision just as good as they ever were in the past, and he has certainly lost nothing of that charm and dignified simplicity which all who know him well have recorded. In accordance with custom, he sent Rushdi Malhas to us with several presents: I was given, in addition to the suit of Arab clothes, a scimitar with gold filigree-work on the scabbard, and a small carpet: Mr. Adams and Mr. Rodgers each received a suit of clothes and a gold watch inscribed with the King's name.

8. I enclose herewith a copy of the English text of my speech.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus and Amman, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 8

Speech to King Ibn Saud on presenting Letters as Ambassador

Your Majesty,

I have the honour to present to Your Majesty two letters from my August Sovereign King George the Sixth, the first recalling my predecessor Sir Laurence Barton Graftey-Smith, and the second accrediting me to Your Majesty in his place, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

2. I am privileged to take this happy opportunity of conveying to Your Majesty the expression of His Britannic Majesty's sincere good wishes for the prosperity and well-being of Your Majesty, and of Your Majesty's family and people. I am particularly happy to be able to point out that this occasion is unique, in that it is the first occasion on which an Ambassador has been accredited to Your Majesty: an event which is, I think, appropriate from three points of view. First, it expresses the closeness and friendliness of the relations which have always existed between our two Governments. Second, it is appropriate to Your Majesty's exalted position among the Arab peoples. Third, the dominions of Your Majesty include the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, to which large numbers of pilgrims of British status resort every year as a religious duty.

3. As for myself, it is with the greatest personal happiness that I enter upon my mission, and I beg Your Majesty to be assured that I shall do all in my power to maintain and strengthen the mutual friendship which links Your Majesty's dominions with those of my August Sovereign.

JEDDA WATER SUPPLY

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 11th December)

(No. 166)
Sir,

Jedda, 23rd November, 1947

I have the honour to report that the pipe-line which has been installed to bring fresh water to Jedda from springs 40 miles away in Wadi Fatma was inaugurated with appropriate ceremony by His Royal Highness the Amir Saud on 18th November.

2. This occasion marked the successful completion of the first part of a scheme which provides for the eventual supply of fresh water not only to Jedda itself but to the villages which surround it; and it is gratifying to report that the undertaking has so far been entrusted in its entirety to a British firm of water engineers, Messrs. Balfour Brothers, who are locally represented by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Saudi Arabia) (Limited), and only British materials have been used. Despite considerable difficulties both in England, in arranging for the supply and delivery of the asbestos-cement pipes and other equipment required, and also locally, in translating plans into achievements with, for the most part, only local unskilled labour and inexperienced administrative staff, the project has been carried out in a manner which reflects credit upon all the British firms and individuals concerned.

3. The arrival of natural fresh water in Jedda is indeed a historic event, for throughout its long history the town has had to rely upon a very meagre quantity of rainwater collected on the few rainy days each year and stored in underground reservoirs outside the town, a poor supply obtained from wells sunk at Waziriyah, some 10 kilom. outside the town, and, more recently, upon condensers which contrive to render sweet the waters of the Red Sea. At present the new pipe-line ends at a number of terminal points, whence it is distributed by donkey-cart, but it is hoped, finally, that the water will be piped direct to the majority of the houses.

4. Last Tuesday's ceremony took place at one of the terminal points, which is situated just outside the principal gate of the town and beside the barracks of the Jedda garrison. Large tents had been erected specially for the occasion: the guests were seated within them in a hollow rectangle, the Diplomatic Corps seated on the right of the Crown Prince and the remainder of the company, numbering several

hundred, on his left. As I have not yet presented my credentials I considered it inadvisable that I should be present at a formal ceremony of this kind, and the embassy was therefore represented officially by Mr. Clarke.

5. The proceedings, which were protracted—to the discomfort of those sitting in the stifling and airless heat of the tents—began with a recitation from the Quran. This was followed by a speech delivered by Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, Minister of Finance, in which he welcomed the Crown Prince, lauded his royal father for having graciously ordered that the water scheme should be put into execution, at His Majesty's personal expense, and paid tribute to Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. and to the British engineers who had carried out the scheme. His Excellency was followed by Sayed Saleh Gazzaz, deputy director of the Pilgrimage Administration, who repeated the sentiments expressed by the previous speaker and outlined a most impressive list of developments—some of them already achieved, but most still projected—which the Saudi Arabian Government have designed to make the performance of the pilgrimage to the holy cities of the Hejaz more comfortable for the many thousands of Moslems who each year come to this country for the purpose and to raise the standard of living of the local population. The plans apparently include those for the construction of a modern port at Jedda, asphalt roads between Jedda and Medina, and between Mecca, Muna and Arafat, public electricity services and hospitals in the principal towns and the provision of other services calculated particularly to be of assistance to pilgrims.

6. At the conclusion of this speech the Crown Prince, amid general applause, signed the instrument commemorating the completion of the present scheme, and, while the document was subsequently circulated for all the guests of honour to sign, further speeches were made which consisted, for the most part, of repeated eulogies of Ibn Saud and his family. The senior Arab member of the staff of the Jedda branch of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. spoke on behalf of the firm, and gave details of the length of the pipe-line, the manner of its

construction and so on. The speeches were made audible to a crowd several thousands strong which surrounded the tents by means of amplifier equipment which had been borrowed from the Indian Vice-Consul, to whom it was supplied by the Indian Government for addressing crowds of pilgrims, but they were interrupted from time to time as guns were fired in salute and as five Saudi Arabian Dakotas roared over at 400 feet, giving the citizens of Jedda what was probably their first sight of formation flying.

7. The speeches and a final Quran recitation over, the Crown Prince was escorted to the pipe-line terminal where he turned a silver tap and, amid cries of wild enthusiasm from the crowd, the water was seen to flow. His Royal Highness was evidently very pleased with the whole show, and is said himself to have tasted the water and to have pronounced it good.

8. Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. and their principals now hope that they will be entrusted with the execution on acceptable terms of the remaining stages in the execution of this vital scheme, and I shall make it my duty to give them such assistance in this as lies in my power. The total cost to date has been about £250,000 and the rest of the scheme is expected to cost at least a further £100,000.

9. According to local rumour the delighted inhabitants of Jedda have already compared Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey

and Co. with the famous and wealthy benefactor of pilgrims Queen Zobeida, consort of the Caliph Haroun el Rashid. She provided aqueducts and wells for pilgrims to Mecca and her name is constantly on pilgrims' lips for that reason. The single source from which the water is taken at present is about 65 kilom. from Jedda, but it is hoped to bring other sources, some more distant, under contribution when the scheme is fully operating. Possible complaints from local landowners who have hitherto been using those waters are being forestalled by the construction of a kind of weir which will divide the total water available into eight parts, only one part being taken by the pipe to Jedda. The water engineers draw attention to the curious fact that no one seems to know whence the water ultimately comes: all that is known is that it is brought by underground channels from a considerable distance. No one knows who built those channels, where they lie, or how it is that they do not silt—for unlike the *ganats* of Persia there are no lines of vertical wells which would enable men to inspect and clean out the underground bed from time to time.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office and to the Export Promotion Department, Board of Trade.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

ARAB DIFFERENCES: BRITISH POLICY

Ibn Saud's Concern and Request for Assistance

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 12th December)

(No. 171. Confidential) Jedda,
Sir, 4th December, 1947

On receipt of your despatch No. 150 of 11th October, 1947, Mr. Clarke, then chargé d'affaires, prepared for transmission to His Majesty, who was at Riyadh, a letter embodying the main points of that despatch. I have the honour to send as a first enclosure to this despatch a copy of that letter. Mr. Clarke felt that the subjects contained in paragraph 4 of that despatch were unfortunately not likely to appeal to the King, and that, in any case, if mentioned at all they might best be mentioned orally. That applied also to the last sentence of the preceding paragraph. In view of the King's attitude, as revealed later on in this despatch, I think that those

views were certainly correct, and I did not mention any of those points while at Riyadh on my recent visit.

8. Mr. Clarke's letter was handed in to Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, the senior official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. On reading it he seemed pleased with the second paragraph but doubtful of the Royal reactions to the third. The Shaikh seemed to think that the King would be reassured at our saying that the Trans-jordan forces were not meant to be used for anything except internal security or joint defence; and that he would be pained at the reference to Palestine. Yusuf Yasin made no comment on the complaint concerning the Arab League's action on the Egyptian question. In the event, however, the King's reaction was somewhat different.

3. As for the Arab support of the Egyptian case, it may be relevant to insert here the gist of a conversation which I recently had with the Syrian Minister here. Haidar Mardam said that the King had recently remarked to him that the Egyptians had done wrongly in irritating the British, with the result that an impasse had been reached, the only solution of which seemed to be the independence of the Sudan, the advisability of which was doubtful.

4. However that may be, the King said nothing to me at Riyadh about Palestine, nor about Egypt, nor about Greater Syria. I have already reported that Mr. Philby told me that the King really thought that it was a great pity that we were leaving Palestine at all, though he did not like to say so lest he might offend other Arab States. From my conversations with Azzam Pasha I gathered that the King had not been at all as forthcoming as the Pasha had hoped. Azzam Pasha said to me: "The King will help us"; "the King will pay his contribution"; "the Saudis will send a representative to our permanent military committee," but that was all.

5. His Majesty spoke to me, at great length, on one subject only—the Hashimites, their present attitude, and its implications. His Majesty's whole argument was based on his contention that we had helped the Hashimites more than him, and that we ought therefore to repair the omission and help him on the same scale as we had helped them. He regarded His Majesty's Government's present attitude as being one of complete neutrality in disputes between two Arab States, whereas he considered that he received a promise in Sir Percy Cox's time that we would control and guarantee the conduct of the Hashimites towards him. The immediate cause of His Majesty's evident irritation was the disappearance from Riyadh of two young Shaikhs of the Ibn Rashid family, a reference to which was made in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's despatch No. 148 of 28th October, and he attributed that entirely to the evil machinations of his traditional enemies. We must, I think, make allowances for Ibn Saud's strong reaction to this unexpected event which he said was causing great commotions among the powerful Shammar tribes, and he had not been in the least reassured by the reply of the Iraqi Government to his representations in the matter.

(¹) See p. 91, col. 1.

6. I have not yet been able to trace the record of the promises of Sir Percy Cox in the rather remote times to which His Majesty refers, nor to the personal insult which one of the letters from the Amir (now King) Abdullah is said to have contained; perhaps that rankles most. I will only comment on the proverb which the Royal memorandum contains. The Arab commentators on this well-known saying give the following explanation: "The phrase is used for one who is forced to do an unpleasant thing contrary to his will, and it was first said by a woman named Hadhám the daughter of Rayyan, who was awakened during the night by a frightened sand-grouse, and woke her father with those words, meaning that enemies were near; but the father took no notice and was defeated." The King's meaning here seems to be that His Majesty's Government, by supporting King Abdullah, have inadvertently woken up the sleeping sand-grouse of Greater Syria and of the Rashid family hostages, of which he, the King, was bound to take notice, though he did not wish to do so.

7. I transmit herein as a second enclosure a literal translation of the Royal memorandum, handed to me as I left Riyadh on 26th November, 1947, and shall be grateful to be informed in due course as to my reply. We must, of course, make due allowances for the irritation of the King at the unexpected developments in the Shammar tribes, and perhaps it is not necessary to take too seriously the request for further gifts from us; but it is clear that there is at present no hope whatever of the Saudi King settling his differences with the Hashimite family.

8. At first sight the King's long statement contains a manifest inconsistency. On the third page of the translation(¹) he expresses satisfaction that His Majesty's Government "would not take sides among the Arabs themselves," presumably because that enabled him to settle matters with the Hashimites in the Hejaz, and it will be remembered that he recently expressed to us his willingness to "settle matters" with King Abdullah if only it did not involve him in action conflicting with British interests. But at the top of the following page(²) he seems to complain that His Majesty's Government are now leaving the Arabs to "settle their own matters between themselves." He seems to mean that His Majesty's Government gave him a free hand in 1925 but are not doing so now. These long statements by the King seem

(²) See p. 91, col. 2.

to be dictated at great speed and to be taken down and sent off with little if any revision; the main point seems to be that as he is not allowed to touch the Hashimites, he wishes us at any rate to restrain them from touching him. Another very important point is the fact that no definite proof of Hashimite intrigues in this country is given. I was able to raise this point in one or two questions I put to the King at Riyadh; in reply he said that the names of the Hashimite emissaries who led astray the two young Rashid Shaikhs were well known and would be given to us; whenever I receive the names I will, of course, report them. The main point of the King's argument is that after being loyal to His Majesty's Government throughout his career, he now sees his bitterest enemies, whom he had himself driven out of Arabia, supported and aggrandised by the British until they have reached a position of power and influence in which they can and do threaten the security of Ibn Saud's position in his own country.

9. In view of the King's evident irritation and strength of feeling, I did not venture to allude to the many ways in which we had helped him in the past, and were still doing so. When Fuad Bey endeavoured to draw me, I merely said that the questions raised by the King's memorandum were complicated and the request which he made for help was new, and would have to be examined carefully by His Majesty's Government.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, and to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10

Mr. Clarke to King Ibn Saud

Your Majesty, *Jedda, 25th October, 1947*

I did not fail to communicate to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the views expressed to me by your Majesty when you graciously received me at Hasa last month on the subject of the Arab Legion and of the relations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Arab States.

The Secretary of State has given to this communication the careful consideration which His Majesty's Government always give to expressions of your Majesty's

views, and he is anxious to give to your Majesty the greatest possible measure of assurance that, so far as lies within their power, His Majesty's Government will never be a party to any action likely to disturb peaceful relations between the Arab States. His Majesty's Government did not supply war material or lend their military personnel to any Arab State with the idea that they should be used against any other Arab State, but only in order to contribute to the internal security of the State in question or to the joint defence of the whole area against any possible aggression from outside. His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that the military assistance which they have afforded to any Arab State is being used for any improper purpose. If they found evidence to this effect, they would naturally have to reconsider the grant of assistance to the State in question.

Your Majesty asked for a clear statement of the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Arab States and to the relations between those States, and I have been instructed to inform your Majesty that His Majesty's Government have been considerably disappointed that their efforts to promote Arab unity have led to nothing but the combination of the Arab States in supporting the Egyptian case against that of His Majesty's Government and to the adoption of an extremely critical attitude to His Majesty's Government in regard to Palestine. Nevertheless it is of course far from their thoughts to promote disunity in the Arab world, and it is always a source of grief to them when they see a quarrel between two of their loyal Arab friends. His Majesty's Government have no intention whatever of withdrawing from the Middle East. The stability of this area will always remain a major British interest and they will make full use of such influence as they have to ensure that stability is maintained.

Please accept &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10

(Copy in Translation)

Memorandum from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz al Saud, dated 12th Moharram, 1367 (23rd November, 1947). (Received at Jedda 26th November.)

We wish to express our pleasure at the decision of our friends the British Government agreeing to the raising of status of their diplomatic representatives in our two countries and appointing for the first time

an ambassador to our land. We consider that a proof of our firm friendship and a happy omen pointing towards the desire of the two countries for strengthening and consolidating their good relations.

2. And we also wish to record our pleasure at the statement of the British Government communicated to us in the memorandum of the Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah dated 25th October, 1947. We detected in it a desire to understand the real state of affairs as distinct from their outward appearance, and to express the British position in general in relation to us and to our neighbours. And we hope that behind that is what we ourselves always earnestly desire: that is, a complete mutual understanding. And we had been hoping that circumstances would not compel us to depart from our desire not to insist upon an examination of our mutual relations in all respects. But the Arab proverb says "if the sand-grouse had been left alone during the night it would not have woken up" and how can our opponents and the real opponents of the British Government leave us alone in peace, or wait for a better understanding between us and it? But we are always anxious to avoid prejudicing our friendship with what is agitating our mind, and to keep you informed of whatever happens to us which might affect our relations, and that is what induces us now to enter upon this matter and discuss it and refer it to the British Government.

3. The matter is—what the Ashraf (*i.e.*, the Hashimites) are, as usual, doing against us in the way of intrigues and in spreading the seeds of strife. The British Government well knows what they have been doing for a long time. And we, with God's help, are not alarmed by them and we do not give them greater attention than they deserve. Especially since we found, with growing confidence, that God helped us against them since first they attacked us with their forces in the Hejaz, their first place of refuge. But we were always of the opinion that the Ashraf were very far from the hearts of the inhabitants of the countries they were inhabiting, wherever they were and whithersoever they went; and nevertheless the Hejaz was their original home—but their family was always weak there, and their relations with the people were weak. And no doubt their position is the same in Iraq and in Transjordan. They are strangers in those two places, and their adoption of those countries ought not to make them consider themselves to belong to the people, or to represent them, or that the people obey

them or support them. The Arabs in Iraq or Transjordan are nearer to us in their ways of thought and in the hidden parts of their hearts than to the Ashraf. Experience has in truth shown on two occasions in Iraq the weakness of the ties binding the Ashraf and the people of Iraq. Nor have they been any luckier in Transjordan. But the silence of their people about them does not arise from any feeling of popularity or from their admiration of their deeds: but it is the silence of one who fears the power which supports the Ashraf, which infuses power into them, and puts weapons and money into their hands, so that the people are deterred from their real wishes. But we do not wish, by these words, to detract from the qualities of the Ashraf or to diminish their prestige, or to attribute to them what they do not possess. But we only state the plain truth, which facts have established and which circumstances confirm. Our only purpose is to establish a proof: though if the result might be to prejudice our relations with the Ashraf, or their relations with the Arabs, that would be a simple thing of no importance. But the question touches our relations with the British Government, and it is impossible that their intrigues should have any effect upon our firm friendship.

4. The intrigues of the Ashraf against us from the very beginning have been clear and obvious, and the British Government knows them, no doubt, from the reports of their past representatives in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. No doubt the British understand what efforts we have made to avoid a clash with the Ashraf. Whereas they, on the contrary, had tried their best to oppose us, in sending a force to Nejd and imprisoning my brother Sa'd by means of a trick. If it had not been for the revolt of the tribes with us and their opposition to the Ashraf the situation would have gone badly from that time. And the Ashraf tried all they could, since our agreement with the British Government through Sir Percy Cox, to spoil our good relations with every possible trick and intrigue, nor did they consider how damaging their policy was to the British Government in the Middle East. And we kept back [? imprisoned] Ibn Rashid from starting any serious movement which might be to the disadvantage of the British, just as we ordered our tribes and our subjects to co-operate with the Arab rebellion and to serve in it as if it had been our own rebellion. I can never forget the reply which Hussein gave to me when I applied to him for strengthening

co-operation between us in order to help the British in their war efforts in which they were then engaged against the Germans and the Turks. Hussein, moreover, wanted to avoid mentioning my name and therefore sent his reply addressed to the Saudi family, and accused me of being either drunk or insane. So I rose up against him and wrote to him: and when I found that the matter had gone beyond all limits I sought an interview with Sir Percy Cox and told him about the letter, adding that I proposed to make war on Hussein. But Cox told me that that would help the Germans and play their game. He said "O Ibn Saud, if you want to help *them*, make war on Hussein: but if you stand by your friendship with Britain, then Britain will help you in all that you want." I replied that I only wanted two things:

First, that Hussein should be prevented from claiming that he was King of the Arabs.

Second, if Hussein should attack us, that the British should leave us alone and not intervene in favour of either of the two sides. And the British promised us that they accepted both of the above-mentioned matters.

It is well known that that was followed by the establishment of two Governments for the Ashraf in Iraq and Transjordan. It is also well known that the Ashraf announced in the three places in which they were that they intended to expel me and to take from me all I had, except only Riyadh.

But God, blessed is He, thrust their falsehood down their throats and their weakness became evident to all, and the people in their countries, as well as their own family, cared not for them.

The events which followed that are well known. One of them was the attempt of Hussein to declare himself Caliph when the Turks had brought that office to an end. I then thought that the silence of the British Government and their not referring to me or asking my opinion meant that they had no objection to my settling matters with Hussein in the way which I had to take. So I sent a force of troops which put an end to the so-called strength of the Ashraf. The Sharif overcame me in Ukhaydir, and seized Ta'if. I feared that the British Government would intervene on behalf of Hussein. But their statement to us after our entry into the Hejaz that they would not take sides among the Arabs themselves, and that they would only take measures to protect their own subjects and their own interests—all that gave me confidence that the time

had come to settle accounts with the Ashraf in the Hejaz, and God on high gave me success, and the British Government were the first to recognise my sovereignty over that country.

But the Ashraf were uprooted from the Hejaz and never entered it save at one place. (?) And they stayed in Iraq and in Transjordan. Our trust, first in God and then in the British Government, was strong. More especially because when I argued with the British against Faisal's being declared King in Iraq and Abdullah's becoming Amir of Transjordan, the British messenger, Sir Percy Cox, and other British officials assured me, on the word of the British Government, and they would guarantee that they would not allow the Ashraf to take any action at all against us, and that they would watch carefully their actions and their deeds so that we should sustain no loss caused by them.

In spite of that those people have not stopped intriguing against me and opposing me for a single day. We are always confident that with God's help we can deal with them at any time. We nevertheless make it our practice never to have any dealings with them, in accordance with our friendship with the British and with a view to preventing all intrigues against them. We have already put up with a great deal of intrigue, relying on our engagements with the British. Nevertheless we feel, from our recent approaches to the British Government, that the latter have turned aside from the path which they used to take. It seems that they now take the line that the Arabs should settle their own matters between themselves, and that the British Government does not now wish to intervene in the Arabs' own affairs. And this new standpoint of the British, however much it may be strengthened by international safeguards which it says are strong, seems to us to involve danger for the relations between the Arabs themselves and them (the Ashrafs), and the British.

As we have said we place no great value on the Ashraf. In the first place they are weak in themselves. In the second place circumstances show that the people of their countries, who are Arabs like us, are not with them. But the support of the British and their protection, and their grants of weapons and money to them, that is what frightens us. In the same way we are frightened lest our dispute with them might affect the general political and military position of the British in the Middle East.

Recently some of the Ashráf have sent secret messengers to our country to play tricks with the minds of two young men of the house of Rashid. They deceived them with wiles and attracted them with inducements so that they went to Iraq. These two have no importance. The reason why we were looking after them just as we are looking after the rest of the Bani Rashid in Riyadh was in order to prevent certain ones of them from rebelling against certain others of them. But the only object of the Ashráf in seizing those two persons was to make use of them as stalking-horses for various evil persons of the tribes on our frontiers. We have informed the Government of Iraq that we attach no importance to the two persons mentioned, nor to their actions, but that we fear lest they may become the seeds of evil infection in our two countries, and we have reminded the Iraq Government of the provisions of our treaties and of the prerequisites of friendship and good neighbourliness. The answer of the Iraq Government arrived just at the time when we heard news which was quite contrary to what the letter promised. In fact we heard that the Iraqis had sent messengers to the Shammar tribe and had arranged that they should gather near the frontiers: and that the object of the Ashráf was to send the two young men of the Bani Rashid with weapons and money so as to start trouble and propaganda on the frontiers. We wished to report this to the British Government.

In truth I, thanks be to God, care not for either the Ashráf or the house of Rashid. He who helped me against them before will help me against them again. But I am anxious about my friendship with the British and I fear lest changing circumstances should introduce between us anything which might diminish my relations with them, and in consequence might confront the general situation in the Middle East with danger and perplexity. Therefore I deem it my right to approach the British in my quality as a friend, their first friend who has stood by them in all circumstances without changing and without equivocating. The British know my station in my own country, they know the strength of my army and the state of my kingdom, and they know that I am not like the Ashráf, a stranger in the land, of few friends and incapable of acting save with the help of others.

I have already reproached the British Government as a friend with helping the Ashráf with money and weapons while

they had not helped me in that way. The British Government have replied in the note referred to at the beginning of this memorandum that they did not give the weapons except for internal security and defence, and that they were not intended to be for use in attacking enemies, especially not between the Arabs themselves. But is a threat to my frontiers, and the spread of intrigues, to be reckoned as legitimate measures of defence?

I am a warm friend of the British. My position in relation to them has not changed. I think I am entitled to claim at least equal treatment with that granted to the Ashráf, and to ask that they should give me help and weapons similar to what they have given to them. I find myself compelled to make that request at this time when I see the British changing their former position, and at a time when the Ashráf are taking steps to gather together strangers to set alight the flames of ruin and intrigue.

So I had to explain this to my friends the British Government and to ask them to look upon my request with the eye of carefulness and favour. I have made clear to them what I am thinking, and they will excuse me if things have changed to something different from what had been anticipated. For I, in spite of the difficult position of the British, always regard them as responsible for the security of the Middle East. That was what induced me to join the international conferences, in the desire to take part in guarding the general security of this part of the world. And in the name of friendship, and in the name of our common interests, I see myself compelled to point out to the British that they have given a force to Iraq and Transjordan in order that they should help in preserving security and defending themselves against any other Power. Now if that force comes against me, then "there is no might and no power save in God." But if it is used against your enemies, then I will be one of those who fight side by side with you against your enemies, and I think the day will never come when the British will be content to reckon me among their enemies: nay, on the contrary, I am among her special friends. I will help every one who helps them and I will endeavour with all my forces to keep peace and security in these regions, which have a vital interest for them and for the whole of the Arabs.

I have explained what is in my mind, as a friend explains to his friend, and with the desire of peace and quietness, free from

intrigue and prejudice: for I cannot keep silence when the Ashráf raise the Bedaween to raise forays on the frontiers, to stop trade, and to threaten security. I cannot stand with my hands in my pockets.

The important point is that I must point out to the British my need to be supplied

with the same as the British supplied to Iraqi and to Transjordan, and I am confident that it is impossible for the British to grant preferential treatment to the Ashráf and to grant them forces which they will not grant to me.

E 11803/10169/25

No. 11

UNITY OF SAUDI ARABIA

Danger from the Hejaz Constitutional Party

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 13th December)

(No. 170)
Sir,

Jedda,
3rd December, 1947

In paragraph 5 of his despatch No. 130 of 15th September, Mr. Clarke referred to a booklet which had been shown to him by King Ibn Saud during his audience at Hofuf, and which the King described as an attempt to undermine his position among his people. The booklet was, I understand, entitled "The Hejaz Constitution" and apparently expressed the views of a hitherto unheard-of group known as the Hejaz Constitutional Party.

2. I now have the honour to inform you that His Royal Highness the Amir Saud recently delivered an address on this subject to an audience of Government officials, merchants, and other prominent persons assembled in the Palace at Mecca, and the speech was reported fully in the official journal *Umm-ul-Qura* of 14th November last. His Royal Highness referred to reports in "certain newspapers" on "what was called the Hejaz Constitution," and said that he had full confidence in the loyalty and affection of the people of the Hejaz for the Royal House. He stated that the Royal House had done much for the Hejaz: they realised that much remained to be done, but steady progress was being made. Their confidence in the people of the Hejaz was demonstrated by the employment of many Hejazis in important duties throughout the whole country. If there were any complaints of injustice, they wished them to be brought to their notice. His Royal Highness emphasised that the prosperity of the whole country depended upon the co-operation of all parts of it, and he reminded his audience that the Amirs Faisal and Mansur and the Minister of

Finance, who live in the Hejaz, were a channel of communication between its people and the administration at Riyadh. He concluded by stating his conviction that no Hejazi had any connexion with the booklet, and that it was a fabrication produced by malicious persons living outside the country.

3. The address of the Crown Prince reflects, of course, the view expressed to Mr. Clarke by King Ibn Saud that the booklet was an instance of the Hashimite propaganda and intrigues of which His Majesty so frequently complains. Unfortunately I have no copy of the booklet, nor have I seen any of the newspaper reports to which the Crown Prince referred. As there is no independent press in this country, the reports must clearly have been published in some other territory, and if any reference to the Hejaz Constitutional Party comes to the notice of any of His Majesty's representatives, I should be glad to hear of it.

4. The fact that such an address should be given at all, and that it should be published in the *Umm-ul-Qura*, shows clearly that King Ibn Saud is considerably exercised by the danger that propaganda from outside his frontiers might foment a separatist movement in the Hejaz which, though little likely to disturb the peace of Saudi Arabia during his lifetime, might prejudice the succession of the Crown Prince to a united country.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus and Amman and to the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

CHAPTER III—THE YEMEN

E 1248/166/91 No. 12

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Yemeni delegate to the Palestine Conference called on me to-day and brought a copy of a message from the Imam of the Yemen to The King, which he asked me to pass on to His Majesty. I agreed to pass it on to His Majesty on board ship.

2. Prince Abdullah then expressed the hope that I would take active steps to remove the differences existing between the Yemen and Great Britain. I asked him to name the differences.

3. With regard to the question of diplomatic relations, Prince Abdullah said that it was too early for a settlement and he was not pressing it. The main difficulty which he wished to bring to my attention was an alleged lack of co-operation between

the Aden authorities and the Yemen. First, as regards the frontiers, he said that in the Treaty the *status quo* had been maintained but we were continually infringing its terms. Secondly, we were using our position at Aden to encourage subversive movements in the Yemen, to their detriment. I asked His Royal Highness to let me have a detailed memorandum showing evidence of their grievances and in the meantime I promised to go into the matter with the Colonial Office as well as our own Department, and on receipt of his memorandum I would meet with him again to discuss it.

E. B.

Foreign Office,
7th February, 1947.